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Abstract: Ethics After the Genealogy of the Subject 

My dissertation examines Michel Foucault’s critique of the present, through his analysis of our hidden but still active historical legacies. His works from the Eighties are the beginning of what he called a “genealogy of the desiring subject,” in which he shows that practices such as confession—in its juridical, psychological, and religious forms—have largely dictated how we think about our ethical selves. This constrains our notions of ethics to legalistic forbidden/required dichotomies, and requires that we engage in a hermeneutics of the self which consistently fails to discover its imagined secret self, or to find the happiness and freedom promised by contemporary ethics. 
In order to think the modern self in different terms, Foucault’s later works analyzed Classical and Hellenistic ethical sources, emphasizing their distance from today. He hoped doing so would allow us to rethink our current assumptions about ethical matters, the truth of oneself, and the relation to others. 





At the most general level, this dissertation is a response to two intersecting questions. One is very broad: “How to live a better life?” One is fairly narrow: “How to best understand and most effectively use Michel Foucault’s works on ethical subjectivity?” In different forms, and with very different answers, we are always asking the first question. The second could only be asked at the moment of Foucault’s death, because the simultaneous publication of The History of Sexuality, Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure and of The History of Sexuality, Volume 3: The Care of the Self occurred in the same year as Foucault’s passing (1984). Since these works occur at the end of Foucault’s life, were separated by 6 years from his prior book (The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction), and differ greatly in many ways from his other works, Volumes 2 and 3 are often referred to as “the later works” of Foucault. 
The two questions intersect in multiple ways. First, although his later works cover much more than just “morality” (in the sense of a code of right and wrong), the texts which Foucault researched for these books were mostly practical ethical works, covering questions about how to best live one’s life. Second, Foucault’s works help their readers get free of certain “dangers” of contemporary life, which is one possible way to make our own lives better. We might say that many of Foucault’s works have a broadly ethical function (in the sense of helping us to “live better lives”), though he uses the term “ethics” in a specific and technical sense in his later works. This more detailed sense of ethics which the later works embody will be detailed below; for now, what “ethical” means in terms of Foucault’s later works can be summarized as an analysis of what he calls “the relation of oneself to oneself” or “subjectivity.” 
Third, if Foucault’s works in general can help us live better, what specifically do the later works have to offer? How do they differ from Foucault’s other works, and to what extent? Should they be read as a rejection of previous texts such as Discipline and Punish, a continuation or supplement of the stated aims of the first volume of The History of Sexuality, or as revealing for the first time certain concepts which were nonetheless always implicit in his work? As will be shown below, The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self are particularly difficult texts to understand both in relation to Foucault’s work generally, and in terms of their potential to help us change the ways in which we live. For now, I will just state that the questions about how to live better and about the content of these later works coincide because we must know how those works function in detail before we can effectively put them to any possible attempt to live better lives. 
Chapter 1 Summary- What Genealogy Is, and Why It Is Not Enough: Historical Description Without Prescription
Foucault clearly attempted to prompt some sort of change through his writing. However, readers of the entire range of his works struggle with interpreting exactly what changes he sought and with how successful his works might be at effecting change. Most of his readers hope for some sort of critical apparatus as well as tactical advice from his works.​[1]​ However, Foucault was notoriously cagey about what he wanted his works to accomplish and how to mobilize them: this is a difficulty throughout his work, from History of Madness to his last interviews. Reader reactions to Foucault often mix intense hope that these texts will prompt significant changes, with confusion about exactly where to look in the texts for guidance. 
However, the later works double the hope and the confusion. First, Foucault no longer talks about the ways in which we are enmeshed in power-relations, which inspires further hope in some readers that there might be greater flexibility and potential for change in the domain of “ethical subjectivity.” Second, The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self are so different from other works by Foucault that one hardly knows what to make of them—and the increased confusion they thus inspire is often found in the same reader in whom they caused increased hope. In these later works, Foucault covers Classical Greek and Hellenistic Roman ethics, eras which he had scarcely mentioned in prior publications. Additionally, his death prevented him from discussing them after their publication, and of course we have no books written after which might shine additional light upon The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self.​[2]​ With these works, the mixture of hope and confusion which attended Foucault’s writing reached a sort of crescendo. However, with the passage of years, other works being translated and subsequently studied, additional quality Foucault scholarship being published, and the release of almost all of Foucault’s yearly book-length lectures from the Collège de France, the time is ripe to clarify exactly what Foucault’s later works are capable of, to discover which ways of reading take full advantage of what these texts offer, to put them to work in pursuit of living better today.
As I explain in the first chapter, I think Foucault can be very useful for living better today, but that he is most useful if understood and read in specific ways. I think Foucault’s historical method, which he calls “genealogy,” shows us the historical formations which currently shape our lives, or what he calls a “history of the present.” His work reveals that much of what we take for granted (about who we truly are and what we should strive for) are inventions of a recent date which can have unsavory implications. However, Foucault also tells us that, as these ways of life were made, they can be unmade. Foucault’s genealogical approach is useful for diagnosing what we are today, and for giving readers the hope that they can be changed significantly, since they are not a permanent part of human nature. 
However, as I will argue, Foucault’s texts have to be read as describing our historical constitution, without prescribing how we should become constituted instead. That is, Foucault diagnoses our contemporary ills but does not himself recommend a cure, not even implicitly. (On this significant interpretative issue, I am in disagreement with many Foucault scholars, as I discuss in the Chapter 3.) Far from being a failure on Foucault’s part, the silence he maintained regarding solutions allows his readers to experimentally fashion their own ways of living. While he loosened the hold of the past over us in the present, he left us to make experiments for our own futures. Instead of a ready-made, one-size-fits-all answer dictated from his position of authority, Foucault left us room to experimentally replace elements of our subjectivity. 
Briefly, the main reasons why I think that Foucault limits himself to description are these. First, Foucault thinks that the history which shapes us is largely a product of chance rather than destiny. Therefore, how we live currently does not have any necessary correlation to how we should live instead, because there is no unfolding logic of history from which we can deduce the path of progress nor predict the next necessary “stage.” Second, though Foucault is highly critical of certain aspects of contemporary life, he makes it clear that his objects of criticism are not pure evils from which we ought to be liberated. We misunderstand Foucault if we think that because he genealogically diagnosed object “X,” that he thus implicitly prescribes “not-X.” We cannot simply flee, destroy, reverse, or otherwise be liberated from that which we wish to change. 
Third, Foucault’s explanation of his genealogical critique has two moments: description and prescription, or understanding and transformation, as alluded to above. His texts take us through the first, which is indispensable for the second. However, since he left the second prescriptive moment to us, we must go beyond his descriptions if we want to make his works as effective as they can be. After (Foucault’s) diagnosis of the present limits, there should follow an experiment (of our own) with going beyond them. Fourth, each reader inevitably brings her own perspective, problems, and preferences to bear on the histories Foucault gives us. Multiple prescriptions will arise from out of different readers’ interactions with the text, and neither could nor should be dictated solely from the text alone.
The arguments above are drawn primarily from “What is Enlightenment?” and “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” where Foucault outlines his general methodology of genealogical critique. I also marshal evidence from the books The Order of Things, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, and The Care of the Self, as examples of the enactment of said method. In these central books from throughout Foucault’s career, I show that Foucault again and again stops short of recommending a response or prescribing what we should do. In hundreds of pages, we find long passages of uninterrupted historical description, but only the rarest of fragments resembling prescriptions. A close look at those passages reveals that quasi-prescriptive passages are typically framed hypothetically or as questions. Foucault calls readers to imagine their own futures rather than dictating what tactics to pursue here and now. His readers are thus left with the task of going beyond what they have just read.
Various interviews support the same interpretation. In multiple interviews, Foucault explicitly tells his interviewers that he will not predict the future, will not tell his readers what they should pursue, and will not foist his preferences on others as if he alone possessed a universal “Ought.” When he does occasionally put forth a tactic, he often points to what others have done, or posits it as one of multiple that could be tried (rather than the sole legitimate answer crafted by himself). Additionally, his language follows the split I have proposed between Foucault’s diagnoses of our present limitations, on the one hand, and his readers’ experiments with going beyond him, on the other. Often, Foucault links historical description, “I,” and his existing texts as one grouping, and as another grouping he links the future, “we,” and new practices.
But if methodological pieces, interviews, and multiple books all support my claim that Foucault limits himself to description and refuses to prescribe answers, then could it be that his texts are useless? It would be a shame if we were either reduced to flâneurs, strolling idly and gazing bemusedly at windows stuffed with historical curiosities, or left shaking our fist impotently at imperfections that Foucault indicates but cannot help us solve. This is not the case, however. Foucault’s works have great potential to aid all manner of attempts to change the way we live. However, Foucault’s works are less effective precisely to the extent that we expect them to hand us an answer from on high. We—and I include myself here—have already expended so much precious energy on finding and deciphering the rare passages where Foucault seems to perhaps have let slip an implicit prescription. But the texts become more effective if we read them in full knowledge that we must go beyond them. Then, after having absorbed detailed descriptions of how we came to be built this way, plenty of energy will remain for the difficult task of inventing our own new practices to counter and unmake what we currently are. 
Chapter 2 Summary- My Objections to Secondary Literature’s Prescriptive Responses 
I am of course not the only reader of Foucault who feels hopeful that his works can be put to effective use and then makes a case for how to do so. That is, much of the scholarship on Foucault attempts to elaborate what I have called prescriptions, solutions, or experiments. However, all the solutions with which I am familiar leave me dissatisfied in certain respects, despite having much else to offer. While it is difficult to summarize so many different approaches, here are the main ways in which I disagree with the solutions put forth by readers of Foucault’s works on ethical subjectivity. In general, let me note that most of the following seek a prescriptive answer from within Foucault. While I already noted that my interpretative approach to Foucault wants to go beyond him, the issues summarized below are not at the level of that reading strategy. I criticize them for the results they present, independent of whether those results were drawn from inside of or produced beyond Foucault. 
Some solutions offered are overly broad. These are not wrong, but they are incomplete: they offer inspiring Foucauldian calls to “think differently,” “get free of oneself,” to “free thought from what it silently thinks,” without offering concrete proposals or plans of attack.​[3]​ Similarly, to say that we should strive for “freedom” seems to praise change for its own sake while asking for no change in particular. Both run the risk of being tautological, for critique already shows that we are a certain way yet need not continue to be so. Thus, “thinking otherwise” adds nothing since it merely says that if critique has described something as undesirable, the solution is to be other than undesirable. 
Foucault’s comments on an “aesthetics of existence,” as seen primarily in Ancient ethics, are often prescribed as a model which avoids the diagnosed dangers of today. One issue with such an approach is rather technical, following the details of Foucault’s discussion of ethical subjectivity, detailed below. However, in short, I will say that an “aesthetics of existence” cannot itself be a specific form of subjectivity according to how Foucault used the terms. In his technical usage, “aesthetics of existence” can be one element or part within an ethical form, but cannot define a whole ethics by itself. Additionally, those ethics which Foucault called aesthetical have so little in common—such as a 19th century dandy and an austere Ancient Greek—that one cannot recommend or prescribe them all at the same time. Even ignoring other differences, the ways in which these are “aesthetic” differ greatly. Thus, “aesthetics of existence” is neither an ethics itself nor a category which includes basically similar forms of ethics. This approach thus does rather too little (taking one small aspect of ethics, say, having a goal of “living a beautiful life,” as if it were a whole form of life) and rather too much (recommending in one breath various ethics which are so different as to be incompatible) at the same time.
 The next general objection I have to existing solutions offered is that they are not prescriptions for how to change the subjects which we are today. Briefly, let me note that many scholars agree on a rough periodization of Foucault: his early works typically performed an archaeology of knowledges (The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, and The Archaeology of Knowledge), his middle works performed a genealogy of relations of power (Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1), and his later works analyzed ethical subjectivity (The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self). Each of these periods relates to the others, but none of their objects can be reduced to another. For instance, power and knowledge intersect in important ways, but power does not simply produce knowledge, nor does possessing more knowledge mean that one is more resistant to power. 
The same basic relation holds for ethics and power-relations: ethics is neither the product of nor fundamentally opposed to power. Foucault analyzed various ways in which specific forms of power have contested, assisted, and otherwise interacted with specific forms of subjectivity. In some instances, power and ethics have reinforced each other, while at other times power was made to shift because of mutations in ethical self-relation. There is no permanently established relation of power and subjectivity, despite the insistence of much secondary literature that power either directly forms the subject as a derivative of its own workings or that the subject is resistance to power as such. There are two fundamental points I mean to establish here. First, there is a specificity to subjectivity which cannot be reduced to the content of Foucault’s prior work. Second, ethics cannot be defined as resistance to power. While it is certainly “good” to oppose certain forms of power, “ethics” in Foucault means something rather more precise than “good.” Thus, I cannot accept any attempted prescriptions for ethical subjectivity which are identified entirely with resisting power-relations. While tactics of resisting power may provide answers to questions Foucault raised regarding power-relations, they are not answers to the specific questions posed by Foucault in The Use of Pleasure and the Care of the Self. 
In a related objection, such prescriptions not only conflate different domains, but also demonize various relations of power as if all were simply evil, repressive, and dominating. While Foucault surely described power-relations so that we could adjust them where we saw fit, it is a common misreading of him to think that power is bad as such. Relations of power let die, categorize delinquents, and punish. However, they also teach skills and organize groups. In any case, that there will be some manner of power-relations is a fundamental and ineradicable feature of human experience. Such readings confuse Foucault’s technical sense of ethics (as self-relation) with an everyday sense of ethics as “being good,” and having mistaken power for evil, reduce subjectivity to an eternal battle of good versus evil. However, ethical subjectivity and relations of power are equally fundamental for Foucault, and so ethics can never be understood as the absence of power. 
I also object to those prescriptions which are formulated by direct reference to the life of Foucault. If the books of Foucault successfully analyzed the problems, the reasoning goes, then the life of the man Michel must contain the solutions. The frequency of this general approach is astounding if we recall Foucault’s repeated deflections of personal questions, his silence on the personal lives of the authors which he discussed, his emphasis on historical explanation rather than psychological or biographical data, and his skepticism toward what he called the “author function.” Within a Foucauldian framework, in addition to the standard risk of founding a cult of personality, these specific issues prevent us from relying too much on his personal life. Additionally, it is not clear how we could practically put some of the anecdotes about Foucault’s life to use, or how they would counter the specifics of the selves we are today. If Foucault took LSD in Death Valley, how am I supposed to change my life in response if, for instance, I am nowhere near the desert, or do not want to take LSD? There are ways to take inspiration from Foucault’s life if one is very savvy about it, which certain authors are. However, the inspiration they took still had to be transformed into practices or into a specific mode of life, which is always beyond what was found in either the texts or the life of Michel.
Chapter 3 Summary- Transition to Later Works: What Subjectivity Is, and Why It Was Not Present Earlier
To avoid these kinds of risks from the start, I propose a certain style of reading Foucault and his later works specifically. Instead of reading the later works as a continuation or as a reversal of other more widely-read works of Foucault’s, I attempt to treat The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self as autonomously as possible. Instead of using these texts to supplement, say, Discipline and Punish, they are read on their own terms, with a focus on their distinct methodology and content. Such a reading and research choice avoids the just-discussed problems that much of the literature stumbles on. Focus on the detailed content will avoid vague goals of “being otherwise,” understanding the relatively autonomous constitution of subjectivity avoids the risk of casting ethics as a derivative inversion of “repressive” power. Attention to the broad, impersonal historical nature of subjectivity will prevent us from fetishizing the personal life of Foucault.
One of the central ways by which I establish the relative autonomy of Foucault’s later works is by tracking the slow shifts of his research. Recently published lecture courses from the Collège de France establish which themes and texts guided his thinking from each year from 1970 to 1984.​[4]​ How Foucault moved from disciplinary power in barracks, prisons, and schools, toward the sexual relationships of the Ancients is complex. It can be summarized, however, as follows. Between the 1976 publication of the first volume of The History of Sexuality and the 1984 publication of the second and third volumes, there is neither a reversal nor a simple continuity. Instead, as the lectures show, each year his research moved from one connected topic to another, and in the span of years, he moved from the model of confession found in contemporary talk-therapy as a form of power, to mandatory confession in the Church as a form of power, to other forms of Church power which also required that subjects govern themselves, to earlier Christian forms by which a monk governed himself ethically, to Ancient forms of ethical self-relation found in Rome and Greece. 
This itinerary is complex, but even this brief sketch indicates that while Foucault’s later work differs from his prior work on “power-knowledge,” each new area of research formed a “hinge” with one prior, while also shifting in important respects. In short, Foucault went from a focus on power, to a focus on governmentality (as the overlap of power-relations and relation to the self, government of others involving government of the self), to a focus on a relation to the self with hardly any reference to power. Foucault disengaged from a nearly exclusive focus on power in order to gradually devote his attention to the realm of subjectivity, which, while linked in certain specific ways to power, can and should be studied relatively autonomously, according its own unique modes of operation. 
An under-appreciated methodological innovation of Foucault’s is crucial for understanding his works on ethical subjectivity, and therefore I present it in some detail. In explaining the changes in his aims and methods which gave birth to The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, Foucault outlines four aspects which he says are to be found in any ethical subjectivity. Not only does he explicitly declare their methodological import, he also uses them as the basic grid of intelligibility for both books. In brief, Foucault analyzes ethical subjectivity through four aspects: ethical substance, mode of subjection, practices of the self, and telos. For any given historical formation, he asks, what is the privileged object of ethical concern (ethical substance), in what way is one called to be ethical (mode of subjection), how does one prepare or practice to become better (practices of the self), and what is the ultimate goal achieved by a life well-lived (telos)? Despite the importance of these four aspects for subjectivity, many discussions of Foucault pay them only cursory attention. I highlight these four aspects, because if we are to change the contemporary form of self-relation which is prevalent today, we need to see in detail how it works in terms of these aspects. 
In order to show what constitutes the present relation to self, as well as what other relations to self are possible, Foucault analyzed Classical Greek and Hellenistic Roman ethics in The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self respectively. A close reading of these also reveals the basic outline of the subjectivity of early Christianity. I present these three ethics and contrast them to our own. Only a detailed presentation of the subtle  similarities of these ancients as well as their utter foreignness to ourselves can give us a full sense of what we are today and what we might become. In the concrete contrasts and connections established genealogically, Foucault shows us what we are, which parts of contemporary life have been contingently constructed and so could possibly change, and puts both in a radically new perspective which often makes a reader attempt to actualize changes. However, the cursory attention often given to this material is not sufficient to really learn what we are today, which no doubt contributes to the limitations of proposed solutions. If we are to go beyond Foucault’s diagnostic of the present moment by prescribing effective solutions, we have to first learn the details of his diagnosis.
Having been attentive to Foucault’s method of analyzing subjectivity, the method can be put to the test by analyzing our own subjectivity through this lens, as well as putting forth a solution of my own in these same terms. On the topic of contemporary subjectivity, which he called “desiring subjectivity,” Foucault gave us only scattered comments before his death. However, from what he did say as well as the implicit contrasts he draws between present and Ancient ethics, I have attempted to reconstruct the four aspects of today’s ethical self-relation. They seem to be our contemporary focus on the secret feelings of a deep self (as our ethical substance), a demand to discover one’s true authentic self (as the contemporary mode of subjection), the use of talk methods as practices of the self (that is, as askesis), and with a goal (or telos) of freeing or liberating oneself. 
By discussing our present form of subjectivity in terms of the four aspects, I hope to reveal the target of criticism in enough detail that we can more successfully undermine it. However, knowing how we are built today is simply a first step. The second step is to adopt another form of ethical subjectivity which will displace or counter that which we currently are. We cannot simply “opt out” of desiring subjectivity, any more than we can opt out of power-relations. Therefore, if we are to undermine that which constitutes our subjectivity, we must re-constitute ourselves through another form of ethics. The counter-subjectivity which best undermines desiring subjectivity is that of Spinoza.
Chapter 4 Summary- An Experimental Prescription: Spinozistic Ethics to Take Us Beyond Description
The use I am making of Spinoza is rather narrow. I make strategic use of a certain recent style of reading him, in order to make an intervention in a specific interpretative issue in Foucault, so that I may begin formulating a better way of life. My interpretative claim is that Foucault is most useful if we read his descriptions and then attempt an experiment which goes beyond him: Spinozistic subjectivity is the form of subjectivity which best counters the desiring subjects which Foucault has diagnosed us as and thus should be our way beyond his diagnosis. Spinoza is being made use of strategically, for a narrow goal, which is shaped by my interpretation of Foucault. I am not attempting to combine every aspect of their philosophy. I do not claim that one must know Spinoza in order to understand Foucault’s thought. I am not looking to Spinoza to supplement some shortcoming I see in Foucault.​[5]​ I am not claiming in principle that only Spinoza can counter desiring subjectivity, but instead claim that in actual existing forms of ethics and existing solutions offered by Foucauldians, none seem as well suited to the task as Spinoza. 
I acknowledge the seeming awkwardness of claiming that we can best go beyond Foucault by “going back” to Spinoza. In brief, I address those concerns in three ways. First, I read Spinoza through what is loosely referred to as “French Spinozism,” so the ethical subjectivity which I am discussing cannot straightforwardly by reduced to that of the seventeenth-century. Second, I note the ways in which Spinoza is “untimely,” specifically, falling out of step with Descartes and other contemporaries on a number of philosophical fundamentals. These two points combine in the claim that Spinoza is a privileged resource for critiquing the present moment (a use to which many French Spinozists put him). Third, Foucault himself on occasion turned to the past as models for how we could act now. While this does not mean that within Foucault, every past thinker is somehow retrievable, his explicit emulation of elements of Kant and Nietzsche (who are barely closer to us in time than Spinoza) show that it is possible to reactivate the past in order to modify the present. 
Having acknowledged those questions of historical methodology, I turn to sketching out the broad outlines of Spinoza’s philosophy which are most relevant to my aims. Spinoza shares with Foucault an approach which can be called non-humanist, which can be generalized as follows.​[6]​ Neither thinks of humans as if they were “a kingdom within a kingdom,” as Spinoza puts it.​[7]​ A person is not a sovereign individual opposed to the world, perfectly distinct from others, and autonomously directing his affairs. Foucault does not rely on choice or freedom to explain human action, and Spinoza denies free will emphatically. Where Foucault demonstrates the ways in which history constitutes us, Spinoza shows the way in which we are causally determined: both thinkers deny that there is an original, essential “me” preceding the ways in which I am constituted or determined to exist. They are both nominalists, especially about anything which might be called “human nature.” Under this admittedly general heading of “non-humanism,” we can see that relevant aspects of Spinoza fit well within the Foucauldian analysis of ethical subjectivity. I do not of course claim that everything about them would fit—for instance, their epistemologies clearly differ—but I do not need a perfect isomorphism to achieve my goal.
Chapter 5 Summary- Applying Foucault’s Four Aspects of Subjectivity to Spinoza
At a more detailed level, I explain Spinoza’s ethics through the four aspects outlined above. Doing so shows that Foucault’s ethical grid of intelligibility has explanatory power outside of his own application of it to the Ancients. It also draws attention to just those parts of Spinoza’s thought which will undermine the operation of each of the aspects of desiring subjectivity. In my analysis of Spinoza, I have determined that the ethical substance (that which counts as the prime matter of ethics) consists of the sad affects, the mode of subjection (the mode of the demand to be ethical) is the natural striving or conatus of each individual thing, the askeses or practices of the self (those ways of acting on oneself to improve oneself) are various concrete methods of joining and separating those mental images which affect us most intensely, and the telos (the goal of a unified way of life that living ethically achieves) is to become proportionally more powerful in the face of other causes or to increase our capacity for action. I think that this form of ethical subjectivity is achievable today (unlike any attempt to replicate the ethics of Classical Greece, for instance) and thus is suitable as a prescription for our present. Its non-humanist features would not be rejected by Foucault, and, as I will argue, provides the most effective foil to desiring subjectivity since Spinozist subjectivity counters it on all central points.
Chapter 6 Summary- Detailed Applications Within the Axis of Subjectivity Made Possible by Methodological Focus on Later Works
If we implement the ethics of Spinoza as described, it will significantly undermine the ways which desiring subjectivity constitutes us in the present moment. In response to the questions posed, the dangers criticized, and the descriptions given by Foucault, I have attempted to give answers, propose solutions, and fashion a prescription of my own. The next move we make has to have the power to work against what we currently are. The move to Spinozistic subjectivity can be seen as an experiment, one designed not merely to be a different alternative but designed to counter and undermine desiring subjectivity in concrete and specific ways. 
The impersonal nature of affects in Spinoza are a far cry from the feelings and preferences which we think have their origin in our true, deep self. Re-describing the self as naturally determined, and thus already automatically striving for what it needs to be itself, presents an alternative to our current construction of the self as in possession of free choice, by which we can decide to express a heretofore hidden but authentic version of oneself. Spinozistic practices of adjusting one’s own patterns of thought allow one to perform ethical work without submitting to common contemporary practices, many of which involve power-relations with technical experts—the same doctors and therapists whom Foucault criticized throughout his career. Instead of an hermeneutics of the self which endlessly fumbles as it tries to merely know the self, Spinozist askesis successfully uses knowledge to care for the self. 
Finally, Spinoza presents a clear, if modest, telos of gradually reducing the debilitating power of some of our sad affects, and proportionally increasing our ability to causally determine that which happens to us. Desiring subjectivity, on the other hand, has goals which seem to me to be confusing, vague, and impossibly utopian. The search for “happiness” and “self-discovery” which characterize the present moment are difficult to define, even for those actively seeking them. Additionally, another goal is indistinctly fused with these: “freedom” as liberation from the effects of others. Such freedom seems to me to be a somewhat utopian goal of immutable impermeability, which neither Foucault nor Spinoza thinks is even in principle possible for humans. Spinoza, rather than having a goal of freedom defined negatively as the absence of an outside, conceives it as drawing what power one can through the right connections to others, and avoiding harmful effects but not simply all “external” effects. 
Developing a knowledge of the concrete points of the ethical works of Foucault is necessary if one wants to work against the present form of subjectivity, a knowledge which would be obscured if one also pressed those works to answer other concerns, such as how to resist power-relations. Additionally, my narrow focus on subjectivity has revealed some other fascinating insights of Foucault’s later work. First, especially in the light of the 1982 lecture course The Hermeneutics of the Subject, (which shares the same themes and material as The Use of Pleasures and The Care of the Self), Foucault’s analysis shows again and again that practices of the self, askesis, care of the self, or technologies of the self, are extremely important for analyzing any ethical formation. Seemingly every ethics, no matter how intellectualist or how freedom-centric, requires that one treat oneself as a quasi-object by training oneself for ethical existence. The importance, not only in Hellenism (when care of the self virtually defined ethics), but in perhaps every ethics, of processes, techniques, practices, and self-modification in general, demonstrate that the subject is malleable to a high degree. It also implies that even an ethics positing an original self requires that one fabricate the original self to which one is “returning,” and an ethics emphasizing a radically free will still must train and prepare the will before it can freely choose well.
Second, Foucault discusses how philosophy has generally come to privilege other aspects of ethics and thinking over the just mentioned care of the self. In short, the dominant way in which philosophy is lived today ignores the fact that philosophy can be more than “research,” and institute a way of life. Despite our protests to the contrary, Foucault shows how contemporary philosophy has reduced itself to textual commentary at the expense of its former power to transform logos into bios. That is to say, philosophy today often limits itself to the accumulation of arguments, and so philosophers no longer manifest truth in their very lives. Philosophy, which as we all admit has tremendous power to change one’s life, is less and less asked to serve this noble ambition. We have knowledge, but we no longer live the true life.
Third, Foucault details some of the many ways that ethics can relate to truth, or the subject’s relation to knowledge. Since both ethical subjectivity and forms of knowledge have changed over history (as his genealogies well attest), there is a rich, complex, and interesting field of historical research here. The wide variety of totally divergent conceptions of truth are interesting in their own right, since they reveal how even truth has a history, but do so in a different way than Foucault’s earlier archaeology of knowledges. 
Fourth is a point which draws the prior three themes together. Foucault called a “spirituality” any ethics in which the ethical subject must be reformed, converted, or have their very being significantly altered, before it can accede to specific kinds of truth. Ancient Pythagorean mystical rites which open one up to new and higher forms of knowledge would be included, but so too would that of the avant-garde artist. Various forms of ethics hold out a tantalizing promise: that if one becomes a certain kind of subject, one can experience a previously unavailable, rare, and powerful relation to truth. The ethical change which would lead to this knowledge must be preceded by an askesis capable of changing the subject into something radically new. Our current inability to understand truth as something that might need to be won and not simply absorbed, and our unwillingness to fight to become a different person instead of merely being satisfied to be any generic knowing subject whatsoever, contribute to the flatness of many philosophical lives today. What has been and could once again be a militancy of the true life has been limited to a safe pedagogy which collects as much knowledge as possible yet remains relatively indifferent to its effects on the knower. But Foucault’s last works demonstrate that philosophy as ethics, reconceived as a particular relationship of subjectivity and truth, has the power to induce transformations which would be truly radical.


1. What Genealogy is, and Why It is Not Enough: Historical Description Without Prescription 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will first define genealogy in Foucault as a method of historical research which remains at the level of description while forgoing prescriptions. Thus, one will fruitlessly search his genealogies for prescriptions about what to do next. I would like to separate the descriptive from what we might call ‘full critique,’ which is achieved if one ‘experiments’ or goes beyond what has been called into question by genealogy. While Foucault supplied his readers with descriptive genealogies, his readers are left to supply themselves with prescriptions in the form of new thinking and new practices. After arguing this, I will turn to uses of Foucault’s later works which attempt to offer their own prescriptions, and give the reasons why I cannot affirm these approaches. This chapter will set up my claim that prescriptions are not to be sought within Foucault, and that most existing attempts to supply prescriptions beyond Foucault have fatal flaws. This accomplished, we will be well prepared for a later chapter, which is my attempt to supply a prescription for our ailing subjectivity by recourse to Spinoza.
I support my definition of genealogy through “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." Genealogy there is limited to a skeptical historical method stripped of prescriptions. The lack of prescriptions inherent in genealogy does not prevent readers from giving prescriptions. However, such prescriptions should be considered as responses which go beyond genealogy. Such a reading is supported as well by “What is Enlightenment?,” where interrogation of our constitution and experiments which go beyond that are repeatedly discussed as two distinct terms. Then I will return to "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" to highlight Foucault’s Nietzschean insistence that each historian’s own will informs the values or prescriptions she attaches to her historical research. In short, I will show that while genealogy does not contain or imply its own prescriptions, such prescriptions can arise from a reader’s interactions with the texts. 
Finally I will turn to numerous statements by Foucault for additional support, texts in which he clearly stops short of giving prescriptive advice. He only claimed to describe what might be wrong today. Foucault left the future to us. Foucault asked questions through genealogy while steadfastly refusing to give answers to his audience, whether they were prisoners, academics, gay men, or other readers. He may have done so because he respectfully assumed that we could take on the “task” of our “maturity” ourselves, rather than allowing his books or authority to take the place of our own experimentation.​[8]​ I believe that his readers are worthy of such respect, but the task of our maturity requires that we give up fruitless asking after absent prescriptions so that we may develop our own therapeutics for contemporary subjectivity. It is not in vain to search his work for tactically useful diagnoses of our dangers today; however, it is in vain to look to him for answers about what to do next.
While I get the impression that most of Foucault’s readers would agree with weak versions of the claims above, the prescriptions they offer nonetheless often attempt to wrest their prescriptions from something in Foucault instead of going beyond him. I will argue in addition that, despite the variety of secondary responses to Foucault’s genealogy of the desiring subject, almost all of them involve unsatisfactory interpretive moves. Some readers look directly to his life; many give an inspiring but ethically empty affirmation of the ‘aesthetics of existence’ or ‘freedom;’ there is the common identification of ethics with resisting the supposed ‘evil’ of ‘Power;’ finally, almost every instance of a proposed ‘ethics’ fails to count as ethical in Foucault’s technical sense of a “form of subjectivity” (describable in terms of the four aspects detailed in the third chapter).
Genealogy Defined: History of the Present, to Free Us from Our Past
Foucault describes the modern critical attitude as “a reflection on history and a particular analysis of the specific moment at which he is writing and because of which he is writing. It is… the reflection on ‘today.’”​[9]​ Also called genealogy, this attitude describes the forms of our constitution which are “contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints”​[10]​ but are no less important in our lives for their contingency. Foucault says that his type of history “starts off from this present day actuality… The game is to try to… give some more or less vague indications of the fragility of our system of thought, in our way of reflecting, in our practices.”​[11]​ To reintroduce into the historical flux “everything considered immortal in man” reduces the influence of these things within our thought by showing that “[n]othing in man… is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition.”​[12]​ A whole history of contesting forces and processes have formed us, rather than a single destiny; thus, we do not need to continue to be everything which we currently are. Genealogy “disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified.”​[13]​ Genealogy is a necessary propaedeutic to changing what we are because when it removes faith in ahistorical certitudes, the self propped up by those certitudes begins to tumble. After genealogical analysis of the present, we can begin to “imagine it otherwise than it is.”​[14]​
Many assume that since genealogy disintegrates what we are, then it has an implicitly prescriptive vision.​[15]​ After all, genealogy “will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.”​[16]​ And Foucault said that what motivated him personally was a “curiosity… which enables one to get free of oneself… the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks.”​[17]​ Quotes like these are often read as Foucault telling us what to do: do not think this way, do not be that way. But note the language used: no longer, get free, think differently. Genealogy insists on the possibility of cutting ties to a particular past, but it does not indicate any particular future to which one might tie oneself. Foucault informs you that you could become different, but consistently refuses to tell you what you should become. “Kant defines Aufklärung in an almost entirely negative way, as an Ausgang, an ‘exit,’ a ‘way out,’”​[18]​ as does Foucault, I will argue. Genealogy is a release from the present-as-past, but not a recommendation of a future. It is an indication of what you might discard but not of what you should aim for. 
Genealogy could perhaps be called ‘negative’ since it only critiques an inheritance and does not contain a replacement itself. 
The [genealogical] search for descent is not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself. What convictions and, far more decisively, what knowledge can resist it?​[19]​ 
It undermines convictions and foundations, rather than establishing them. In order to properly estimate what genealogy can do—and what it cannot—we must take heed of Foucault’s exact formulations. 
History becomes ‘effective’ to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being—as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against itself. ‘Effective’ history [i.e. genealogy] deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature… It will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity. This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting.​[20]​ 
Foucault uses genealogy to disturb, fragment, divide, destabilize, uproot, and disrupt, and not in order to posit, found, create, or begin. Creation comes after genealogy. Notably, in 1983 and without putting the statement under the name of another, Foucault’s definition of genealogy remains similar. 
It is a matter of making things more fragile through this historical analysis… from the second that [something] is historically constituted, it can be politically destroyed… I wanted to reintegrate… the historicity of some of these practices and thereby rob them of their evidentiary status, in order to give them back the mobility that they had and that they should always have.​[21]​ 
The mobility granted to concepts frees our thinking from remaining rooted to the spot. But where our thoughts will now venture, genealogy cannot say, because it frees us from the past without dictating a future direction.
Genealogy thus describes or diagnoses our current modes of life, but does not prescribe what more preferable form of life should replace it. Certainly, to have read genealogies makes one much more likely to see our current constitution as worth replacing and gives the reader impulse to ‘negatively’ distance herself from something described there. However, as discussed below, ‘toward’ what she moves is not given in, deduced from, or explained solely through the text, though the text may have largely provided the impulse ‘away from’ the old. We should not confuse cause and effect. If reading genealogy often has the effect of causing readers to envision a new future and make experiments for the sake of it, that does not mean that the future was already in the text.
Why Genealogy Cannot Prescribe a Future 
Foucault’s genealogical descriptions give us reason to doubt elements of our present constitution rather than reasons to endorse any particular new constitution. Someone might reply, however, that just because Foucault bit his tongue does not mean that genealogy is always incapable of directing us. Perhaps he failed to make explicit implicit prescriptions.​[22]​ I would respond that we can isolate four more reasons to strongly deny the claim that genealogy itself can direct us. First, genealogy shows that history is determined by chance, and does not have any inherent directionality or internal progression. Therefore, genealogy cannot indicate any general trajectory of history, either to follow or to reverse. Second, the targets of Foucault’s analyses are not forces from which we need liberation. If they were, then perhaps simply showing them for what they are would amount to a sort of negation of a negation. For Foucault, though, instead of a single prescribed action of refusal or revolution, resistance consists of an infinite range of possible micro-actions of adjustment. Third, in “What is Enlightenment?,” Foucault appears to separate distinct moments (history and evaluation, analysis of reality and violation of reality), the first of which lines up with Foucault’s own genealogical descriptions, and the second with the prescriptive task left to us, beyond Foucault. Fourth, a close look at “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” shows Foucault denying that historical research itself reveals or generates values. Instead, he says that historians bring their own perspectival values, which I claim is the true fount of prescriptions. 
Genealogy Describes Chance Events- History of Accidents, not Destiny of Values
First, genealogy does not predict or dictate the future—neither what will be nor what should be. Genealogy is a history of the arbitrary “accidents that accompany every beginning,”​[23]​ and so cannot speak in terms of what we necessarily need to become. How is analysis of past events without necessity, supposed to dictate what our future will or should hold? There is no enduring logic or trajectory to history—only chance.​[24]​ “Genealogy does not resemble the evolution of a species and does not map the destiny of a people… but the exteriority of accidents.”​[25]​ What I mean to emphasize is that our past’s discontinuity must also be extended into our prescriptions for the future. The fact that our dangers today were caused by chance means that today is not a deviation from what ‘ought’ to be: genealogy shows neither an apocalypse to avoid, nor a glorious past to redeem. There is only chance, so the history of something ‘bad’ or dangerous does not reveal some original ‘good’ path we were on beforehand and to which we should return.​[26]​ 
Genealogy Does not Prescribe Liberation from its Objects of Research
Second, we must constantly remind ourselves that the problematized objects of Foucault’s genealogical analyses are not primarily repressive, essentially dominating, or otherwise calling for our ‘liberation.’ Some readers—no doubt more often those well-read in Hegel or Marxism​[27]​—think that Foucault’s objects of criticism supply the answers, if in inverse form. But this would require that a danger today would be repressive and have one central way of working which could be reversed. Genealogy does not unmask The Man or the Evil Empire. We have had a hard time giving up the political model of the King or Sovereign, Foucault notes,​[28]​ and he was at pains to challenge ideas based in the “failure to see that power relations are not something that is bad in itself, that we have to break free of.”​[29]​ And again: “You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions… I would like to do the genealogy of problems, of problématiques. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad.”​[30]​ While Foucault explicitly rejected the model of repressive power, it remains a typical misunderstanding of Foucault; for instance, below I will discuss readings of the works on ethics which claim that ethical subjectivity (or care of the self, or aesthetics of existence) is ‘free’ and ‘resists’ power.​[31]​ 
Foucault’s refusal to indulge in somewhat “utopian” liberatory thinking is clearly stated in “The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” ​[32]​ in which he distances himself from the interviewer’s repeated attempts to describe his later works as liberatory. Foucault is asked whether the “work of the self on the self… may be understood as a certain liberation, as a process of liberation?” Foucault does not endorse such a reading. 
I would be more careful on that score. I have always been somewhat suspicious of the notion of liberation, because… one runs the risk of falling back on the idea that there exists a human nature or base that… has been concealed, alienated, or imprisoned in and by mechanisms of repression. According to this hypothesis, all that is required is to break these repressive deadlocks… I think that this idea should not be accepted without scrutiny.​[33]​
If genealogy were just a matter of showing how some basic human good (freedom, or rights, or desire) had been denied or repressed, then the answer would simply be to reverse all that, and revert to some naturally good status. However, Foucault never clearly endorses the existence of any universal good,​[34]​ and he certainly denies that power works primarily through repressive domination.​[35]​ It is not the case that there are basically two possibilities in any scenario, and that by rejecting the bad possibility we will by default actualize the other good possibility. Foucault even rejects a more subtle version of positing by negation, which “claims to be a methodical examination in order to reject all possible solutions except the one valid one… the definitive solution.”​[36]​ 
Foucault is not a black-and-white thinker, as seen in his characterization of the critical attitude of modernity. “We are not talking about a gesture of rejection. We have to move beyond the inside-outside alternative,” a dichotomy which is tantamount to “intellectual blackmail.”​[37]​ Nothing is evil and nothing is inevitable. There are only dangers and possibilities, and the tactics which arise out of these. Though the opposition is a comfortable one, “one has to refuse everything that might present itself in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian alternative: you either accept… or else you criticize… and then try to escape.”​[38]​ Indicating what is dangerous or wrong with the present does not show, therefore, the opposite of what we should be doing. Hence, genealogy does not give an inverse indication of what to do.
Additionally, Foucault’s emphasis on practices throughout his work means that saying no does not automatically produce a concrete yes. After saying no, we must produce concrete practices to replace our rejected inheritance, because there is no possibility of living un-constituted for Foucault. Theoretically, he abhors a vacuum of constituting practices. Simply vacating one practice would do little to change us, since we are primarily “done” or made through practices. “This is why I emphasize practices of freedom over processes of liberation; again, the latter… do not seem to me to be capable by themselves of defining all the practical forms of freedom.”​[39]​ Since the terms used in this interview are not precisely defined, reference to other themes in Foucault’s thought may help to clarify my point. Imagine if our knowledge was ‘liberated’ from every episteme. What would we even be able to think? You might as well ask what one would do if liberated or freed from the body. To think well or even at all, we need real, concrete practices which produce knowledge. The point is not to be liberated from constitutive constraints, but to better constrain or constitute the self through new practices (whether in terms of subjectivity, power, or knowledge). Language of liberation is a distraction in this context.  
Genealogies of confession do not free readers from desire.​[40]​ They are instead useful for their description of confession as a practice with dangers that we would do well to know more about. An attempt to replace the practice of confession requires displacement through a counter-practice. For Foucault, everything has its history. Nothing exists without a process to generate it and highly complex practices which change over time that consist of partial linkages between multiple elements.​[41]​ Again, my point is that, if there were such a thing as the ‘opposite’ of a danger analyzed by genealogy, then Foucault’s analysis could amount to an inverse plan of what to do. But there is no dragon to slay, and the tactics, practices, and techniques we require are not supplied by genealogy. As he stated in the Dreyfus and Rabinow interview: “If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do.”​[42]​ Because Foucault is, at bottom, always analyzing practices, there are always a wide variety of actual practices to establish and maintain, rather than one simple and optimistic final project of overthrowing the evil empire. These various practices will be seized upon by Foucault’s readers, since they were not handed out by him in his works.
 I hope my insistence that genealogy does not itself supply future plans does not make it seem as if genealogy is therefore useless as critique. It is a key moment of fruitful critique. I simply contend that it is not the only moment. Genealogy certainly does not prevent you from positing, beginning, and so on—you can posit goals after genealogy, but not through it. Let me be clear. Just because Foucault’s genealogies do not posit goals beyond their diagnoses, does not mean that his readers cannot go beyond diagnosis. We legitimately can and should do what genealogy does not do, and I think this is what the task of maturity requires of us. Therefore, if we want to posit values, plans, or prescriptions (and who among us is indifferent on this score), then we need to take the next methodological step, after or ‘beyond’ genealogy. 
The Two Moments of “What is Enlightenment?:” Experiment, Transformation, or Prescription Must Follow After Analysis of Limits, Genealogy, or Description
We now turn to “What is Enlightenment?,” where Foucault reminds us (through Baudelaire) that the best of those with the modern critical attitude do not remain mere spectators treating the world around them “as a fleeting and interesting curiosity.”​[43]​ A thinker with a properly modern critical attitude, 
just when the whole world is falling asleep, he begins to work, and transfigures that world. His transfiguration [entails] a difficult interplay between truth of what is real and the exercise of freedom… to imagine it otherwise than it is, and to transform it… an exercise in which extreme attention to what is real is confronted with the practice of a liberty which respects this reality and violates it.​[44]​ 
The repeated “and” does not seem incidental to me. Rather, critique consists of the genealogically diagnosed reality of our historical constitution and that which violates that reality or the truth of the world and its transfiguration. It is certainly possible to solely collect, analyze, describe, and know, without transfiguring, and this truth of reality is what genealogy itself reveals. But transfiguring practices are also possible—not inside of genealogical description, but as a prescription beyond it. 
Critique thus involves an interplay of two moments, rather more distinct than often acknowledged, of a “truth of what is real” (our historical constitution) and an attempt “to transform it” (work to constitute ourselves in other ways). As Foucault says, “this historico-critical attitude must also be an experimental one… on the one hand, open up realm of historical inquiry and, on the other, put itself to the test of reality.”​[45]​ Full critique, beyond flâneur-esque genealogy, must involve a “correlation of historical analysis and the practical attitude.”​[46]​ That these are often found together does not mean that they are one and the same, for their correlation is precisely not an identity. What I have called ‘full’ critique or ‘going beyond genealogy’ “is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.”​[47]​ There are genealogical analyses on the one hand and responses to those analyses on the other. If my reading is correct (genealogical analysis plus response equals ‘full critique’), then we may have a way to join two Foucauldian positions that are otherwise difficult to reconcile. The first position is Foucault’s general refusal to himself give the response beyond genealogy and the second position is his claim that his work is done in order to make such responses possible.
Prescriptions Derive From the Will of the Historian, not Solely from Genealogical Facts
However, the responses which follow upon genealogical research are necessarily going to be multiple. For Foucault, truth is produced from out of perspectives and historical locales which are no less real just because they vary. In “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Foucault highlights genealogy’s “affirmation of knowledge as perspective… Nietzsche’s version of historical sense is explicit in its perspective… [as] a deliberate appraisal, affirmation, or negation… in order to prescribe the best antidote” for the things the historian finds to be “poisonous.”​[48]​ 
Unlike Foucault and Nietzsche, the non-genealogical historian is an ascetic priest of knowledge, who “effaces his proper individuality… to silence his preferences and overcome his distaste, to blur his own perspective and replace it with the fiction of universal geometry, to mimic death in order to enter the kingdom of the dead, to adopt a faceless anonymity.”​[49]​ The ascetic goal of anonymous judgment says that the object alone is allowed to contribute ‘objectively’ to judgments and so any other judgment (such as one that involves our interest) is illegitimate. “Historians argue that this [disinterest] proves their tact and discretion. After all, what right have they to impose their tastes and preferences…? Their mistake is to exhibit a total lack of taste… The historian is insensitive to the most disgusting things.”​[50]​ Genealogists should admit that they have interests and preferences for a different future, and that they bring these to their research. Unlike pious, ascetic historians, genealogists refuse to sacralize the text in order to pretend that it gave you every idea you have ever had. We would do better to admit that a preferred future is not contained in the past or within its analysis. The future is ours.​[51]​ Prescriptions are added as perspectival responses to a genealogical history, in keeping with the will of each ‘historian,’ according to Foucault.​[52]​ 
Examples of Foucault’s Refusal to Supply Prescriptions: Questions, Not Answers. First Examples: The Order of Things, The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, and The Care of The Self
We have now covered some of the formal reasons of method that show that genealogy does not give solutions to the dangers which it analyzes. Even though genealogy is distinct from prescriptions, some readers persistently seek to find norms or crypto-norms floating in bits of content, so we should demonstrate just how little prescription there is in the content. I want to show this, not to render genealogy empty or useless, but to show that we have full license to produce our own prescriptions, instead of waiting for Foucault’s preferences to be revealed so that they can supplant yours. The texts show a near-total absence of Foucault voicing his own views, and contain a wealth of explicit refusals to do so. Over a variety of texts, which we will now review, we see that his ‘responses’ typically do not advance beyond open-ended questions or paths for further research.
An early, well-known, and typical pronouncement shows Foucault very precisely limiting his claims. At the close of The Order of Things¸ he says that he has not given us “affirmations,” but “at most questions… left in suspense, where they pose themselves, only with the knowledge that the possibility of posing them may well open the way to a future thought.”​[53]​ Regarding his vision for the future of the episteme centered upon “man,” Foucault only says, it is “perhaps nearing its end… if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility” were to occur.​[54]​ His historical research “easily shows [that] man is an invention of a recent date,”​[55]​ but the future is left wide open.
Foucault hardly becomes any more prescriptive later in his career. In Part One of HS1, Foucault says his aim is to raise “serious doubts concerning what I shall term the ‘repressive hypothesis.’”​[56]​ “The doubts I would like to oppose to the repressive hypothesis are aimed less at showing it to be mistaken than at… defin[ing] the regime of power-knowledge-pleasure that sustains the discourse on human sexuality in our part of the world.”​[57]​ And did all this research and description lead to a prescription, a solution? No—Foucault claimed a more modest result. “I would like to write the history of these instances and their transformations.”​[58]​ Not exactly a prescriptive manifesto, if we can take his clear words at face value. His aim was to raise doubts about a “story”​[59]​ through a history of the formation of that story. 
However, Foucault does appear more prescriptive in the final pages of The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1. 
We must not think [Ne pas croire] that by saying yes to sex, one says no to power… It is the agency of sex that we must break away from [qu’il faut s’affranchir], if we aim [on veut faire valoir]—through a tactical reversal of the various mechanisms of sexuality—to counter the grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges… The rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not to be [ne doit pas être] sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures.​[60]​ 
I ask, though, even in the dramatic hortatory of this closing passage, what actual prescriptions are given? What content is given, what direction? None or next to none.​[61]​ The first “ought” quoted is an epistemological-theoretical point (as in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”), not a prescription. Foucault says that we “must not think” along the old lines that oppose knowledge and power because he has given us a better description of how they interact. 
The other “ought” (“must break away”) goes beyond what story we should believe about the history of sexuality, toward counter-tactics—and yet, the difficulties of this passage (its open-ended language, the problem of connecting it to the later, revised plan for The History of Sexuality, the use of undefined terms like “bodies”) have been noted.​[62]​ Foucault does say that a new program could exist, and that it should not center around desire- but the bare possibility of a pleasure away from sex-desire is hardly a positive program. Foucault goes so far—and only so far—as to say that “we need to consider the possibility that one day, perhaps… people will no longer quite understand how… we became dedicated to the endless task of forcing [sex’s] secret, of exacting the truest of confessions from a shadow.”​[63]​ It is unclear to me what prophetic guidance we could legitimately extract from this oracular passage. Perhaps, reading with Occam’s razor, if it does not appear to offer explicit prescriptions, we should not presume that there are secret prescriptions.
Again, we see two different modes. The first mode (seen in Part One of The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1) is more certain in tone, is aligned with the content of his books, stated in his voice (“I”), and denies prevalent ideas. This mode lacks no boldness in presentation, and is detailed and concrete. A second mode (seen in Part Five of The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1) is more conjectural and vague, and calls on “we” readers to experiment. The first is descriptive.​[64]​ The second is an invitation to complete the ‘full critique,’ to undertake the experiment which the first prompts. The second approaches a prescriptive ‘ought,’ but consists of the most halting, vague calls.​[65]​ Foucault, despite the use of a quasi-prescriptive language, does not ask anything of us, but rather inspires us.
In terms of ethical subjectivity, the closest to a prescriptive passage is Foucault’s implied criticism of our civilization,​[66]​ which has “become a singularly confessing society… Western man has become a confessing animal.”​[67]​ A subject today performs “immense labor” through various exercises and discourses because “we have come to attach a nearly fabulous price to the truth they claimed to produce.”​[68]​ But Foucault’s comments here are not a direction, a value, a prescription. It only implies that Foucault wants to replace the confessional aspects of scientia sexualis. Has Foucault ever stated what other kind of animal we should become after confession? Foucault is asking questions about what we are today, and asking if we need to remain the animals we have become. The answer—and this is what one can extract from Foucault’s works—is no. No, we do not need to remain what we just so happen to have become. But answers as to what would be better and how to achieve that better constitution are not to be found in Foucault’s texts or in his life. Foucault refused to tell us what animals to become. Instead of claiming the mantle of prophet, shepherd, universal intellectual, or vanguard, his near-silence on the future leaves us the task of our maturity. His discretion allows for our maturation. I used to think that Foucault was just being coy—not wanting to give it to us too easily or all at once, but letting the persistent and sensitive reader into his esoteric prescriptions—but I now think he was effectively silent on these topics. Since Foucault restricted himself to posing questions, any responses will have to be our own.
Similarly, in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault characterized his research into the Ancient world as pursuing “the general question: What is involved in the relationships of the subject to knowledge of the world?”​[69]​ His research results showed the difference between our relationships and those of Classical and Hellenistic ethics, which enables a “disentangling [and] freeing from our own categories and questions.”​[70]​ There is “a fundamental heterogeneity here that should warn us against any retrospective projection,” since “neither of these two [contemporary] problems (of obedience to the law and of the subject’s knowledge of himself) was really fundamental or even present in the thought of ancient culture.”​[71]​ It is a negative description, then, establishing that subjectivity is not eternal.​[72]​ Prescriptions or responses to this research, however, do not seem to be stated anywhere in the lectures. 
Foucault did not get any more normative by the 1980s, when he was studying ethical subjectivity; what he is describing in the Ancients is not to be pursued.​[73]​ The interpretation which says that ‘a middle Foucault’ diagnosed what our problems are, and ‘a late Foucault’ offered solutions to these problems, cannot stand on the basis of the texts. The methodological statements and the lack of prescriptions remain substantially the same (though the objects of research and the results of the research are different). Foucault is perhaps even more prescriptively hesitant in the later works, despite standard interpretations, since there is less of the veiled criticism (as in Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1) which can appear as inverse guidance. In The Hermeneutics of the Subject, his statements are less critical. “I would like to show you… this history that made [the care of the self]… a decisive moment that is still significant for our modern mode of being subjects.”​[74]​ 
From the same era, the final summary of The Care of the Self (where we might expect to find recommendations, or at least speculation about what to do next) only says that in Ancient ethics, “precepts emerge that seem to be rather similar to those that will be formulated in the later moral systems. But one should not be misled by the analogy [since] they will derive from a profoundly altered ethics and from a different way of constituting oneself.”​[75]​ All that one can expect directly from the mouth of Foucault is the claim that we are not forever the same, though some practices from our past may still have significance for us today. In a deflationary mode, we can read Foucault as generally saying that the self is not eternal, which means that most of it differs from the past, and also that which is similar is historically constituted and thus remains changeable. The detailed content is crucial for specifying what we are today,​[76]​ but is not designed to answer what we need to change into instead. Thus, readings which scour his work and life for such answers do so in vain.
Foucault’s Refusal to Answer, Second Examples: Key Later Interviews (Aesthetics of Existence Is Not Prescribed by Foucault)
Foucault did not attempt to give us answers, so he is best understood as asking questions. That is, his publications and lectures are almost entirely limited to an analysis which calls something into question (a genealogical re-description of the past). Scholars’ interpretations of what Foucault’s answers were thus tend be based upon slender sections of interviews, with much of the contextual surrounding comments left out. A highly commented-upon passage is from the Dreyfus and Rabinow interview. I will compress the seven pages of back and forth while trying to give the full context. This will show how far this interview is from giving a strong prescription—though it is about as strong as we get from Foucault. Foucault says that for the Greeks, religion and legal systems had very little influence on ethics; instead, their ethics was formed aesthetically. “Well, I wonder if our problem nowadays is not, in a way, similar to this one,”​[77]​ insofar as we also refuse religiously- and legally-informed ethics. He is then asked if “the Greeks”—who here primarily indicate the “aesthetics of existence”—are thus an “alternative”? “No! I am not looking for an alternative [or] solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people.”​[78]​ We are in a way similar to the Greeks, yet ours is not the same problem after all. 
Foucault is not telling us, but questioning. “What I want to ask is: Are we able to… take into account the pleasure of the other?… without reference either to law, to marriage, to I don’t know what?”​[79]​ He does not know what could support a novel ethics today, that is, he does not know that “we” can rely upon an aesthetics. He may not know for sure, but he is intrigued. “The idea of the bios as a material for an aesthetic piece of art is something that fascinates me. The idea also that ethics can be a very strong structure of existence, without any relation with the juridical per se… All that is very interesting.”​[80]​ What Foucault finds interesting is anything (“all that”) which is not indexed to law or religion or “to scientific knowledge;”​[81]​ that is, anything which reconfigures the subject-truth relation (not just aesthetics of existence). So while a past aesthetics “cannot exactly be reactivated [it] can be very useful as a tool for analyzing what’s going on now—and to change it.”​[82]​ That is, we cannot exactly reactivate it, but it does prompt interesting questions (but not recommendations) from Foucault. “But couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object but not our life?”​[83]​ I really believe that these are questions for you to address, rather than prescriptive statements from Foucault. 
While the “work of art” line is often quoted, what is very often left out are the immediate criticisms and warnings about aesthetics of existence. There are bad aesthetics, as seen in those Berkeley types who think theirs is based on “the truth about desire, life, nature, body, and so on,” as well as a Sartrean model based on “authenticity.”​[84]​ Avoiding the multiple warnings, more often readers zero in on a single line, “we have to create ourselves as works of art,”​[85]​ which does sound directly prescriptive. However, even this rare “we have to” is contextually conditional: “from the theoretical point of view, Sartre avoids the idea of the self as something that is given to us… I think that the only acceptable practical consequence of what Sartre has said is to link his theoretical insight to the practice of creativity—and not that of authenticity. From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art.”​[86]​ Strictly, Foucault is explaining what he sees as reasonable practical extensions of Sartre’s existentialist theory of the subject. And while I think it is obvious that Foucault agrees that the self is not given to us, his final word that his “view is much closer to Nietzsche’s than to Sartre’s”​[87]​ cannot be taken as a firm basis that Foucault recommends that we today create an aesthetics based on Nietzsche, let alone based firmly on a contextual and revisionary application of Sartre. If what he meant by The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self was simply to recommend Nietzsche’s aphorism 290 in The Gay Science, he could have spared himself the trouble of refreshing his Greek and Latin. 
I am not proposing that Foucault is actively against all aesthetics of existence or even that he is wholly indifferent. I am making the weaker claim that, while he said an aesthetics of existence might be possible and would be interesting, such passages do not recommend an aesthetics of existence as the only ethical response available to us today. An aesthetics of existence certainly would be one Foucauldian response. However, it is not the only one; it should not necessarily be privileged above all others (especially on the basis of an interview in which he distances himself from three different aesthetical ethics: Greek, Sartrean, Californian); and, as I will shortly discuss, there is a lack of any concrete aesthetics of existence worked out by either Foucault or those who recommend it.​[88]​ My claim is that the comments above are stretched to the breaking point by readings which take them as prescriptive advice.
When discussing narrower practical issues in another interview, Foucault again gives precisely limited answers: provocations but not prescriptions. When asked what institutions would help create new social forms, Foucault replied, “I have no precise idea. I think, of course, that to use the model of family life, or the institutions of the family, for this purpose…would be quite contradictory… The question… is an important and crucial issue, but one that I cannot give an answer to. I think that we have to try to build a solution.”​[89]​ Foucault apparently applied the saying, ‘politics is too important to leave to the politicians,’ to himself. He will not give an answer himself, but we should try to build a solution. For all the variety of self-descriptions Foucault gives in interviews, on this point, he seems quite consistent. When using “I” and speaking directly for himself he says, “I cannot say,” and only makes negative indications based on genealogical research (not the family, not juridical binaries, and so on). For the future, however, he says not “I” but instead “we” and the future is left fully open. Other instances of near-affirmations or prescriptions are found in this interview. For instance, he says that S&M is interesting because it has a very different relation of sex to relational strategies than romantic courtship has and because it is a reversible game and a creative process of invention. However, note that even when asked if S&M is “challenging [to] the dominant discourse” and “what we can learn about power” from it, he says S&M is “interesting” four times,​[90]​ but never that it is freeing, the answer, an escape, a solution, or the necessary tactic.
Note that I am not cherry-picking quotes that sound most vague and hesitant regarding prescriptions. In fact, these kinds of passages are the furthest Foucault can be pushed toward telling us what to do. Another instance is his extension of an interviewer’s suggestion that non-familial legal ties would expand relational possibilities by responding, “adoption…—why not?—of one adult by another. Why shouldn’t I adopt a friend…?”​[91]​ A question, a what-if, a why-not. A bit later in the same interview, Foucault affirms macho leather daddies, saying there “can be something rich” in this style as part of “a movement toward redefining the monosexual relation,” which he describes in terms of a group finding its way, not as dictated by theory or by himself.​[92]​ 
The dearth of suggested improvements in a method which is meant to help us improve our present is no accident. Foucault insisted that he would not, and need not, tell his readers how to live. “There is always something ludicrous in philosophical discourse when it tries, from the outside, to dictate to others, to tell them where their truth is and how to find it.”​[93]​ He elaborated his refusal in a definition of the difference between the “specific” intellectual and the “universal” intellectual.
In a general way, I think that intellectuals…are renouncing their old prophetic function…[including] the legislative function which they’ve aspired to for so long: ‘See what must be done, see what is good, follow me…’ I dream [instead] of the intellectual… who incessantly displaces himself, doesn’t know exactly where he himself is heading… who, in passing, contributes the raising of the question.​[94]​ 
Again: “I absolutely do not consider myself either a writer or a prophet.”​[95]​ Once more: “There is no reason why one should write not only the book, but also lay down the law as to how it should be read… which I find repugnant.”​[96]​ Foucault was elsewhere asked where he stood on innate predisposition versus social conditioning as explanations for sexual preference.  “I have absolutely nothing to say. ‘No comment’… On this question, I have only an opinion; since it is only an opinion, it is without interest…I don’t want to make use of a position of authority while I’m being interviewed to traffic in opinions.”​[97]​ There are no indications that Foucault refused to tell readers what to do because of any ‘theory/praxis’ divide. Nor is he pessimistic about the odds facing us, or the direness of the situation. Instead, he leaves the eminently possible task of carrying out a new set of practices to the various communities who read him. Asked if he saw it as his “role to address the gay community” since he might have “some special advice, or a special perspective,” Foucault responds: 
I am wary of imposing my own views, or of setting down a plan, or program. I don’t want to discourage invention, don’t want gay people to stop feeling that it is up to them to adjust their own relationships by discovering what is appropriate in their situations… It is always useful to understand the historical contingency of things… But I am not the only person equipped to show these things… Gays have to work out some of these matters themselves.​[98]​
It is entirely possible to experiment in light of and build on the basis of what Foucault has presented to his readers. However, rather than stepping in and dictating what ought to be done, Foucault left us the leeway to begin our own experiments.

Genealogy, Though Not Itself Prescriptive, Remains Useful for Us in Our Creation of Prescriptions—Most Useful if We Go “Beyond” It
Foucault should be understood without reference to a dichotomy of an author who gives pre-formed answers versus an author who is useless for critique. Foucault’s texts are useful for cutting certain ideas out of our minds, which is the preparatory work necessary before making change. When Foucault was asked, if “all the knowledge accumulated in recent years about the body, sexuality, the disciplines [has] improved our relationship with others,” he responded that it had a “been profoundly beneficial” even though 
in most of these analyses, people are not told what they ought to be, what they ought to do, what they ought to believe and think. What they do rather is to bring out how up till now social mechanisms had been able to operate… and then, it seems to me, people were left to make up their own minds, to choose, in the light of all this, their own existence.​[99]​ 
I think that passages such as these need to be given more attention, with a corresponding decrease in emphasis on oft-cited lines such as the following (from immediately before in the same interview): “the idea of morality as obedience to a code of rules is now disappearing, has already disappeared. And to this absence of morality corresponds, must correspond, the search for an aesthetics of existence.”​[100]​ Briefly, I want to note that, per Foucault’s definition, ethics consists of a moral code and the four aspects of ‘ethics,’ in different proportions of emphasis.​[101]​ Therefore, if one fades in importance, the other necessarily grows proportionally. So, this may not be an endorsement so much as a prediction. 
Second, even if something more normative is meant, the concept of “aesthetics of existence” is too vague to count as a concrete prescription. Technically, “aesthetics of existence” is not itself an ethics; it is a broad category that would include many utterly distinct forms of ethics, such as those of dandies, the Renaissance era, and Classical Greeks.​[102]​ If all these are aesthetical, with the variety of their criteria, how does the umbrella term which covers them help us select criteria for ourselves? Most of the basic contents of ethics—ethical substance, telos, askeses—are left undetermined if one opts simply for an aesthetical mode of subjection. If a reader has content to their specific version of aesthetics of existence, they should flesh it out and share it with others. However, that aesthetics would not need not discover its content in Foucault in order to be justified, any more than Renaissance aesthetics of existence required his imprimatur. 




2. My Objections to Secondary Literature’s Prescriptive Responses 
Summary of My Objections
I am not the only reader of Foucault, of course, who has tried to go beyond him. However, I have certain broad issues with the content and style of most of the critical work done in the wake of Foucault. Most of the uses of Foucault or the proposed solutions to diagnosed dangers, strike me as missing something required for specifically subjectivity-centered critique. My own response to genealogy (outlined in the next chapter) is to develop an ethical form describable in the four aspects, which is not simply genealogy itself, which admits that every subject and each form of subjectivity is constituted, and which is explicitly aligned against the desiring subject, denies that subject is best defined as a free will, and privileges askesis as way to develop a new ethical subjectivity. The best way that I can see to develop a new ethical subjectivity in these terms, is through recent (largely French) work on Spinoza.  
Many of the approaches with which I take issue share a tendency to stay too close to what Foucault has given us (either in his texts, or in his personal life). It is precisely for this reason that I had to emphasize above that we can and should go outside Foucault. Foucault’s texts problematized the current notion of self, but many readers take his questions or “problematizations” as if they were fully worked out solutions, and in so doing mistake the method for a goal. ​[103]​  We should not assume that the change called for is already present somewhere in what Foucault has left us, as many do when they confuse the genealogical-critical method with which he identifies (that is over two hundred years old) with the goal of a different subjectivity (that does not yet exist). Another failure to go beyond occurs when readers look to the biography of ‘Michel.’ Shifting the search for authorized answers from the text to the author of the text does not solve the problem—in fact, for someone associated with ‘death of the author’ reading strategies, biographical readings compound the difficulties.
Another approach is to take Foucault’s focus on Ancient aesthetics of existence or the related Ancient care of the self and propose this as a solution to the moral dangers diagnosed. This, however, is rarely given content (as I have noted above), which renders such readings stranded as formally possible and strategically reasonable—but tactically empty. Additionally, such proposals often lose the specificity of terms as Foucault used them. For instance, care of the self can happen without an aesthetics of existence, though often these terms are used interchangeably.​[104]​ 
Another of my general criticisms is that many readings propose a replacement for our subjectivity, which is not itself a form of subjectivity. If a solution to today’s subjectivity is sought in power relations, or in an ‘ethics’ which cannot be described by the four aspects of subjectivity, then such work falls largely outside of critique of subjectivity itself (even if this work may be useful in some other important senses).​[105]​ A straightforward example is when readers say that the ethical response lies in resisting power-relations, which is a noble goal but is not a direct route to adjusting our relations to ourselves. 
Though the objections I will raise below will often reference more than one of these broad issues together, I can broadly restate the three general flaws I see in responses to Foucault’s later works on subjectivity. First, there are inspiring but vague calls to freedom, aesthetics of existence, or becoming otherwise. These lack content and thus remain at the level of working away from what we are (never reaching what we would prefer to become). Second, responses often make moves that are grounded in Foucault generally but not grounded in the works on subjectivity. This broad problem has two major forms: first, taking power-relations as if they were the content of ethics, and second, proposing something which cannot be categorized in terms of the four aspects which are the grid of intelligibility for an ethical subjectivity. While resisting power-relations and performing genealogies are both important Foucauldian activities, neither is particular to “ethics” in his sense of the broad historical constitution of subjectivity itself. Third, responses rarely try to go beyond Foucault, identifying ethics today with some element of Foucault’s written production, or, seeking inspiration from the man himself. We should not seek to extract secrets from the corpse of Michel, and as I have already noted, I think that Foucault’s texts are genealogical and thus present us with questions rather than answers. 
First Class of Objections: Vague or Empty Responses. “Freedom,” Aesthetics, Becoming “Otherwise” in Hoy, Rabinow, Rajchman, Deleuze, Bernauer, and McGushin
Often, readers of Foucault cannot articulate a vision for the future beyond ‘thinking otherwise.’ These visions are not positive proposals, however, and the force of existing thoughts and practices means we cannot replace an existing form of constitution simply by praising the not-yet-arrived new. To say that anything is possible and to call for others to experiment does not move us beyond a yearning for ‘anything but this.’ Foucault noted that we struggle today to posit a replacement for subjectivity as it stands: 
today we see the meaning, or rather the almost total absence of meaning, given to some nonetheless very familiar expressions which continue to permeate our discourse—like getting back to oneself, freeing oneself, being oneself, being authentic, etcetera… I do not think we have anything to be proud of in our current efforts to reconstitute an ethic of the self…  without ever giving it any content.​[106]​ 
Without detailed content, we are stuck with vague negations (‘do not be this’) without any way to re-constitute ourselves (‘do that instead’). This position is not without merits (e.g. it maintains the Foucauldian lesson that an intellectual should not step in and tell others what to do and thereby respects the contingent dangers that are specific to different situations). However, it stops short of suggesting a new form of life, no matter what other lessons it remains aware of. Such approaches are not yet recommendations of a new subjectivity. In Foucault, we are constituted by real practices, so current practices must be replaced with new ones for attempts at change to be effective.
Hoy’s Critical Resistance
Of course, such readings are based in Foucault’s text, even if I find them problematic. If we turn to a passage which these readings commonly cite, we can see that, while such readings accurately capture the spirit of Foucault’s intellectual enterprise, staying with this passage does not lead to specific advances in reconfiguring desiring subjectivity. The following passage, from the beginning of The Use of Pleasure, is cited by most discussions of ethics in Foucault.
As for what motivated me… It was curiosity… that which enables one to get free of oneself [se déprendre de soi-même]… in one way or another and to the extent possible, in the knower’s straying afield [égarement] of himself… the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks… But, then, what is philosophy today—philosophical activity, I mean—if it is not the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself… the endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently…? [Philosophical activity] is entitled to explore what might be changed, in its own thought, through a practice of a knowledge which is foreign to it… The “essay”—which should be understood as the assay or test by which, in the game of truth, one undergoes changes…—is the living substance of philosophy.​[107]​ 
Use of this passage as part of an argument about what ethics should be today is nearly ubiquitous; David Couzens Hoy, in his concise text on the most promising forms of resistance, quotes this passage to explain what Foucauldian resistance or critique should be today.​[108]​ Using this passage (combined with “What is Enlightenment?”) as support, Hoy characterizes resistance as disruption of convictions, “dissolving oneself”​[109]​ or desubjectivation, which shows that “the idea is clear. For Foucault, the force of critique is that the encounter with one’s limits… amounts to dissolving fundamental beliefs about oneself, [which] opens up other possibilities and reshapes one’s sense of what can be done.”​[110]​ Hoy’s goal is to discuss how Foucault understands resistance, and he achieves this goal. But for my goal (concrete indications of a new form of subjectivity), Hoy makes the necessary initial step (showing the negative, distancing, dissolving power of Foucault), but does not take steps beyond this. Hoy does not claim that passages like these exhaust the meaning of the later works, and yet he unites the subject, creating oneself, freedom, the task for today, desubjectivation, the badness of domination, and enhancing life, so he must take himself to be discussing ethics in a significant way. “In sum… the point of critique is to enhance the lives and the possibilities of individuals, to allow them the space to try to create themselves as works of art.”​[111]​ For Hoy’s own project, he is right to stop here, but since most texts which invoke or deploy “ethics” in Foucault similarly stop short, more work needs to be done. Ethics can begin with dissolution but it cannot remain there. 
Rabinow’s  “Introduction” to Essential Works of Foucault, Volume One
A more extended use of the introduction to The Use of Pleasure hardly proceeds any further. As Hoy noted in the section just quoted, Rabinow, in his excellent introduction to The Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 1: Ethics and Truth, spends around a dozen pages discussing ethics in Foucault. To show what “a life of thinking entailed” and thus also what ethics was for Foucault, Rabinow turned Foucault’s four “ethical categories onto his own thought.”​[112]​ Rabinow cites the curiosity which allows one to get free as the telos of Foucault’s ethics: “the stakes of this simple little thing could not be higher.”​[113]​ Thus, the final goal of Foucault’s ethics is “avoidance or alteration of historical[ly] constituted obstacles, and as a patient disentanglement from the encumbrances of contingency… and the patient labor required to reformulate them, fragment by fragment.”​[114]​ The goal of Foucault (and thus presumably a proper goal of Foucauldians at present) is thus to become changed or reformulated. But to claim that the telos (that is, not part of a process but the goal itself) is to no longer think the same, is without content. As Rabinow fully recognizes, the stakes of what one seeks to become are high, which is precisely why we cannot leave the goal as empty as to ‘reformulate oneself.’ Once more, authors who note that we should become otherwise are correct and important, but we see yet another source with no further specification of what we should do today. In answer to the question, ‘what should we be like instead of what we already are?,’ a tautological confirmation of the question (‘you should be not what you are’) is not false but is not yet an answer. 
Rajchman’s The Freedom Of Philosophy
Rajchman, in a book which is subtitled and centered upon The Freedom of Philosophy, says that Foucault’s philosophy allows us to revise “our experience of ourselves or our subjectivity,” and this 
real freedom does not consist either in telling our true stories… or in accepting our existential limitations in authentic self-relation. We are, on the contrary, ‘really’ free because we can identify and change those procedures or forms through which our stories become true… and because there is no ‘authentic’ self-relation we must conform to.​[115]​ 
We are left with a purely negative freedom which, despite its emphasis on the historically constituted nature of subjectivity, seems to involve a freedom dangerously close to that of the humanisms Rajchman is rightly wary of. If ethics is freedom and if freedom is defined as the reversal of our history, then how does this found any particular future? This limitation of ethics to the ethic of the intellectual, to vague otherness, is once again rooted in the introduction to The Use of Pleasure, taken as a motto for Foucauldian ethics. The “ethic of the intellectual… requires the invention of new modes of thought and of action…se déprendre de soi-même: the constant questioning and transforming of the role of one’s ‘self’ in one’s thought.”​[116]​ That the self will shift again and that it has shifted before is not a proper definition of subjectivity. 
Deleuze’s Foucault
Deleuze similarly reduces ethics to thinking and doing “otherwise,” thereby defining ethics as ethical undoing: “the relation to oneself has the task of calling up and producing new modes of subjectivation.”​[117]​ Ethics, as the relation to self, cannot be the constant transformation of the self. At the very least, the specific difference of ethics cannot be new modes or “reinvention” because the other two axes are just as prone to change as is subjectivity. Deleuze puts “difference, variation and metamorphosis” at the heart of ethics: “subjectivation, the relation to oneself, continues to create itself, but by transforming itself and changing its nature… the relation to self is continually reborn, elsewhere and otherwise.”​[118]​ Such passages show the problems caused for an interpretation of Foucault which fails to differentiate critique from ethical subjectivity. Without such a distinction, we end with provocative but empty discussions of the subject. While the subject is not self-identical throughout history,​[119]​ that does not logically require us to define it as non-identity in the present moment. 
Many readers other than Rajchman and Deleuze identify ethics with change, critique, freedom, or genealogical undoing of the past, but doing so has only achieved a negative, restless, and preliminary denial of what should not be, without positing what should be. We are told that the ethical import of Foucault is “to occasion new ways of thinking” (any new ways whatsoever?), and to pursue “freedom… as the revolt through which history may constantly be changed,” which “is oriented toward the existence of concrete controversy, conflict, debate, paradox surrounding subjectivity.”​[120]​ It is hard to imagine a form of life which constitutes our entire relation to self being a paradox, though it is easy to imagine it as one part of an intellectual stance. But if this is the whole definition of an ethical subjectivity, then the shape of a new form of life has been whittled down to the abstract and permanent ability to say ‘no.’
Bernauer’s “Foucault’s Ecstatic Thinking”
James Bernauer casts Foucault’s ethics as so lacking in content that he defines it as a negative theology: “Foucault’s ethic is the practice of an intellectual freedom which may be described as an ecstatic thinking or a worldly mysticism.”​[121]​ However, while justifiable as a general description of the ethos of an intellectual, it does nothing to invent a new subjectivity. By blending together the freedom of the intellectual, the ethical works, and all of Foucault’s other writing, much of the content of Foucault’s later works falls out.​[122]​ We are then left with what is generally true about Foucault as an intellectual, not what a specific adjustment to desiring subjectivity might look like. In fact, such blending even makes the ethos of the intellectual become fuzzy and trades concrete interventions for infinite movement. “Foucault insisted on the necessity for developing new forms of relating to the self and he exhibited one… This breath of life or force of resistance, this Foucaultian spirituality, witnesses to the capacity for an ecstatic transcendence of any history which asserts its necessity.”​[123]​ Bernauer gives a description of all that Foucault’s ethics is not: it is “not a general statement of a code nor even primarily an exemplary model for inquiry…but a possible escape from an intellectual milieu unnourished by ethical interrogation.”​[124]​ An escape, a revolt, a power to not be anything which claims you necessarily must be that, a movement that carries one always away (though Bernauer notes that it must begin with concrete resistance). Ethics is the “force of flight.”​[125]​
A clarification is in order here. Foucault is known to have used the same word or similar phrases in different ways over the course of his career. “Ethics” is unfortunately one of those shifting parts of his lexicon. Bernauer, Hoy, and Rajchman are right if they use ethics only in the particular sense of the “ethos of an intellectual.” However, if that is how they and similar accounts mean the term, then their discussion is not of much use for a discussion of ethics in the sense of ethical subjectivity (as Foucault uses the term ethics in The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self). On the other hand, if they mean to speak also of ethical subjectivity, then there seems to be a confusion of different levels of analysis (caused in part by Foucault’s inconsistent usage of similar terms). If what they mean exclusively is that what they call ‘ethics’ is how Foucault described critique as an intellectual ethos, then they are accurately describing a theme which is present in all of Foucault’s work. This “intellectual ethos” would not, however, be specific to the later works and would not itself generate a new form of subjectivity.​[126]​ If they or we mean to also discuss ethical subjectivity with any of the specificity given by Foucault, then inspiring but vague calls to change, to revolt, to “not-this,” are not sufficient. 
The conflation of “existing post-Kantian ethos of the intellectual” with “what form of ethical subjectivity we should adopt in the future” stymies attempts to invent a novel relation to self. What Foucault called variously the task of thought today, the attitude of modernity, genealogy, critique, and enlightenment—these are not of the same order as “the desiring subject” or as a subjectivity which might replace it. Intellectuals are well-prepared by those critical practices to form a new subject, but it remains preparatory. Critique is a way of being an intellectual, surely, but are we so elitist that we would insist that the way we are as a certain niche of scholars is the proper modern ethos? Or so democratic and optimistic that we really believe constant reversal and dissolution is an ethical goal which most people would want to hold? Perhaps I am being too ambitious or presumptuous in my demands for an actual form of subjectivity to replace the dissolution of our current subjectivity, one that has concrete content and has specifications beyond polymorphous resistance. On the other hand, I think we Foucauldians are not ambitious enough regarding subjectivity when we are satisfied with perpetual calls for becoming different. This necessary first step has held our patient attention for a good amount of time, but now is the time to move forward. Maybe my impatience can be pardoned if we recall that Foucault wanted patience, not in undoing, but in doing or creating: “a patient labor giving form to our impatience for liberty.”​[127]​ 
I also must add that the responses which end with statements that we should persistently question and change cannot be what I have called “full critique” either. They cannot because they remain at the level of explicating what the first level of genealogy implicitly states (we should change because we could change). But if one never gets clear on what exactly to change, let alone what to change into, then one will never get past the mere possibility of change. If we cannot track down any specific suggestions of practices or experiments in these texts about the ethics we should be practicing today, then they will remain at the level of the statement “the unexamined life is not worth living”: a true and rhetorically powerful call to arms which nonetheless does not supply the required tactics for success. 
McGushin’s Foucault’s Askesis
Even texts which are devoted to the later works can still lack positive ethical content beyond the imprecise hope for change. Edward F. McGushin, in Foucault’s Askesis: An Introduction to the Philosophical Life, delves into the later works (including Foucault’s last four Collège de France lectures), and his is one of the very best texts on this period.​[128]​ McGushin gives an exhaustive presentation of the relations to self in Kant, Descartes, monastic Christianity, as well as the Greeks and Romans. Nothing is lacking is those areas, but his responses for how we should live today do not reach a level of specificity beyond care of the self, philosophy, and askesis, with all of these defined as perpetual change. 
For all the detail which McGushin gives regarding distinctive modes of doing philosophy in relation to care of the self, when he describes what philosophical subjectivity should be today, ethical detail is harder to find. “Philosophy is an art of living that problematizes… we can read it as a critical reflection on, and artistic transformation of, life.”​[129]​ Not only is ethics identified with the care of the self or askesis, but ethics is then equated with philosophy, which is itself defined as the modern attitude of critique. Ethics today is thus said to consist of only reflection and transformation. Though there is an argument for linking these terms,​[130]​ the end result still remains a blurring of care of the self (a mode of subjection), askesis in general (techniques which relate to but are not themselves such a mode), the “modern” attitude of philosophical change through critique, and what we should do today. The end result is simply change for its own sake, which can be summarized in Ezra Pound’s modernist motto to “make it new.” While McGushin’s focus on askesis is welcome, askesis is too readily attached to those techniques which induce perpetual change and never those which cause ethical maintenance. There are a wealth of askeses which do not change the subject, but maintain its integrity and strengthen it in what it already is.
What is the goal of infinite change, what mode of being do we hope to attain? “Foucault activates this ēthos of modernity in his own thinking. Certainly the feeling of vertigo before the ruptures in time is a sensation Foucault experienced and attempted to convey in his work.”​[131]​ I am not satisfied with a way of life which is nothing but infinite vertiginous transformation through ruptures in thought.​[132]​ On this account, our modern ethics will not transform us in order that we can become something new, but rather, ethics and its goal are reduced to change as such.​[133]​ This is the only possible result when one identifies ethics almost entirely with an askesis defined as those techniques which de-subjectivate (not those that make one stronger, more self-controlled, or stable). When life is nothing but change, this will always come at the expense of the ethical goal or telos (the ideal state which one hopes to achieve). Our way of life, according to McGushin, should have “no conclusion, no terminus; it can never be fully achieved or finished,” and this in principle, for “how could it be otherwise?”​[134]​
Yet the philosophical subjectivity which founded care of the self had the possibility of being achieved and finished. Hellenistic Roman ethics, and certainly Classical Greek ethics, could reach a terminus and at least aimed for stasis. Hellenistic philosophers were paradigms of aesthetical care, and what they wanted was apatheia or ataraxia, not a whirlwind of perpetual rupture. Their care was centered on the maintenance of the soul—not an endless remanufacture of the self. Foucault understood that care could maintain a subject just as much as change it, so care today does not have to mean perpetual change.
Some of these readings strip away all positive content which might form a real form of subjectivity and attempt to render ethics as purely negative, permanent genealogical critique. Rather than understanding genealogical critique as a moment to be used in a method, they attempt to become or embody this method wholly. Making genealogy into an ethics may inadvertently give some supra-historical status to today, while laying claim only to a generic negative freedom.​[135]​ To say that the present ethical imperative is to constantly move (so as not to be caught), to not just attempt to think otherwise than our history has dictated but to be defined by this attempt—does it amount to admitting we have a history in order to do everything possible to claim independence from any  history? If today we are defined by the critical ability to de-constitute ourselves, even if this is said to be a limited ability, then what we are by dint of acknowledging history, is de-historicizing. Surely, our freedom in this scenario is not absolute, and it is not original but hard-won. And yet it sounds awfully like the liberal model which states that to whatever extent one can escape constraints, to just that degree one is free. I would think that real freedom comes from crafting a new edifice and techniques by which to move more and to grow (not from solely getting out from under constraints). Beyond merely asserting that one can so build after negating constraints, I would prefer to actually have specific techniques in hand. If we fail to supply some positive form of ethics (no matter how contested it will eventually become), what have we done but affirm an undefined (that is, negative and infinite) freedom? Such a result no doubt comforts those who are fearful that there is no agency in Foucault, because at bottom it affirms a “freedom” or a “thought” quite close to two cherished essences of good European humans: “liberty” and “reason.” That is a fear which I would rather do without. 
By way of summary, we may ask, why are so many commentators so general and so negative about how we might live better? No doubt partially because it is certainly difficult to create a new positive form of life from scratch. That is a legitimate reason, but a more unfortunate reason is that some commentators try to capture the technical sense of “ethical subjectivity” in the much more generic terms of what they find to be ‘good’ in his thought. Since what most commentators find to be most ‘good’ in Foucault is genealogy, the content of a few hundred pages gets reduced to the prescription “do genealogy.” Notably, many references to ethics in Foucault could likely have referenced only his works before the 1980s (or use only “What is Enlightenment?” and the brief introduction to The Use of Pleasure) without changing significantly, which shows in the paucity of references to the Ancients and a lack of time spent on the key categories of ethical substance and telos. (I turn to these categories in the next chapter.) Additionally, we may remark that calls to get away from what we are as ethical subjects rarely even mention what we in fact are, failing to discuss confession or desire at length (I discuss these further in Chapter 6). So, while many commentaries are truly important and correct in their analysis of general Foucauldian themes, I must now present the technical objection that some responses lose focus on the axis which Foucault delimited as “subjectivity.” Thus such works end up functioning as something other than a critique of our selves, though they may perform other functions. 
Second Class of Objections: Responses That Are Not Technically Ethical. Genealogy Itself as an “Ethos” and Improper Use of the Four Aspects of Subjectivity in Rajchman, Bernauer and O’Leary 
My next set of objections to existing suggestions on how to complete the critique of today’s subject refer to the broad heading of those that are not primarily about subjectivity as defined by Foucault. Often, a suggestion is made to adjust power-relations as an ‘ethical’ response to the later works; hopefully, the confusion inherent in this move will be made manifest by the axial interpretation of the next chapter. Another way that non-subject solutions are offered to subjectivity’s dangers, is when the suggestion for a new subjectivity cannot be phrased in terms of the four aspects. Similarly, the prior chapter’s emphasis on the centrality of the four aspects will hopefully already have troubled such readings. If the critique found in The Use of Pleasure, The Care of the Self, and the last four Collège de France lectures is centered on subjectivity, and if subjectivity has to be understood in terms of the four elements, then critique must be followed by the positive endorsement of a subjectivity which can be described in terms of those aspects. While other readers respond to Foucault, rarely do they attempt to respond in this specific way.
First, I do not think that Foucault’s intellectual ethos, the critical attitude of modernity, or genealogy can possibly constitute a form of subjectivity (I will here refer to these collectively as “genealogy,” since they all involve an intellectual reflection upon one’s past in order to get a distance from it). If, as I have claimed above, genealogy is negative epistemology or description alone, then it will not itself produce an ethics for today. However, even if genealogy produced a positive ethics, it could not be an ethics itself. As I quoted above, Foucault described genealogy as “a matter of making things more fragile”​[136]​—a tactic, then, but not a kind of subject.​[137]​ To claim that genealogy can help us figure out what the subject should be today, and also to claim that it is the content of that subjectivity, produces a circularity: genealogy tells us what to do, and what to do is genealogy. Foucauldians will reply that genealogy is necessary; I agree that genealogy (which shows that any form of subjectivity is historically constituted, carries dangers within it, and can be changed) is indispensable in order to critique existing relations to self.​[138]​ But to claim that genealogy, as the necessary tool for creating a new ethics, is then also simultaneously the proper current ethics, confuses method and goal. That genealogy is necessary to prepare us for genuinely novel forms of living, means precisely that it is not that novel form itself.  
In addition, genealogy is a historiographical reading method, not a form of life. Some readers fail to employ Foucault’s central ethical grid of intelligibility (the four aspects: ethical substance, mode of subjection, askesis or techniques of the self, and telos), ​[139]​ and so do not see that genealogy could only be understood as askesis, not itself fleshed out in all four aspects. For instance, Socrates’ life was more than merely critical, since it also manifested a full ethics (substance, askesis, mode of subjection, and telos). Notably, the Apology is not even in the bibliography of The Use of Pleasure. Socrates was indeed a critical gadfly, but that was not really his ethics. Critique of oneself and one’s historical inheritance could be an element of a subjectivity, but does not exhaust or define a subjectivity. The wealth of detail that Foucault gave for for early monastic ethics, even though we do not have a proper published text from him on that era, far surpasses what can be attributed to critique.​[140]​ It is that kind of detail which must be possible if one is to call something a form of subjectivity, instead of practices, activities, or behaviors. 
Rajchman
Only a few texts even attempt to sketch out the content of their proposed ethics in terms of the four aspects, and these tend to explicitly or implicitly identify genealogy with each of the four aspects.  Rajchman tries to conceive Foucault’s own thought in terms of the four aspects. The results seem to submit slightly different phrasings of the critical intellectual stance for each of the four, which erodes all the specificity of those categories. Rajchman says that “substance is that which, in the being of the subject, is open to historical transformation,” the mode of subjection is “the invitation to practical freedom… a choice of a mode of being,” the askesis or “ethical task” is “a critical analysis… to determine exactly what we have to struggle against,” which aims to achieve “a practice of truth-telling” working against domination.​[141]​ So the ethical form of subjectivity which Foucault developed (and presumably which we should pursue) can be summed up as acknowledging that history transforms everything, analyzing what we should change, and changing what you can, in order to resist. While an apt summary of Foucault’s project, the attempt to schematize it as a kind of subject results in mutually defining the different aspects until they are indistinct. The aim is that freedom which the mode is already the invitation to, and what makes that choice possible is just ethical substance as the possibility of transformation, and the task is to free ourselves from our history. The four aspects have been so intertwined that they have become nearly one, and they reveal not a form of subjectivity as discussed by Foucault but instead an attitude or way of thinking. It is, of course, more or less the ethos of modernity described in “What is Enlightenment?,” and thus did not require any reference to either Ancient ethics or desiring subjectivity.
Bernauer
Bernauer also asks how one could describe the subjectivity of Foucault himself. This approach is immediately problematic, it must be noted, since Foucault asked after the subjectivity of an age and not that of an individual. As for the content, Bernauer says that the ethical substance is “analysis…of practices” in all three axes; the mode in which one relates to oneself “is a commitment to a history of the present… as a field of contingencies”; the askesis is “the exacting arts of questioning which he developed in the archaeological-genealogical methods”; as its goal, this ethics “subverts the status of Absolute Man.”​[142]​ Ethics is reduced to a professorial description of meta-theses, method, and topics: history is built on changing practices, so research those historical changes and publically discuss your analysis in order to subvert others’ beliefs that certain things do not change. To call this a new form of ethical subjectivity is strange to me. Foucault and others were doing roughly this kind of historical thinking well before his work on ethics: this was a set of not-uncommon intellectual commitments for a certain kind of academic since WWII, perhaps since Nietzsche, perhaps even since the Enlightenment. Issues abound with this conception of ethics. If ethics (Foucault’s or ours) is basically genealogy as historical critique, then it is not clear that the later works offer anything which was not done before. Also, if they differ significantly, then the four aspects need content which can be more clearly differentiated from, say, Discipline and Punish. Further, others were doing something like this style of critique before Foucault, so this supposedly novel subjectivity has been haunting the halls of universities for roughly 250 years. Finally, even if we justly emphasize the uniqueness of Foucault’s way of doing history, even this kind of unique historiographical position cannot be said to structure the whole of one’s life, but only a narrow slice of it. This description (what was studied, why, the research methods used, and the expected results) would not sound out of place as a professor’s self-description, an agenda for research, or a rationale for a grant—but not everything about a ‘self’ and not everything about Foucault can define a form of subjectivity. 
Some attitudes and intellectual styles, as important as they may be, are at a different level of analysis than that of ethical subjectivity. In fact, as intellectually-centered as this description is, it is strange that it is supposed to be a new ethics and not a new form of knowledge. But ethics, as Foucault described it, is not typically centered upon denying others their false beliefs (such as the belief in Absolute Man). Certainly, the job of a professor is to change the way others think. But once you have given up the belief in Absolute Man, this so-called ethics would have very little impact on your relation to self, and would really be a relation to the false ideas of others. (Anyhow, if this were a good ethics to have after desiring subjectivity, then most of my colleagues have very little ethical self-formation left to do, which would be a great comfort to them.) If genealogy were truly a form of subjectivity, it would follow that a contemporary thinker who disagrees with the intellectual position that history is contingent (say, a Marxist) would have a wholly different form of subjectivity than Foucault. This is the equivalent of saying that Marxists and Foucauldians belong to wholly different regimes of knowledge, or that a man belongs to a different set of power relations than a woman.  Foucault’s understanding of an axis as a condition of possibility has been lost here, by taking a particular intellectual practice (a certain way of reading history for critique), and trying to expand it into a fundamental form of the constitution of experience. The attempt to render critique into ethical subjectivity does not at all resemble the kind of content found in The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self; in fact, those texts presuppose an intellectual stance like that which Bernauer described. 
Another way to put this is that one cannot be a “Genealogist” in the sense that one can be a Stoic, a Christian, an Epicurean—or a Spinozist. Recall that sex, food, and the household were important for Ancient ethics. Can these arenas of life really be lived genealogically or as critique? Exactly how does a genealogist have sex qua genealogist?​[143]​ Anything worth calling a form of subjectivity can be schematized by using the four elements, but genealogy cannot. What elements of sex count as ethically relevant to a genealogist (positions, intent, statements, results)? Why does genealogy call us to be sexually ethical (to prevent harm, to master oneself, to increase pleasure, because called upon to increase the human race)? How does it practice ethics via askesis (tests of denial, purifying confession, speech which reveals your true desires)? What is the net result of an ethical life (peace from the passions, harmony with nature, dominance in the private that is reflected in the public, unity in the private which carries one through the difficulty of the public)? Genealogy or critique simply cannot be stretched to supply content to the four elements that Foucault used to study Classical, Hellenistic, and Christian ethics.
O’Leary’s Foucault and the Art of Ethics
O’Leary devotes half of a book to describing a Foucauldian ethics in terms of the four aspects, giving each a chapter of its own. However, while the depth is much appreciated, once more, I take issue with the content, which also tries to ground a new form of subject in the texts of Foucault himself, instead of truly experimenting and going beyond Foucault. The ethical substance is the identity one has, the ways in which our experience is constituted.​[144]​ We must reject these identities and create new ones, O’Leary says. The mode of subjection is thus an aesthetics of existence.​[145]​ Once we have done away with what we do not really have to be, we now must select what we freely could be instead. Note though, that how aesthetics of existence actually functions for O’Leary: less as a form of relation to ethical precepts and more as a meta-ethical argument against selecting an ethics guided by universals, moral codes, or science. While O’Leary supports such a meta-ethical stance by arguing that Foucault had a positive implicit concept of freedom which can only have been aesthetically supported, the ensuing rejection of objective grounds for ethics is not really a relation to an ethical principle or an answer to ‘why be moral?’ It is rather is a realization about the possibilities left available. If all objective moralities are rejected, then aesthetic ethics remain. This realization would be the decisive moment before selecting a new ethics, but is not yet a decided-upon relation to ethical demands. Once more, we end with crucial lessons Foucault taught us (that since not all moralities are code-based, we do not need to ground our ethics today on science). We need to take this lesson, and wed ourselves to some kind of moral injunction and principle.  
O’Leary also states that the askesis of Foucault was philosophy,​[146]​ defined as “constant ‘mutation,’”  “a critical, reflective practice whose aim is to transform and de-subjectivate the individual,” to “’risk himself,’” to have a “conversion” to another way of life.​[147]​ Since he has defined the ethical substance as an identity to be rejected, the focus of askesis is to “untie the knots of our subjectivity.”​[148]​ While O’Leary knows that Hellenistic care developed and secured a self, his suggested askeses do not build or strengthen, but only reject what one is.​[149]​ But my central objection here is that it fails to maintain the four aspects. One element is to be done away with, and another element is that which does away with—ethical substance and askesis (respectively) are not truly distinct. Askesis, construed as the pure process of de-subjectivation, ends up negating the other elements. Thus, we are not discussing four distinct elements of a self here, but rather a single process leading to a new self. 
The telos likewise deals not a goal or state to be achieved, but with a process or the possibility of achieving a state. The telos is said to be “giving form to freedom. Freedom would operate as both the ontological condition of this ethical work, and as its ultimate aim: to maintain the openness and malleability that made form-giving possible in the first place.”​[150]​ The first aspect was defined as to be done away with; the third was defined as always undoing; the last is defined as the bare condition of possible change, and perpetually remaining open to change. Perpetual process, no produced state of being; never a mode, only modifying; a telos which is not a finality. What O’Leary is describing is the crucial process of moving away from an old subject, without yet having come to a new subject—a transition out of one form of subjectivity. That we are describing a transition is shown in the two selves referenced at once: the identity one already is, and the freedom one will become. There are two selves, and askesis is simply the process of transition between a self-element of ethical substance and another self-element of freedom. 
Despite the best efforts of the best interpreters of Foucault’s last years, genealogy, critique, and the ethos of the intellectual cannot be made to resemble a form of subjectivity. We can continue to colloquially refer to critique as an “ethical stance,” but this will not be continuous with the technical Foucauldian meaning of ethics as subjectivity. Many of his readers equate ethics with the “critical” mode, but Foucault’s many references to critique as an “ethos” are not enough to render critique an ethics. For instance, a Hellenistic farmer would have had a very different ethos than Seneca, yet they may have had the same basic ethical subjectivity qua Hellenistic Stoics. If subjectivity is one of three basic axes which structure any possible experience, does it make sense to say that this axis or form consists primarily of the historically informed questioning of that form? What kind of self could be exhaustively described by reference to genealogy, which is not a form itself, but the insistence that any form is historically constituted and carries dangers within it? It is one thing to say that a genealogical critique is important, was a practice of Foucault’s, and can inform what you do and think; it is another entirely to say that genealogical practice fully constitutes and fundamentally defines your relation to self.
Third Class of Objections: Responses That Confuse Ethics With Resisting Power
Foucault’s Texts Showing that Ethics is Not Defined Against Power
Another unsatisfying form of responses which ‘miss’ subjectivity are those which identify the ethics with attempts to change, disrupt, or resist power-relations. This reading occurs commonly, and in such disparate figures as Gilles Deleuze, Nancy Fraser, and Judith Butler. Notably, these readings do not fully engage with the bulk of the second and third volumes of the history of sexuality. For instance, they cannot point to instances of power-relations which are allegedly being resisted in Classical and Hellenistic ethics, because Foucault does not give such examples. Foucault does address the complex Hellenistic power-ethics interaction in the little-discussed “Self and Others,” Part Three of The Care of the Self (especially the chapter “The Political Game”), where he even uses the term “power relations,”​[151]​ a rarity in the later texts. However, the interaction cannot be categorized as resistance, especially since the political sphere is at this time ‘shrinking,’ more or less, as the ethical self becomes more important. 
The question of the choice between retreat and activity was indeed posed in a recurrent fashion. But the terms in which it was posed and the solution so often given to it show very well that it was not purely and simply a matter of… an ethics of withdrawal. It was a matter of elaborating an ethics that enabled one to constitute oneself as an ethical subject with respect to these social, civic, and political activities.​[152]​ 
The relation is difficult to sum up, but in no way is a non-withdrawal that integrates social and personal, to be read as resistance. He also is likely discussing power-relations of the Classical era indirectly in “Erotics” in The Use of Pleasure. In that text, it is even more clear that Classical ethics was so far from resisting power relations (of pedagogy, virile domination of subordinates, and agonistic competition with equals) that it indeed seems to support and intensify those power relations. Ethics prepared the boy to dominate himself in order to dominate others, and control himself as a boy so that as an adult he would not lose his control when he was with boys. Power and ethics in this instance could hardly be more close-knit.
If ethics can be categorized generally as resistance to power, then why would examples of this be wholly lacking in the texts on ethics? It could perhaps be because the relations of power to ethics were not of interest to him in that era; maybe they were too complex to sum up in a book with another focus; perhaps his selected sources did not directly treat themes relevant to power-relations. When asked in an interview if “the problematic of the care of the self [could] be at the heart of a new way of thinking about politics,” his response was, “I admit that I have not got very far in this direction.”​[153]​ Foucault, a few questions later, notes that there could be a “hinge point of ethical concerns and the political struggle for respect for rights, of critical thought against abusive techniques of government and research in ethics.”​[154]​ First, if the discussion has returned to ethics ‘fixing’ politics, this was in response to the interviewer’s repeated queries about domination in certain forms of power. Second, we should note that a “hinge” sounds like two axes interacting, not one thing resisting another. Third, in between these two quoted sections, Foucault emphatically declared, “Power is not evil. Power is games of strategy. We all know that power is not evil!”​[155]​ Why by definition ‘resist’ that which is non-evil as such, and even if one did so, why call that a form of subjectivity? And if one recalls that Foucault noted that “strategies” already involve resistance,​[156]​ then power-relations themselves contain resistance—we do not need to look to ethics to resist. Characterizations of ethics as resistance to power are not found in The Use of Pleasure or The Care of the Self, and do not seem to fit with discussions like these.
To try to explain the absence of examples of Ancient ethical resistance to power can only be speculation, of course. But what is certain is that Foucault does not in principle oppose power to subjectivity, and that Ancient ethics cannot be summarized as resistance to power—indeed, examples are hard to find. Foucault, in Security, Territory, Population, describes specific power-subjectivity relations that could be categorized as ‘resistance.’​[157]​ These are not suitable fodder for claims that power always oppresses our naturally free subjectivity, however, since the counter-conducts there are as power-based as they are ethics-based, and do not represent any permanent state of opposition. Therefore, I do not see support for claims such as, “Hellenistic and Roman salvation is the production of a subject of resistance,” that there is an “ethics of the self as a resistance to political power and to the self as an effect of this power,” or that “saving oneself, philosophical salvation, is… the effort one makes to resist power.”​[158]​ 
Such readings essentially collapse the ethical relation to self into power-relations with others, reduce a complex interaction to an identity-in-opposition, and substitute acts which aim at adjusting power-relations for real adjustments within subjectivity proper. If displacement of power-relations (such as Foucault’s own prison reforms) amounted to an answer, it was not to the problematization of subjectivity, but to that of power-relations. There are plenty of harmful contingencies that are specific to our subjectivity that continue to go without full analysis and thus without remedy, which results in the abandonment of ethics in favor of politics-as-power-relations? ​[159]​ Of course, political action can be a component of ethics, and I have emphasized that axes have complex forms of interaction. However, it is not a given that an ethics has to devote itself to, or be primarily defined by, its clashes with power-relations. In fact, a basic tenet of Foucault’s axes, that due to their “relative autonomy” an axis can ever be entirely collapsed into any other, should make us very wary of the tendency to claim that the axis of ethics can be exhausted by resistance to power.​[160]​ 
In fact, we need to be more than wary of such readings—we need to argue against  them, ​[161]​ as Foucault himself did on a number of occasions.​[162]​ Claiming that the ethical subject ought to resist power will end up hypostatizing power as ‘repressive domination’ which is permanently opposed to the ‘freedom of subjectivity.’ Foucault explicitly rejected this view. However, much as Foucault had to insist repeatedly that power is not opposed to knowledge,​[163]​ I must insist again that power is not opposed to subjectivity. Foucault’s later works set the stage for a particular reading of ethics which does not claim to free us from power. This is a crucial lesson, since overly crude notions of power as a permanent “No” directed at an originally free self, remain unknowingly complicit with neo-liberal forms of power anchored in the “the free subject.” Not only do we misread Foucault when we oppose power to the self, but we miss out on an opportunity to reconceive freedom. I will pursue another way of thinking, by asking what will we reject and what will we seek as subjects when we no longer need to think the self as pure indeterminate freedom.​[164]​ How will we understand failure or limitation, other than blaming an outside restriction? How can we understand our freedom as produced, and thereby lead ourselves to produce ever-more freedom? 
Deleuze
In nearly every reading of Foucault, the reading of ethics as resistance to power is assumed, and often explicitly stated. I will mention, then, just a few explicit instances of such a reduction. Deleuze is a primary example. “There never ‘remains’ anything of the subject, since he is to be created on each occasion, like a focal point of resistance, on the basis of the folds which subjectivize knowledge and bend power… The struggle for a modern subjectivity passes through a resistance to the… constraints of power.”​[165]​ While admitting that the Greek subject is detached from and not dependent on the other axes, Deleuze claims the subject or ‘inside’ is just the ‘doubling’ or ‘folding’ of power-knowledge.​[166]​ And if we are today seeing “the ‘production of a new subjectivity,’” Deleuze says, this is because “changes in capitalism find an unexpected ‘encounter’ in the slow emergence of a new Self as a centre of resistance.”​[167]​ Defining the subject as resistance to power also has the unintended but very real effect of de-historicizing forms of subjectivity. For Deleuze, the “Self” resists whatever could be called Power around it. The power-relations which Deleuze points to in the Ancient world are the wife and the boy; evidently, for Deleuze, the free, dominating Greek husband resisted power by teaching his wife to serve him. Deleuze cites the initially more plausible case of the boy, who “learns to govern himself, to be active and to resist the power of others.”​[168]​ However, how are we to understand the older man’s subjectivity as ‘resisting’ power? Deleuze here ignores the texts and puts his own words in their place. While this may sound like an extreme judgment, note that the ‘fold’ which he uses to define subjectivity is from Deleuze’s earlier text on Leibniz: that is, Deleuze’s account of Foucauldian ethics rests on a Deleuzian concept which justifies Deleuze’s own politics of constant deterritorialization.
McGushin
On the other hand, McGushin, in a very different interpretive mode (rooted in the texts, focused on the later works, and not carrying a Deleuzian agenda) also attempts to cast ethical care of the self as counter-power. McGushin mastered the details of the lectures from 1981-1984, which enabled him to note those instances where an ethical practice was ‘resisting’ or otherwise out of step with power relations. For instance, there was “mysticism, as a counterpractice, which resisted incorporation into the pastorate.”​[169]​ However, such examples do not mean that the ethics and power are always opposed. There are also many instances, just as concrete, of ethics supporting or providing a relay for power or knowledge; it is not as if the many times that the two have supported each other were just unnatural colonizations of ethical subjectivity by power. The subject is just as liable to be a “support, or handle” for power as it is to be an “adversary, target.”​[170]​ Since power is not evil or opposed to us in any way, ethics and power dovetailing is not in principle evil or foreign to any form of subjectivity. Imagine if we had ‘good’ power-relations—would you still want your ethical subjectivity to be resistant to power-relations? In a text otherwise so historically sensitive, once again the opposition of ethics and power makes history disappear in the face of a timeless and Manichean division. “Foucault’s interpretation of the Hellenistic and Roman model of philosophical care of the self is in constant reference to Christian hermeneutics of the self. However, we can also see it with constant reference to the contemporary problem of disciplinary, normalizing forms of bio-power.”​[171]​ But attending to the details of both, I am not sure how a conversion to oneself is meant to undo the statistical rendering of a population in terms of birth rates, for instance. 
Fourth Class of Objections: Taking Foucault’s Life as an Ethical Model. Cult of Personality Around “The Man Michel,” as Typified in Miller. Halperin and McWhorter Avoid This Danger.
Foucault’s Texts Showing his Skepticism Regarding the “Author Function”
There is another style of interpretation which is flawed. Some readers emphasize too much the particulars of the biography of ‘the man Michel’ himself.​[172]​ There is the tendency to dredge up opinions and anecdotes of his life, as if they held the key to what ethics ought to be after the desiring subject.​[173]​ Without discussing the details, I would here like to invoke “The Discourse on Language,” from 1970. Foucault indicates a number of functions or practices that constitute discourse, which like all other practices give a consistency to our experience which we often mistake as a necessary structure of being (or language or truth or man). In this case, the author-function operates “as the unifying principle in a particular group of writings or statements… as the seat of their coherence.”​[174]​ Since the seventeenth century, and in disciplines outside of science, we give special credence to the author-function to make sense of statements. “We ask authors to… reveal their personal lives, to account for their experiences and the real story that gave birth to their writings;” this function encompasses “even preliminary sketches for the work, and what he drops as simple mundane remarks.”​[175]​ Briefly, if Foucault argues here that the author-function should not be understood as a guarantee of unity within an oeuvre, then my claim is that even less so can it fuse together oeuvre and the subjectivity of its writer. 
Miller’s Passion of Michel Foucault 
Yet that is precisely what is asked—what “we virtually insist” upon is a fusion of every word written with “an identity whose form is that of individuality and the I.”​[176]​ Even non-verbal acts get swept up; for instance, in Miller, the act of taking LSD in 1975 is said to have given birth to the altered plan for The History of Sexuality series. More than that, taking LSD in the desert is united with sex in San Francisco, with understanding a Malcom Lowry novel (a favorite of a former lover, and so also linked to the comprehension of this then-dead lover), with Foucault’s publications mentioning drugs from 1967 and 1970 (despite not having taken this drug until 1975, a unity will be found); even the non-act of refraining from taking LSD earlier in his life finds unity by drawing in the wariness of Foucault’s then-current lover.​[177]​ Lovers dead and alive and not yet met, his own philosophy and the literature of another, drugs imagined, undergone, and refused—all are drawn together by the magical line (which no doubt forms a perfect circle) which is the name “Michel Foucault.” Staying too close to Michel the man (his biography or tastes or mundane remarks) doubles down on the statement-unifying principle of the author, and posits a unity between statements and his personal life. 
Even if such a unity did obtain, is it possible to mimic Foucault’s personal behaviors or style of living? Even if the author could be propped up as a unity of life and text, which bits of his life should we follow? Often, sexual examples from his time in the USA are taken to be especially revealing.​[178]​ If we ask what use Michel as a sexual-ethical model might have for us today, the numerous biographies do not seem to supply useful tactics, but only anecdotes; I do not know many readers who strictly employ Foucault’s sexual practices to transform themselves.​[179]​ Or if we are supposed to merely take Michel’s life as general inspiration, then what connection remains to the specifics of his biography? That is, since he was into fisting, should that be my inspiration to become a philatelist? Those who want his life to give examples of what to do, still do not follow those examples; those who take them as inspiration for very different practices, do not show a derivation of one practice from a different practice. And, I will insist once again, a novel practice does not make a new mode of subjectivity. Anecdotes can supply no theoretical necessity that we must follow Michel to the letter; nor do they supply a clear practical ethical form (with the four aspects of ethics named earlier). 
Halperin’s Saint Foucault and McWhorter’s Bodies and Pleasures
Some biographical approaches rely upon Foucault’s personal life in a much more careful fashion. For instance, David Halperin manages to discuss Foucault and the effect he has on gay activists without reducing Foucault to a theory which they applied, nor does his “hagiography” run the danger of making Foucault a typical saint. He details risks inherent to biographies of Foucault; it is no surprise then that he avoids those missteps or misunderstandings of Foucault which I would summarize as a cult of personality. Notably though, the changes which Halperin indicates that Foucault caused are largely political and address power-relations. The ethical, ascetical examples which are given are those which predate Foucault’s influence, like sculpting one’s body at the gym.​[180]​ Ladelle McWhorter, even going so far as to recount many stories from her own life, deftly approaches the personal while avoiding the dangers of biography. Additionally, she draws inspiration from Foucault’s life and theory to develop transformative practices of her own. But her practices are gardening and square-dancing​[181]​—that is, practices which in no way require mastering Michel’s life story or personal peccadilloes in order to have effects on her subjectivity. Both McWhorter and Halperin helpfully show the reality of creating new ethical modes. However, my point is that these were created beyond Foucault and not by him. These modes are not Foucault’s method of genealogy nor his version of critique, they are not resistance to his descriptions of power-relations, and they do not mimic his biography. We are allowed to make a move of our own, without filtering it entirely through Foucault’s text.
To read genealogies of the subject is necessary to prepare us to reject or disinvest in the “desiring subject”—however, it hardly indicates what we might replace desire with. To contest or resist power will likely change power-relations— however, it is not guaranteed to change the subject. To contest power is not in itself ethical in the Foucauldian sense, though it is of course necessary for adjusting power relations with others. To read about Foucault’s personal life is also no guarantee of ethical change; if reading about the Ancient Greeks is not sufficient to convert one to their way of living, why would absorbing Foucault’s biography make one become a “Foucauldian subject?” Work on Foucault demands more than he gave us, as he fully understood. It demands a transformation into a new form of life, which will follow genealogy, and will be brought about by practices of askesis. A full ethical form of subjectivity must be implemented, which must be describable in terms of the four aspects, and the askesis of which must directly counter desiring subjectivity on multiple points. What I propose is a Spinozistic ethics described in terms of the four elements of subjectivity, which has a large role for askesis and its power to transform the subject, and a novel conception of freedom. Later, we will turn to Spinoza, who according to Foucault, stated a 
very interesting notion… in formulating the problem of access to the truth Spinoza linked the problem to a series of requirements concerning the subject’s very being: In what aspects and how must I transform my being as subject? What conditions must I impose on my being as subject so as to have access to… the highest good, the sovereign good?​[182]​ 
Foucault finds these questions “very interesting” for their emphasis on a theme which was crucial for Ancient ethics, and yet, has been rethought only in fits and starts since. The importance placed on ethical attention and transformation of the self was taken up again in the 17th century and once more in 19th century philosophy,​[183]​ and perhaps may be in the 21st as well.

3. Transition to Later Works: What Subjectivity Is, and Why It Was Not Present Earlier
Introduction 
The usefulness of The Use of Pleasure and of The Care of the Self is far from obvious. The relation of these two texts on subjectivity to Foucault’s other works and themes is also difficult to pin down. A common interpretation (one which I take pains to argue against) is that the function of the later works is to glorify the freedom supposedly found in an individual’s relation to the self which can then be deployed against the repression supposedly inflicted on us by power. Often, this interpretation links to claims that such freedom compromises, qualifies, or contradicts his earlier writings on power-relations. Instead, I will give my support to the interpretation​[184]​ that Foucault’s work can be thought of as consisting of three axes, and that subjectivity is the third in time of the axes.​[185]​ That it comes last in time does not give it any special status, by the way, either diminished or revelatory. Subjectivity is not an afterthought nor is it a crowning culmination.
However, the issue of its timing cannot simply be brushed aside. Subjectivity was not present in any significant way before The History of Sexuality, and even when present, it is not thematized or clearly delineated from other issues. Only with the introduction of a new mode of analysis does subjectivity become a stand-alone object of study; the new mode of analysis is stated explicitly in the “Introduction” of The Use of Pleasure. Without a new method of analysis, subjectivity would have remained poorly formulated and thus functioned merely as a node within power-knowledge. For example, ‘the individual’ of sexuality would have remained under discussion in relation to the axis of knowledge (medical truths about it), or thought in relation to the axis of power-relations (doctors’ and psychologists’ relations to patients). Subjectivity was instead artificially isolated from the other axes (given a “relative autonomy”​[186]​) and formalized by four aspects of ethics (ethical substance, mode of subjection, askesis or practices of the self, and moral telos).
How this axis or line of research developed is best understood by analyzing his course lectures, because Foucault was led to his published results by his historical research and his lectures are a record of that research. Therefore, I will argue that the lectures show how Foucault’s research took him from sexuality, to governmentality, to pastoral power, to confession, to other practices of the self including ancient practices, which (when methodologically specified in terms of the four aspects) led to the subject as that which is constituted or formed by such practices. Sometimes the research narrowed (to pastoral power, as a particular kind of governmentality); sometimes it broadened (to practices of the self in general, after the particular practice of confession). The path that brought Foucault to subjectivity was not contained implicitly in the first step of sexuality; it does not complete the earlier researches; it is not a deepening of the prior ideas. If it was a ‘path’ at all, then it was not a straight one, and certainly not a destiny. History does not operate that way for Foucault, and so neither does his method of historical research.
We should, for this reason, try to avoid the language of steps or stages—even ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ implicitly conveys that the temporal order is definitive of each axis. Subjectivity, in its detailed content, was not present or even ‘between the lines’ in the earlier works. From what would we ‘deduce’ the four aspects in, say, Discipline and Punish? The works The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self are not the explication of latent Foucauldian ideas. Nor is subjectivity a reversal or backtracking of a line. Specifically, subjectivity was not a reaction to an inherent limitation in the way he discussed power.​[187]​ 
Yet subjectivity is relatable to earlier works. The language of axes, elaborated below, is helpful for thinking the relations of different aspects of Foucault’s work. There is a relation where the lines or axes cross; there is distinction of content or method of analysis where they do not cross (that is, for most of the line). In terms of his research, as Foucault followed a line at length, he was bound to eventually stumble upon a node or intersection of that line with another; on occasion he would begin to follow the other line or axis. Hence, archaeology of knowledges eventually includes a node of knowledge-power, upon which Foucault pivoted to follow the axis of genealogies of power-relations; the axis of power-relations eventually described enough about the “individual” as a subject-power node, that Foucault could follow that axis as well. 
Argument for Axial Interpretation
Foucault repeatedly described his project in terms of three basic areas of research, which he called axes. The first which I will present occurs in the programmatic explanation of the “Modifications”​[188]​ he had made to his original plan for The History of Sexuality. The second is his “jointly re-edited” 1983 interview with Dreyfus and Rabinow,​[189]​ which presents his work in general and also contextualizes his more recent direction. The third is “What is Enlightenment?”​[190]​ Thus, these occur not in occasional pieces, or offhand comments, but in works which are central to any understanding of Foucault.
In The Use of Pleasure, Foucault defined “the three axes that constitute [sexuality]: (1) the formation of sciences (savoirs) that refer to it, (2) the systems of power that regulate its practice, (3) the forms within which individuals are able, are obliged, to recognize themselves as subjects of this sexuality.”​[191]​ Foucault uses a similar description in the Dreyfus and Rabinow interview. “How do the next two books after The History of Sexuality, Volume One…fit into the structure of your genealogy project?”​[192]​ Foucault responded: 
Three domains of genealogy are possible. First, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth…; second, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power…; third, a historical ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents. So, three axes are possible for genealogy… The truth axis was studied in The Birth of the Clinic and The Order of Things. The power axis was studied in Discipline and Punish, and the ethical axis in The History of Sexuality.​[193]​ 
Note that Foucault explicitly applies the axes across his corpus. In “What is Enlightenment?,” Foucault applies the axial description even more widely. 
We have three axes whose specificity and whose interconnections have to be analyzed: the axis of knowledge, the axis of power, the axis of ethics… systematized as follows: How are we constituted as subjects within our own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our own actions?​[194]​ 
Here, he seems to say that “we” can do research along each of these axes, not just that his own works could be so categorized. 
So, even if Foucault came very late to the axial description, it was not a passing fancy. The scope with which he used it, and the variety of venues in which he expressed it, seem to recommend taking this description seriously. I have shown multiple examples of Foucault using the language of axes—but not even all of them​[195]​—for a few reasons. Selecting from three different texts, over all of which he had editorial oversight, which are usually taken to be programmatic explanations of his work, and all of which uses axes to explain more than just The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, hopefully gives some force to my claims that the language of axes was not idle chatter, that the axes are a broadly useful way to understand Foucault. Such claims cannot be easily undermined, even though Foucault does describe his project in different terms elsewhere, due to the prevalence of the axial description. 
Usefulness of the Axial Interpretation (Despite its Difficulties)
In different contexts, Foucault repeatedly and consistently described his project as falling under three broad themes, which relate to each other as intersecting axes. And yet, until the last few years of his life, neither Foucault nor his readers could have persuasively characterized his work in these terms. Does the late addition of the terminology of axes undermine their legitimacy or explanatory force? Why do his readers not fully and easily embrace the axial schema as the dominant way to discuss his work? Why did this conceptual language not show up earlier, since it supposedly applies to earlier works? Difficulties like these can be addressed by discussing how axes relate to each other, and hence, how Foucault moved from one to another via their relations.
The ‘modifications’ that took place in Foucault’s works after Volonté de Savoir are real, but need to be understood precisely. No doubt, The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self are different from Volonté de Savoir and Discipline and Punish, in tone, content, and historical periods studied—and the latter genealogical texts differ from The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Order of Things. That is, the differences between the third axis and works on power, are of approximately the same order as difference between “knowledge-power” and “archaeology of knowledges.” The ‘middle’ ‘genealogical’ texts on knowledge-power show that certain elements of power may hinge upon particular elements of knowledge (e.g. the psychiatric evaluation as a new mode of knowledge, helps to establish the divergent carcereal statuses of the mad and sane). “Governmentality” similarly just is the hinge of relations to others and self-relation, or the hinge of the axis of power and the axis of subjectivity. Can the introduction of clearly political themes and the indignant tone of Discipline and Punish be successfully integrated with the staid discursive concerns of The Archaeology of Knowledge? Most readers think the answer is yes; and, while it is more difficult to do so, we should try to retain a similar attitude when considering the works on ethics. To make a similar attitude easier to hold, I want to link the diverse content of Foucault’s works to his general methodology, his nominalism which, in the act of  schematizing or laying down a grid of intelligibility, half discovers and half shapes its object.
The Order of Things and The Birth of the Clinic focused their analysis largely on discursive statements. Other issues remained bracketed. But it is not possible or desirable to entirely bracket all non-discursive practices and objects. The Birth of the Clinic shows this well; references to post-Revolutionary institutional restructurings float in and out of Foucault’s discussion of the medical discourse being formed.​[196]​ Factors other than discursive statements showed themselves to be relevant: practices not reducible to knower-discourse-known relation, differential relations within institutions which made possible the objects known. Power-relations are present in our knowledge of any given object of research, since they are present in the constitution of our general experience. A single-minded methodological focus on discursive statements could not prevent Foucault from stumbling across power, as a realm of research that partially intersected the realm to which he was then devoted. Later, Discipline and Punish methodologically isolated power-relations. Foucault’s work then could be helpfully thought of as treating power-knowledge (though this term would not have helped much before). Since power-knowledge is well documented, let us move on to subjectivity in its connection with the texts on power-relations.
Once more, a partially formed or partially revealed object of research began to catch Foucault’s eye. The individual is a key element of the power-relations which Foucault is studying in Volonté de Savoir.​[197]​ Was there perhaps a level of analysis that focuses on the individual in her self-relation—and neither on the knower’s relation to the rules of one of the particular connaissances, nor on the interrelation of bodies with spaces and people with people? A new possible area of research had insisted upon itself, and so the individual in its self-relation would now also receive attention. 
Foucault’s general methodology​[198]​ was to artificially isolate whatever axis he was working upon, as a propaedeutic to seeing that realm and its transformations on its own terms. But the content of the other axes are still available for study.​[199]​ For instance, knowledge is not a clearly isolated theme in The Use of Pleasure or The Care of the Self, though ‘knowledge-subjectivity’ was taken up in later lectures on Ancient philosophy.​[200]​ Similarly, just because The Use of Pleasure does not contain a chapter called “Power-Relations” does not mean that they were not present in Ancient Greece, or that they were invisible to Foucault.​[201]​ In fact, if read within an axial interpretation, “True Love” in The Use of Pleasure clearly unites truth, power relations, and subjectivity.​[202]​ To read Foucault’s works with his comments about axes in mind is a productive reading method, which renders the relevant axis distinct and precise, without foreclosing the possibility of making or seeing connections to the other axes.  
One can trace any given axis in relative isolation from the others, and yet to fully understand an axis, those points where it intersects the others must eventually be acknowledged.​[203]​ All three are co-constitutive of our possible experience, and research which wholly ignores any axis must be considered incomplete. An approach to reading Foucault, based on the axial interpretation, roughly could be stated this way. First, start with any one axis and ‘master’ that material. Then integrate selected portions of a second axis by analyzing particular nodal intersections (such as pedagogy, the “individual” of “sexuality,” parrhesia, neo-liberal “interest,” or “madness”) between the ‘starting’ axis and another axis. Then repeat the process for the remaining axis. To focus on only one axis would not only largely miss the others, but would even distort that axis, since its nodes would be incompletely grasped. Reading all the works together, however, would lack the clarity of analyzing an axis in artificial isolation. Using this reading strategy, one could begin with subjectivity (reading The Care of the Self, The Use of Pleasure, and the lectures from 1980-1984); then choose nodal links to truth (tracking subject-truth relations through parrhesia, or through psychiatric knowledge); then, after, track down nodal connections of subject-power (pedagogical forms, neo-liberal individual desire).
Lectures: The Trace of Foucault’s Research Itinerary
However, should we trust Foucault’s reports that axes properly describe his work? There are reasons to be skeptical. For starters, he was quite variable in his self-descriptions—as his interview venues proliferated, so too did the range of his provocative pronouncements​[204]​—and so he gave explanations for his work other than ‘axes.’ Also, since I avoid making explanatory recourse to authorial intent or biography, consistency requires that I not make his self-analyses my primary argument. The authority of interpreters such as Arnold Davidson and Flynn is contested as well, by other authorities that do not read Foucault’s writings in terms of axes. Therefore, to buttress my claims against these legitimate challenges, another support will be given for the axial interpretation: his yearly lecture courses at the Collège de France.
A schematic itinerary of Foucault’s courses supports an axial interpretation, by showing the emergence of subjectivity as an axis from power-subject nodes. Every year, his position at the Collège de France required that Foucault publicly present his then-current research. Generally speaking, the research of a published text will be visible in lectures from a few years prior; thus, for the seemingly mysterious leap or ‘turn’ to ethical subjectivity, we can look to lectures to establish the ideas which Foucault was uncovering in his research. The resulting schema looks like this: sexuality led him to research governmentality, which led to pastoral power, which led to confession, which led to practices of the self including ancient practices, which led to that which is constituted by such practices (subjectivity).​[205]​
The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 was originally published in 1976 (as Histoire de la Sexualité, Tome 1: La Volonté de Savoir).​[206]​ The lectures that contain the relevant research for this text are Psychiatric Power (1973-1974) and Abnormal (1974-1975).​[207]​ I will not detail the connections, but if the reader does, she will see initial evidence of a general trend. Foucault’s published books contain many of the same textual references and themes as his lectures from a few years prior. The next lecture is Society Must Be Defended in 1975-1976. In 1977-1978 we have Security, Territory, Population, and then The Birth of Biopolitics in 1978-1979.​[208]​ These three lectures are not too difficult to connect to the two prior. Foucault’s analysis of the norm, and the forms of study and adjustment which take the abnormal as their target, has broadened. No longer is the focus on the abnormal individual and the ways that abnormality underscores and reveals the norm. Now, ‘population’ begins to emerge as a research focus, as well as its twinned power-relation, ‘biopolitics.’ 
Biopolitics, despite never receiving full treatment by Foucault (even in its titular lecture), has captured the attention of many of his readers. However, biopolitics was not the only modality of power-relations which captured Foucault’s own attention in those years,​[209]​ and the other modalities give indications as to how the subject became an isolated axis of research. The research which is important for my argument begins in Security, Territory, Population. “Why should one want to study… ‘governmentality’? My immediate answer will be, of course, in order to tackle the problem of the state and population.”​[210]​ He then further justifies his shift “in a few words and by recalling a somewhat more general project,” referencing disciplinary power and the study of power-relations broadly.​[211]​ To study the state in terms of population as Foucault wishes, he must do a genealogy of governmentality. He then goes on to complicate the genealogy further. To study governmentality requires a history of the individual, for “one never governs a state, a territory, or a political structure. Those whom one governs are people, individuals, or groups.”​[212]​ Foucault then names two kinds of power-relations that have the individual as a central component. “I think we can say that the origin of the idea of a government of men should be sought in… two forms: first, in the idea and organization of a pastoral type of power, and second, in the practice of spiritual direction, the direction of souls.”​[213]​ 
Leaving aside specifics, I will instead note that Foucault also claims that “the absolutely fundamental and essential feature of this overall pastoral power is that throughout Christianity it remained distinct from political power.” Foucault elaborates: “between the pastoral power of the Church and political power there will, of course, be a series of conjunctions, supports, relays, and conflicts… However… pastoral power, its form, type of functioning, and internal technology, remains absolutely specific and different from political power, at least until the eighteenth century.” ​[214]​ Foucault adds that “the reason for this distinction is… for me at least, an enigma. Anyway, I make absolutely no claim to resolve the problem… either now or next week.”​[215]​ The enigma—unresolved at this point—arises because pastoral power, since it cannot be thought or executed without a full knowledge of singular individuals, is inassimilable to the more ‘technical’ models of power used by the Greeks which function without reference to any “individual” in Foucault’s technical sense. An enigma then, because it cannot be properly described in terms of power-knowledge. Foucault is slowly finding his way into a form of power, which is a node of power-subjectivity (hence, the “relays”). The pastorate of the “flock” is a power-relation, but one which requires the individual soul as an essential element, such that it does not exist and cannot be formulated accurately without detailing a form of subjectivity as “individuality.”
The pastorate needs to be distinguished from other, less subject-centric, forms of power, but ‘spiritual direction’ requires a direct analysis of the subject itself. In spiritual direction, e.g. confession, “we see the emergence of what could be called absolutely specific modes of individualization,” brought about by “the exclusion of the self, of the ego, and of egoism” as a form of “subjection (assujettissement),” and acquired through the “production of an internal, secret, and hidden truth” as a technique of “subjectivation (subjectivation).”​[216]​  Here, themes of Volonté de Savoir are side by side with the content of The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self. Research into spiritual direction pushed Foucault’s results along a different axis than the prior themes, without abandoning them or requiring a leap. 
If this seems compressed in my analysis, this is because it is compressed in the lectures as well, as Foucault notes when he says that he is speaking “very schematically.”​[217]​ Already making a brief series of contrasts to “Antiquity,”​[218]​ Foucault can see a different history presenting itself. His research interests are dragging him beyond power. “What the history of the pastorate involves, therefore, is the entire history of procedures of human individualization in the West. Let’s say also that it involves the history of the subject.”​[219]​ A big enough topic for a few volumes, say, but one which is not developed further in these lectures. As Foucault plunged deeper into the individual of pastoral power-relations, he became more and more entangled in the history of the subject in its specificity.
To trace the genealogy of the pastorate around the 13th-18th centuries, Foucault is led to the founding of the Church, and eventually, to pre-Christian sources that are the content of his works on subjectivity.​[220]​ From his research into the pastorate (which had generated “more than a draft of a book about sexual ethics in the sixteenth century, in which…the techniques of the self, self-examination, the cure of souls, is very important”),​[221]​ Foucault “wondered what the technology of the self before Christianity was…what kind of sexual ethics was characteristic of the ancient culture.”​[222]​ 
Following Security, Territory, Population we have The Birth of Biopolitics (1978-1979) and then On the Government of the Living (1979-1980). In 1980, Foucault returns to questions of confession and what came before it.​[223]​ He works through the themes “schematically” set out as possible lines of research in Security, Territory, Population,​[224]​ specifying Christian practices and detailing their remove from ancient practices.​[225]​ Elements of the research of On the Government of the Living, although here centered on Christianity, are deployed in The Care of the Self as well. In both, for instance, Seneca’s use of the term “speculator sui” in De Ira is shown to contrast with Christian examination of the self.​[226]​ 
After On the Government of the Living comes the lecture Subjectivité et Verité (1980-1981).​[227]​ Once more, hinges or nodes of Volonté de Savoir and subjectivity are visible in the researches just prior to the publication of the last works. 
How was the subject established… as a possible, desirable, or even indispensable object of knowledge?… The guiding thread that seems the most useful for this inquiry is constituted by what one might call the ‘techniques of the self’… What work should be carried out on the self? How should one ‘govern oneself’… ?​[228]​ 
The questions and their phrasing are clearly part of the hinge of the axis of the subject with other axes. Foucault is now largely focused on techniques of the self,​[229]​ through which “one could take up the question of governmentality from a different angle: the government of the self by oneself in its articulation with relations with others (such as one finds in pedagogy, behavior counseling, spiritual direction, the prescription of models for living, and so on).”​[230]​ 
Ethical Grid of Intelligibility: The Four Aspects of Subjectivity
These Ancient techniques of the self led Foucault to schematize ‘the self’ in terms of four aspects. The importance of these four aspects or “forms of moral subjectivation”​[231]​ for understanding subjectivity is not often fully appreciated. However, if we want to do more research into what Foucault called subjectivity, we need to better understand the method which isolated the four aspects. To properly understand what kind of subjects we are today, we would need to apply this same method to the subjectivities that occur between early Christian ethics and our own. For a history of our subjectivity, what is important in the Renaissance, in Descartes, in Kant? Only by looking much more closely at what was central in other forms of ethical self-relation can we understand, critique, and eventually reject some of the content of the subjectivity which we are today.
What constitutes a form of subjectivity? In short, the four aspects outlined in The Use of Pleasure which define the structure of that book.​[232]​ “In this volume… I will start from the then common notion of ‘use of pleasures’—chrēsis aphrodisiōn—and attempt to determine the modes of subjectivation to which it referred: the ethical substance, the types of subjection, the forms of elaboration of the self, and the moral teleology.”​[233]​ The next sixty pages then illuminate ethical substance as aphrodisia, the mode of subjection as a technical ‘use’ of pleasures, the elaboration of the self as practices of self-mastery, with a telos of freedom. Foucault spent a fourth of the text explicitly treating these aspects, and yet, in most accounts of subjectivity, these are summarily treated in a single paragraph.​[234]​ 
We should take the time to detail the four elements of subjectivity because we will require the details of subjectivity in order to properly analyze our own subjectivity today—if we seek to change it. Without attention to detail, the lessons we can draw from the later works will be simple and not terribly useful.​[235]​ Foucault, through these four aspects of ethics, underscored a “whole rich and complex field of historicity.”​[236]​ Precisely this rich field deserves to be our central focus in The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self. We should aim for enough detail in this historical field, that we can see what fragments, with what modifications, remain in us today. First, we will define the aspects, then outline the content which Foucault gave to them within each historical era he analyzed.​[237]​
The four aspects which Foucault used as a general grid of intelligibility for analyzing ethics can be schematized as follows. The “ethical substance” is the “prime material”​[238]​ of ethics: that which counts as the site, object or moment of ethical attention. It is what is judged in moral terms: acts, consequences of acts, thoughts, character, feelings?​[239]​ The “mode of subjection” is “the way in which the individual recognizes himself as obliged to put [ethics] into practice.”​[240]​ What demand is there to be ethical: why should one want to be a better person? Are ethical precepts framed as rational rules, as technical plans, as an inner call to authenticity? Askesis is defined as the “ethical work that one performs on oneself… to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject of one’s behavior.”​[241]​ Often called practices of the self, askesis encompasses the training and exercise which refines, founds, or maintains a specific relation to self. One can practice verbal confession to purge sin, or undergo physical trials in order to make one more resistant to pain and difficulties, and so on. There is a “telos” of ethical behavior, in that it “aims beyond” discrete acts towards a “pattern of conduct” and “a certain mode of being.”​[242]​ The telos is what results from living well. Is one happier? Does one achieve eternal life? Does one attain the sage’s perfection in this life? What will you become, once you have truly become a good person? Now that we have schematized what each of the four aspects is, we can proceed to summarize the content which Foucault saw them as having in the Ancient world.
Four Classical Aspects
Classical Ethical Substance
The Classical ethical substance consisted of aphrodisia, that class of “acts intended by nature, associated by nature with an intense pleasure, and naturally… liable to excess and rebellion.​[243]​ A Classical subject was part of nature, and the attraction to pleasure is a fundamental fact about what humans are and how they behave. That is, he was naturally supposed to desire pleasurable things, and indeed did desire them, and getting them (in the best way) was good for him. In classical thought, desire for pleasure was natural and what was natural was good, to put it far too bluntly.​[244]​ 
The Greeks were not naïvely optimistic when it came to pleasures of the body.​[245]​ Because pleasure is good and hence desirable, we have a natural tendency to overdo the pleasures. Nature is in motion for Classical ethics: uncontested, nature may impel a man with motion which is too great, or moves in the wrong direction. Just as sexual pleasure draws him toward it with powerful force, it can push him closer to death, for “if it was not properly measured and distributed, it carried the threat of a breaking forth of involuntary forces, a lessening of energy, and death.”​[246]​ An excellent man, however, successfully marked out when pleasures began to cause problems rather than to secure goods. Nature was worked with rather than fled from. Food and sex, like politics, carry dangers with them, but if a man bested those dangers he became a hero. Proper use of the ethical substance made him an Olympic victor or a Socrates. 
Classical Mode of Subjection
It is precisely such an opportunity for greatness that motivated some Greeks to strive for ethical excellence. The Classical Greek mode of subjection (the principle that justifies ethical life) was this: any man who wanted to individualize and give aesthetic brilliance to his life, would make proper use (chrēsis) of the aphrodisia by subjecting his bodily pleasures to variable adjustment.​[247]​ It is important to understand that the Greek mode of subjection was not a call that all felt, nor were they expected to.​[248]​ Morality belonged “not just to anyone but particularly to those who had rank, status, and responsibility in the city.”​[249]​ 
What would later seem so ludicrous to Kant—that an ethics containing only hypothetical imperatives could even be called a morality, let alone considered worthy of praise—was a given for Aristotle and his ilk. That is, if one wants to become moderate, then one needs to make a certain use of the aphrodisia. Conversely, if not, then one does not need to moderate or use pleasures. The ethical project for a Greek was self-selecting and rare, not universal or obligatory.
The Greek mode of subjection is a technical use of pleasures which was adjusted “according to circumstances.”​[250]​ It would be imprecise to say that a good Greek knows the right use of pleasures, because “prudence” does not fix a regimen “uniformly and for everyone.”​[251]​ It would be more precise to say that he knows a right use: “the modalities of a use that depended on different variables” (including his individual body), a “savoir-faire”​[252]​ which varies by climate, time, frequency, personal temperament, and which presents a range of acceptable options. Greek subjectivity was not a universal demand, but an optional contest.​[253]​ We today struggle with a lack of rules, yet desire to give form of some sort to our lives. 
In conjunction with marriage, the technical aspect of Classical ethics is underscored again, in a rather surprising way. In marriage, status and techne​[254]​ converge, which characterizes marriage as a work relation of ruler and ruled. While the gender disparity is “disgusting,”​[255]​ as Foucault unequivocally states, there are other points of interest. The man invariably is in charge of the house, and so must delegate the means or work to others, such as the wife. What marriage requires is a techne of ordering and guiding others. In a stark remove from today, “the sexual behavior of the two spouses was not questioned from the standpoint of their personal relationship.”​[256]​ Marriage requires, not that a man love his wife, but simply that he direct her well. Its meaning centers on an impersonal techne built around the ends which need to be achieved, not what one feels for the other. 
Classical Askesis
But how did a Greek man get better at the technical use of pleasures? In terms of the askesis, or practices of the self, he had to achieve an “active form of self-mastery” over his own potentially excessive “desires and pleasures.”​[257]​ He needed exercises that would increase his natural strength, so he would be stronger than other natural forces. Since it is a matter simply of force against force, victory will always go to the stronger: the force of Socrates’ true love of wisdom, bested the weaker force of Socrates’ lust for beauty.
“A struggle of this kind required training.”​[258]​ Specific to Classical askesis was that “exercise was regarded as the actual practice of what one needed to train for; it was not something distinct from the goal to be reached.”​[259]​ Greek techniques of the self resemble athletic training, continuous with what you are practicing for: to run faster, he must practice by running fast.​[260]​ 
 Classical askesis requires pedagogy: the boy or ephebe must be taught. Once he has learned, he is a man and an expert. More or less, Classical ethical apprenticeship reaches closure—if he were properly taught in his youth, he would likely maintain that character his whole life. Once perfected through askesis, there is not much cause for worry. Who would be concerned that Socrates would crumble on his death-bed, having courageously practiced death so many times before?​[261]​ We today maintain an intense interest in self-questioning our whole lives long—no doubt, quite anxiously. Perhaps if we emphasized practices that more effectively shape the subject, instead of hoping and fearing that our ‘free’ will might someday make an unexpected reversal, we could develop ourselves more securely, and worry less that we might lose all that we have fought for through practices of the self.
Classical Ethical Telos
What is the aim or telos of Classical askesis? How does the ethical man change and what reward does he reap, through work on himself? Once a man has become a “skillful and prudent guide of himself,” he can “make his life into an oeuvre that would endure beyond his own ephemeral existence.”​[262]​ The ethically excellent Greek achieves the telos of creating an impressive image, a beautiful life which “would assure one of a name meriting remembrance.”​[263]​ The strong appetites and pleasures that dominate the majority of men, have been bested by this rare man. 
While ethical excellence “individualized” a Greek man, it did not make him into a modern ‘individual.’ Insofar as his life achieved a “special brilliance,” it did so “by virtue of the rational and deliberate structure his action manifested.”​[264]​ Ethical greatness did not manifest a personal singularity, ​[265]​ though it did create a separation from the common run of people. 
Finally, the telos or “the mode of being to which this self-mastery gave access was characterized as an active freedom.”​[266]​ We must immediately note that this “individual freedom should not, however, be understood as the independence of a free will. Its polar opposite was not a natural determinism, nor was it the will of an all-powerful agency: it was an enslavement—the enslavement of the self by oneself.”​[267]​ For the Greeks, freedom is a mode of being which a rare man might attain, through hard work. It is not synonymous with a will which would define human nature; it is not a right from which we find ourselves alienated; it is not an always present power that you reflexively choose to employ. Remember that in the Classical era, the bulk of men were not called free, and no man was born free—but Socrates became free. 
Four Hellenistic Aspects
Hellenistic Ethical Substance
In the Hellenistic era, the element of ethical substance remains fairly close to the Classical aphrodisia. The other elements, however, undergo significant changes, especially the mode of subjection.​[268]​ Despite the widespread integration of Stoic physics into Hellenistic ethics of bodily pleasures, “the general principles stayed the same; at most, they were developed, given more detail, and refined.” In terms of ethical substance, or the “elements to which one needed to direct one’s attention,” Hellenistic theories of bodily pleasures changed little. ​[269]​ 
However, we would miss an important inflection if we only noted the theoretical similarities. Subjectivity takes on a changed tone: “the accent is placed more and more readily on the weakness of the individual, on his frailty, on his need to flee, to escape, to protect and shelter himself.”​[270]​ The self is less an antagonistic warrior, more a small ship buffeted by regular storms. Unlike Christian morality, however, Hellenistic “sexual activity is linked to evil by its form and its effects, but in itself and substantially, it is not an evil.”​[271]​  While the aphrodisia are naturally bound up with “perilous mechanisms… which associate them with dread diseases,”​[272]​ these mechanisms can be controlled. One can minimize perils, risks, and ‘evils.’ Foucault goes so far as to describe the attitude as “hypochondriac,”​[273]​ but, “at the same time as one dwells on it, and as the interest that one brings to bear on it is intensified,” there occurs a “charging [of] it with more intense meanings.”​[274]​ Hellenistic worry and attention caused the relation to self to blossom. Ethical worry need not lead to renunciation of the self; deep concern can lead to something other than guilt.​[275]​ 
Hellenistic Mode of Subjection
The Hellenistic mode of subjection, unlike that of Classical ethics, now “refers more and more to universal principles of nature or reason.”​[276]​ In Hellenistic ethics, it is more appropriate to say ‘one’ than ‘he,’ to capture this universalism: “it is in order to… not violate one’s natural and essential being, and to honor oneself as a reasonable being” that one should be ethical.​[277]​ “One” (everyone) deserves and is obliged to honor oneself due to the universal attachment to reason. This is a crucial shift from the modulated individuality of Classical Greeks. Status, personal differences, and so on, no longer make a significant difference.​[278]​ The obvious reference: Epictetus the freed slave and Marcus Aurelius the emperor had the same ethics. Is this not unimaginable to a Greek? 
However, Foucault attaches crucial qualifications to Hellenistic universality, the ethics of which “are at the same time universally valid principles and rules for those who wish to give their existence an honorable and noble form. It is the lawless universality of an aesthetics of existence that in any case is practiced only by a few.”​[279]​ As with the Greeks, ethics was not asked of all people: in “paganism,” morality is a “luxury.”​[280]​ However, if one plays the ethical game, to do so well will require reference to universal rules.​[281]​ Foucault also notes that ‘Hellenistic’ ethics was composed of competing sects or groups, unlike the more unitary Christian Church.​[282]​ Each philosophy claimed to have a better way to care for self, but not that it was the universal true faith or sole way to become good.  
Universality leads to an “intensification of value and meaning of sexual relations.”​[283]​ The Stoic and Epicurean indifference to status meant that for marriage, gender meant nearly nothing (in principle). Since Hellenistic spousal relations were “reciprocal,” the man could love in the woman the same logos and virtue that he was supposed to manifest, producing an “affection that could extend to the point of need and dependence.”​[284]​ Imagine a Greek without shame admitting his dependence on a slave, on a woman, even on a boy! For an extreme version of this insistence on independence even in sexual relations, see the Cynic Diogenes’ praise of masturbation, in part because it is “a reasonable act, for it depends on us alone, just as we have no need of anyone to scratch our leg for us.”​[285]​ Diogenes would no doubt say that while he needs to eat, he does not need to depend on a chef, hence the Cynic rejection of marriage. 
The contrast of Ancient models shows that a loving marriage is a possible component of an ethical life, but is in no way a necessary component of a form of subjectivity. In this respect, our ethics today resembles that of the Romans. However, Foucault is not proposing an evolutionary model, nor one of decline. Hellenistic marriage is not ‘closer’ to ours, but rather, shares a few elements with marriage today, while lacking others. Imagine us today, affirming our similarly powerful feeling for the conjugal partner—but through the reason which they share with all humanity! No, what we affirm is their singularity, how they fit with our own singularity, or even complete it. Once more, attention to the details of Foucault’s analysis produces a much more complex account than merely ‘forbidden or required’ and “similar or different.” 
The importance of the spouse-relation exemplifies the emphasis on others which shapes the Hellenistic mode of subjection. “If [a] relationship with a woman who is ‘the wife,’ ‘the spouse,’ is essential to existence… then there could not be an essential and primary incompatibility between the relationship one establishes with oneself and the rapport one forms with the other.”​[286]​ The common caricature of a Hellenistic ‘withdrawal into self’ still must acknowledge the numerous links to others, which underscore “one of the most important aspects of this activity devoted to oneself: it constituted, not an exercise in solitude, but a true social practice.”​[287]​ Forging the right kind of relations with others is at the center of Hellenistic care of the self. 
A relation to others combined with care for the self—yet we must note—the self has priority here. There is “an attempt to bring a certain number of relations into coincidence… [with] the relation to the self… in order to satisfy the specific requirements of the relation to oneself;” that is, “political work… depended on the relationship he established with himself.”​[288]​ There is not a permanent priority of either self or other. In Hellenism, others are crucial, yet they are so largely as a test of how well one cares for one’s self. Clearly then, the care for the self could come ‘before’ others.
Thus, a close reading of The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self demonstrates that Foucault does not oppose ethical subjectivity to power-relations with others. In case after case, there were indispensable relations to others: sometimes a teacher, or an older lover modeling self-control, other times a political advisor, the wife, or God.​[289]​ An other is required as an component of any ethical self-relation, although the particular function of each particular other-relation varies immensely.​[290]​ So while Foucault seems to indicate that some relation to others will be present in any ethics, caveats must quickly follow: the particular personage of the other is not forever the same; the reason why one relates to them is not fixed;​[291]​ the relation being one of power does not mean it is therefore ‘bad’ as such.​[292]​ Now as ever, we cannot do without the other in ethics, however, the variety of other-relations shown by Foucault’s genealogy indicates that we can always call into question the particular other-relation which our ethics leans upon. For instance, that universal and global relation to each and all (as those to whom harm must be prevented), or, that we take the conjugal partner as one of the most essential other-relations to establish, or that we use others as reflecting surfaces in which to discern our hidden self. The variations of relations to others within ethics demonstrates that none is itself necessary, and their fundamental heterogeneity shows that they are not variations on an essential, universal relation between self and other. 
Hellenistic Askesis
Within Hellenistic ethics, the third aspect of askesis (or practices of the self) receives detailed treatment from Foucault.​[293]​ Askeses are dynamic processes, introduced into a subject to efficaciously change what it is. A subject approaches closer to what it ought to be, through technical determination. Askesis is a necessary element of any ethics,​[294]​ but Hellenistic ethics was a “golden age of care of the self,”​[295]​ the likes of which has not been seen since. The emphasis which Hellenism placed on practices, and their necessity for the very philosophizing of that era (and not ‘merely’ for ethics), is commonly linked to “philosophy as a way of life.”​[296]​ Hellenistic philosophy insisted that askesis is absolutely required to truly equip ourselves with logos,​[297]​ that some kinds of knowledge cannot be fully accessed unless you undergo practices
The Romans’ greater vigilance and anxiety​[298]​ toward pleasures turns life itself into permanent practice. “Hence there is no right age for attending to oneself. ‘It is never too early nor too late to care for the well-being of the soul,’ to quote Epicurus… which asked people to transform their existence into a kind of permanent exercise.”​[299]​ Unlike Greek pedagogy which was terminal, Hellenistic training is lifelong.​[300]​ For instance, Hellenistic athletic metaphors emphasize the permanence of training. Their ethics required tough training through the whole of their lives. Because the Hellenistic self was frail, the number and frequency of practices increased.​[301]​ Today, similarly, it is common to push for ever more, to never rest or be content, to insist that one has more ‘growing’ or self-discovery to do. In contrast, there is something quite seductive about the Classical mode, where ethical work could result in some finality or ‘perfection.’
Foucault seemed fascinated by the sheer number and variety of Hellenistic practices of the self. The rich wealth of Hellenistic askesis included 
exercises, practical tasks, various activities… health regimens, physical exercises… the meditations, the readings, the notes that one takes on books… notes that one reads again later… also the talks that one has with a confidant, with friends, with a guide or director. Add to this the correspondence in which one reveals the state of one’s soul, solicits advice, gives advice to anyone who needs it.​[302]​ 
One form of askesis is to work up a healthy appetite, setting a sumptuous table, then feeding that food to the slaves and eating their food yourself, in order to remind yourself that you can do with the minimum.​[303]​ Or try self-enforced poverty: once a month, sleep outside of a bed, in order to increase your endurance of unavoidable discomforts.​[304]​ Review your day in advance, so that you are more likely to recall and thus implement a good plan for any difficult tasks, or alternatively, review at night any mistakes you made this day in order to halt the progression of bad habits and to reevaluate the life one actually lives day-to-day.​[305]​ 
Foucault’s references to Hellenistic askesis abound, especially in The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Walk around in the morning, and evaluate your spontaneous responses to whatever events you experience: if you see a beautiful person and spontaneously desire them, remind yourself that they fall outside of your control, that things outside your control are not yours, and to want what is not yours inevitably causes pain. Now you have mixed a logically-induced aversion with the desire, in order to lessen this spontaneous desire.​[306]​ Fear of powerful people can be checked and lessened by recalling their less fearful moments: eating, defecating, having sex, sleeping. Similarly, if you desire the purple robe of the elite, break it down into parts—the robe is really just sheep’s hair and the blood of a shellfish—and see your desire be broken as a result.​[307]​ While bouncing your child on your knee, think to yourself, ‘this child I love will die tomorrow,’ in order to lessen that overwhelming, too-intense attachment which makes parents overreact when danger threatens the child.​[308]​ 
Again Hellenistic ethics sounds very different from our present desire to discover our real self. Ethically relevant knowledge, as it is employed in Hellenistic practices of the self, is used to construct oneself, not to know oneself. The self is an objective to be reached, not an object to be known: “you protect the self, you defend, arm, equip it… You respect the self, you honor it… You are master of the self, you possess it… you experience pleasure in yourself, and enjoyment or delight.”​[309]​ Even a practice which keeps “constant watch over one’s representations… is not to inquire (as will be done later in Christianity) concerning the deep origin of the idea … it is not to try and decipher a meaning hidden behind the visible representation.”​[310]​ Ideas or representations are judged, not for a mysterious sign about yourself, but to see whether they are ‘natural’ or ‘rational,’ meaning a straightforward, universal, and impersonal relation to truth. For instance, desiring any representation of the future is rejected by Stoics, because the future by definition is not under your control. What this practice increases is not knowledge of self nor the degree of individuality, but rather one’s identity with Zeus (cosmological logos or reason).​[311]​ It reveals nothing about your self, but about time and the limits of human freedom. The self is achieved, and this is done by conformity to cosmological nature, not by discovering a personal nature.
The reduction of practices of the self, to just those practices which find truths about the self, has been somewhat consistent since the fifth century A.D. The reasons for this are complex; to shed light on Ancient ethics, however, I really only need to highlight their privilege of care of the self (rather than “know thyself”). 
How did it come about that we accorded so much privilege, value, and intensity to the ‘know yourself’ and omitted, or at least, left in the shadow, this notion of care of the self that, in actual fact, historically, when we look at the documents and the texts, seems to have framed the principle of ‘know yourself’ from the start and to have supported an extremely rich and dense set of notions, practices, ways of being, forms of existence, and so on?​[312]​ 
Hellenistic philosophy was not hostile to knowledge; but knowledge was generally used within a practice to change the subject, rather than having a practice that was to produce knowledge about the subject without changing it. Askesis seeks “knowledge of a kind which, considering all the things of the world (the gods, the kosmos, others, etcetera) in their relation to us, we will be able to translate immediately into prescriptions, and these will change what we are. They will change the state of the subject who knows them.”​[313]​ 
Hellenistic Ethical Telos
The telos of Hellenistic ethics was an “enjoyment [of self] without desire and without disturbance,”​[314]​ in which one is “satisfied with what one is”​[315]​; “a state… [which] knows neither degree nor change, but is given as a ‘woven fabric,’ and once given no external event can rend it.”​[316]​ Epicureans and Stoics especially referred to this ideal ethical result of ataraxia: imperturbable serenity.​[317]​ To actually achieve ataraxia would be permanent. Ataraxia, a telos of this-worldly salvation, is when “one ultimately rejoins oneself, like a harbor sheltered from the tempests or a citadel protected by its ramparts.”​[318]​ While ataraxia (as in the life of the Stoic sage) was nearly impossible to achieve, nothing prevented one in principle from achieving it, it happened in this life, it was irreversible, and one would be certain one had achieved it. The Christian, on the other hand, cannot truly be sure of being saved at any point before death. Their ethical life is ceaseless toil, with a goal endlessly deferred, and marked by suspicion and uncertainty. We too, today, are never really sure if we know ourselves, or if we are being true to ourselves. Think of culture-wide admonitions to never stop growing, evolving, discovering, improving your self. Ask yourself if there is an ethical terminal point in your life. What would you identify as an ethical pinnacle, after which nothing more need be added?
Four Early Christian Aspects
Early Christian Ethical Substance
Much as I have occasionally used the loose terms “Greek” and “Roman” above, I will often say “Christian” for the form of subjectivity which follows. However, most of the figures and practices to which Foucault points are from early Church monasteries.​[319]​ Therefore, this form of subjectivity (which goes no further than Augustine and is concentrated around Tertullian, Hermes, Cyprian, Cassian, etc.), should strictly be called an early Christian “‘ascetic-monastic’ model rather than Christian in the general sense of the word.”​[320]​ Taking note of its specificity (and great stretch of time between us) should render one more cautious about assuming strong identifications between this ‘Christian’ subjectivity and our own. 
Christian ethical substance consists of the “flesh,” where will and the most obscure thoughts combine as desire. Ethical substance is that part of the world which we take as soliciting ethical concern; for early Christianity, it was the  “domain of desires that lie hidden among the mysteries of the heart.”​[321]​ No wonder Christian substance is mysterious. First, insofar as the substance is the invisible, non-physical will, it is difficult to ‘see’ or know; second, desire is different in each person and so must be analyzed afresh for each person; third, a will, because ‘free,’ is unpredictable and changeable by its very nature.  These three elements of the will make it nearly indeterminable by knowledge in principle and in fact. To the extent that our will today is considered to be hidden, singular, and free, it too will pose difficulties for analysis. Typically, such difficulties are met by asking experts to assist in analysis.
In addition to being an epistemologically uncertain or difficult object, the flesh or soul may be infested by an “ontologically alien power… The presence of the Other, with its ruses and its power of illusion.”​[322]​ What appears to be your will, your own flesh, may be some other force. Here is a second reason why the flesh is mysterious: Satan may be masquerading as if he were your own will, producing a difficulty in deciphering which will is truly yours or truly good. The flesh is not only mysterious, but its pleasures are evil. Christian subjectivity is defined by “finitude, the Fall and evil.”​[323]​ Whatever the body may have originally been in paradise, the “stigmata of the Fall”​[324]​ of course stigmatizes bodily pleasure. The Christians’ bodies are to be renounced, not managed and optimized like the Greeks’ nor propped up like the Romans’. The anxiety with which Hellenistic ethics regarded the self or its pleasures is actually quite far from Christian subjectivity, where the very self itself is the problem, not just a fragility of self. In principle, a fragile self can be managed, but the self as flesh needs to be rooted out.​[325]​ The substance which a Christian treats ethically would, ideally, disappear through this ethics. 
Early Christian Mode of Subjection
Christians have “a mode of subjection in the form of obedience to a general law that is at the same time the will of a personal god.”​[326]​ The revealed law applies to each singular person and to all of us universally, and is effectively enforced through the institutional rules of the early Church. The “juridico-moral codification of acts, moments, and intentions” in the mode of subjection introduces a significant change; the juridical, institutional mode now “define[s] a ‘natural,’ legitimate, and acceptable form of practice” for morality, dividing acts into either “forbidden or demanded.”​[327]​ To commit a forbidden act makes a Christian bad; for the Romans and Greeks, however, to be a good person produces good acts. 
The authority to create the list of forbidden and denied acts, as well as the power to demand that all obey that list, rested largely in the hands of an institutional Church.​[328]​ The individual’s mode of subjection involves a “recognition of the law and an obedience to pastoral authority.”​[329]​ However, no matter how powerful the Church may have been, we would misunderstand Foucault if we thought that the Church entirely took charge of ethics. Individuals still must recognize that they must submit. Let us similarly likewise take care not to overstate the ‘freedom’ which characterizes Ancient aesthetics of existence. Foucault said that even in the Greek aesthetics of existence, even when “the subject constitutes himself in an active fashion through practices of the self, these practices are nevertheless not something invented by the individual himself. They are models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group.”​[330]​ The Greek mode of aesthetics was already present in their culture, and ideals of beauty and masculinity and decorum which suffused Ancient culture no doubt shaped the ethical self-relation to a significant degree. While the Greeks certainly did not obey anything or anyone in fashioning this aesthetics, it would be oversimplifying to identify either aesthetics with freedom or to identify obedience to domination.
Since Christian ethical substance of the individual’s flesh is evil, it can generally only be legitimate on the condition that it is filtered through some purer, non-personal power.​[331]​ “[S]exual pleasure is in itself a defilement, which only the lawful form of marriage… could render acceptable.”​[332]​ Under the name of God and through his grace, sex can be made holy in an ultimate purification. Thus, the mode of subjection in early Christianity requires renouncing the self through gestures and practices of purgation.
Early Christian Askesis
The askeses or practices of the self for Christian communities include permanent verbalization of the self to a superior, exercises of self-renunciation, and a generalized and constant hermeneutics of self. Such practices have very little to do with prior practices of the self. In fact, even when Cassian directly takes over a Stoical metaphor regarding ideas as money that needs to be tested, there is “nevertheless [a] profound difference” between Christians and a Stoic. Cassian interrogates the “origin” of his idea, asking, does the idea “come from God?… from Satan?… from myself?”​[333]​ Christians developed “techniques whose essential function is to dispel internal illusions… a method for deciphering the secret processes and movements that unfold within the soul… An exegesis of the soul is thus required.”​[334]​ This contrast evidently sheds light on today as well, since it shows that attempts to plumb the depths of oneself are but one form of practices of the self, and perhaps a very strange one.​[335]​ Ancient subjectivity did not have “an obligation for the subject to speak truthfully concerning himself; it never opened up the soul as a domain of potential knowledge where barely discernible traces of desire needed to be read and interpreted.”​[336]​ 
Once early Christians searched every depth of their secret selves and ferreted out the hidden impurities, these elements of the self had to be purged through practices. An evil ethical substance must be utterly renounced, of course. There is no place for practices which shape it (as for the Classical man) or for those which insulate oneself from it (as in the Hellenistic era). Christian practices locate the enemy within and excommunicate it. These practices seek to find, decipher, and renounce inner thoughts. Christian practices must discover hidden evil, then tear off its mask, and then destroy it. Broadly, Christian practices can be summed up as “hermeneutics,” because they involve words/thoughts (not bodily practices), and aim at a secret (not a learnable, straightforward, transmissible technique).
Today, the ethical substance of desire is purely good—a significant difference from Christian communities—but absolute evaluations of ethical substance tend to result in absolutism of practices, which were those of total rejection for early Christians and total acceptance for us. Monks used practices of obedience to renounce their wills.​[337]​ The will of God or the direction of the Church crowded out the perverse will. A Christian’s will is suspect at best, thus requiring a practice by which it can be dislodged. The practices of obedience cause a displacement of the believer’s will.​[338]​ Since the will is so distinctly your own, only practices of exhaustive, impassioned, and continuous obedience to another will are powerful enough to remove it from you. 
Early Christian Ethical Telos 
The related teloi for members of the Christian community are total obedience to God, “a purity whose model was to be sought in virginity,”​[339]​ and an otherworldly salvation. The telos achieved by the virgin-like ethically strong person, is that their good will is now impervious to being supplanted by the evil and foreign will of another. They cannot be penetrated by a foreign object or will.​[340]​ 
We can see another aspect of ethical telos in the Christian community’s desire for a heaven on earth. Evangelism and eschatology are Christian themes which link individual ethical improvement to the perfection of all humanity. Christian universalism is very different from that of Hellenistic ethics, of course. Christians have a telos which requires that each and all be saved, whereas Stoics say that what will save any given person is the same universally accessible logos. But Stoics do not demand that each be saved by it.​[341]​ If a Christian falls, this harms the community. If we fail morally today, it is also usually claimed that it affects ourselves and another. In fact, moral failing is often defined today strictly through its relation to others. Utopian visions, as has often been noted, have a Christian history. However, less obviously, the global nature of the moral obligation to others of the present (I am now responsible for preventing any sin I possibly can throughout the world ) also relates to pastoral power’s attempt to save each and all of the flock. 

What Might Four Aspects of Past Ethics Lead us to Reconsider Regarding the Present Moment?
Critique of the Present is About Much More than Avoiding Moral Code
To be most effective, the genealogical study of the forms of the constitution of subjectivity must be carried out at the level of detail just presented. At one level, genealogy carries a rather simple message. Since genealogy shows that the relationship to self, at its most fundamental level, has changed drastically, with no sense of progress, it conveys the message that what we are in this present moment is not an expression of a timeless human nature, or of a teleology. Thus, there are elements of us which, having changed before, can change again. While this is an invaluable lesson, if we are to turn to the concrete task of selecting which parts of subjectivity today to discard, we need to go beyond the general lesson that change can happen. On the basis of the detailed research he undertook regarding the subject, Foucault asked elaborate questions, and prompted us to ask some of our own.
In comparing the finer points of the various forms that the mode of subjection took in the eras from approximately 600 BCE-400 AD, perplexities regarding our own relation to self inevitably arise. For example, in Hellenism, the mode of subjection (the principle which prompts one to be ethical) was that one is a universal self, called by one’s own essential reason to embody cosmological reason a greater degree. The early monastic Christians, however, felt the demand to be moral as a duty coming from membership in a community, thereby submitting oneself to a law rooted in an authority external to oneself. The Classical man instead took himself to be driven by a natural force which, if successfully controlled, could defeat other forces when they clashed. Merely stating these difference is crucial, because any single aspect reveals how Foucault’s discussions of “ethics” cut to the very heart of how a subject understood itself. It would hardly be overstating these four aspects to rephrase ethical substance as that which matters most in life, mode of subjection as what human nature is (or at least, what of our nature is relevant for morality), askesis or techniques of the self as what behaviors change or improve the self, and the telos as the vision of the pinnacle of life, the ideal human state. If these are questions which matter to you, and you think that the answers that are most common in our culture are in need of consideration, then this frame itself can call into question our contemporary sureties. 
However, many of the lessons which are typically drawn only scratch the surface of possible critiques of the present moment. For instance, from the above, it is not uncommon for a reader to think that the central lesson to draw from The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self is that we should escape our straightjacket of rules. But surely there must be more to these two texts than the lesson “you can do without rules.” We should ask more of them and, from the material just presented in terms of the four aspects, interrogate each of the four aspects and not just rules as mode of subjection. The details just presented allow us to ask multiple detailed questions about each ethical aspects, and then finally to displace multiple aspects of our present subjectivity in favor of another. I think that coming to understand the form of subjectivity in terms of all these aspects is more important than decrying the ‘rules’ that the Church supposedly forced onto subjectivity.​[342]​ What captures my attention when I read Foucault is that our mode of subjection as “desiring subjects” has hardly altered, regardless of the extent to which rules might still govern us. Rather than the baseline genealogical fact that we can change, or somewhat inaccurate demonization of non-enemies like “rules” and “codes,” I prefer to draw more specific lessons across all four of the aspects. 
Additionally, in the details of the later works, we can see that the issue for us to day is not about being under the yoke or rules, Christian or otherwise. I would claim, as did Foucault, that we largely live without rules: “for a whole series of reasons, the idea of a morality as obedience to a code of rules is now disappearing, has already disappeared.”​[343]​ And as Foucault all-too-briefly noted, “most relevant for our morality, is our feelings… You can have a girl in the street or anywhere, if you have very good feelings toward your wife.”​[344]​ Our feelings, as expressions of our freedom and our true selves, are what dictate our behavior today, much more than any rules. So if interrogating our codes or rules is not the central lesson of the later works, what do these texts help us call into question? Below, I will show some of the questions which Foucault’s analysis of Classical, Hellenistic, and early Christian forms of subjectivity raised for me. In Chapter 6, I prescribe an ethics to undermine them, but for now I just want to present the questions raised by his description.
What exactly is our current subjectivity like? How can it be presented as similar and dissimilar to the content of the four aspects I have presented? (Please note that Foucault never outlined the present moment in terms of these four aspects, so the outline I am about to present is somewhat speculative.) Desiring subjectivity is confused in its telos or goal, which seems to be a mixture of an abstract, negative notion of freedom and a vaguely defined happiness. What calls us to be ethical, or the mode of subjection, seems to be a demand to be authentic and express our true selves, which we have difficulty squaring with the centrality of others for ethics. This authenticity refers to the ethical substance, which are the “feelings” which are supposed to be products of a secret self. However, we never know when a feeling is a “real” feeling, nor how to read those feelings. Our askesis is relatively ineffective at achieving its intended results, as can be inferred from the endless restlessness of our attempts to find ourselves or become happy. Additionally, many of these practices of the self further implicate us in power-relations with professional cadres of experts whose training derives from the institutions of churches, prisons, and hospitals. 
For instance, the force of sexual codes forbidding homosexuality is thankfully fading today. And yet we remain desiring subjects. Thus, people still ask when someone first “knew” that they had “deep down always” been gay: our interest in knowing the self rather than caring for it, and a belief in an originary self are on clear display here. The emphasis on coming out also reflects a belief that one must authentically express how one feels (that is, how one desires) in order to be happy and free. While a code that demands one be married is also losing its importance, marriage still seems to be justified as an way of “expressing” a “true self” which reaches its highest point with another singular self. Why one needs another to be authentically oneself is left murky. Certainly, gays should not be forced to hide themselves, and gay and straight couples should be getting married if they wish. However, the positive changes we see in the diminishing importance of these restrictive codes has left untouched other fundamental relations to the self—some of which are deeply confused and rather problematic. Most of us believe that there is a real but mysterious self lurking in the shadows (ethical substance), revealed by talking to others (askesis), which we ought to express in order to be authentic and true to our selves (mode of subjection), and that if we do so, we will be free and happy (telos). Whether we need to believe in a deep self, how effective these techniques are, if the goal is understood or achievable, and whether authenticity and self-expression are satisfying ethical foundations: these are the kinds of questions which Foucault’s later works forced me to confront.
Specifying Some Problematic Aspects of Desiring Subjectivity
One difference between ourselves and the Ancient Greeks is the ethical use of the notion of “nature,” a difference which illuminates our modern relationship to the self. For Classical thought, nature did not refer to your individual nature, nor were your desires a personal or singular secret. Natural impulse for Classical ethics was totally impersonal and largely transparent. Sex was a natural phenomenon, but sexuality did not hint at your true nature, as we take it to presently. Nature circumscribed both the direction a man should take and any direction he did in fact take. How very unlike today, where we place the singularity of personal whims at the heart of sex and so also at the core of individuality. Since nature was for them a force to be harnessed, manipulated, and guided, they worked on the natural desires that flowed through them. We, on the other hand, want to “discover” the “true nature” which was already there. In our time, this produces an irony that our inner lives are the most important ethical substance, but that this crucial element is something which can only be discovered and known but not adjusted or improved. One will improve, not by channeling natural power, but by returning to a hidden self one always “naturally” was.
Classical ethics was very demanding, but it had no formalized code of demands, relying rather on an aesthetics of existence. As Foucault says, now is a perfect time to reconsider a morality which was “austere” yet more or less did without ethical laws. ​[345]​ An aesthetics of existence gives rise to a consistent style, avoiding both the rigidity of codes and the randomness of chaos. At a minimum, he demonstrated that such a morality existed, though Foucault additionally implied that he thought it was possible and desirable to construct another ethics of style, or aesthetics of existence,​[346]​ today.
Classical ethics commonly referred to the training one would have to do in order to develop ethical capacities in oneself.​[347]​ Their practices were typically isomorphic with the desired action: for instance, athletic competition (as ethical training) developed the public bravery required for politics. However, our askesis centers around expressing inner emotional states and learning about our secret desire. Our practices do not develop but only discover the self. They are directed at past weakness rather than future strength and at a hidden inner state rather than behavior itself. 
For instance, some people are bit more indulgent than they would like when it comes to sexual temptation. Classical askesis might recommend something like tempting yourself with food when hungry, or making yourself less sensitive to physical pleasures generally, in order to increase your ability to resist future temptation. However, if someone today kept falling to sexual temptation, instead of training to increase their strength in the face of temptations, they would likely ask what hidden desires prompted the behavior. They might ask if they were secretly insecure, or they would try to decipher if cheating was a actually a way of destroying existing relationships as a form of self-sabotage. But how is knowledge of your desire supposed to translate into better behavior, when that exact same desire itself was what led to bad behavior? How does merely revealing the cause or hidden origin of your behavior undo that cause’s own effects? Why would the best way to influence your future behavior be to talk about what you have been, rather than training for future strength as a Greek would? These questions about our present relation to self-improvement seem to me to be rarely addressed. However, I find it unlikely that merely knowing that one is self-destructive or insecure would abolish those broad traits. Knowledge is very powerful and often very good, but it seems naïve to think that knowledge of the self is almost all that is necessary to abolish anything bad about oneself. We today possess few practices which go beyond unveiling the self. This is a strange sort of ethical practice. It concerns itself so single-mindedly with knowledge that it hardly acts, and it treats the bare uncovering of a truth about what already is, as if it were an improvement on what was.
In terms of the telos or overall state one hopes to achieve by becoming ethical, we no longer have the Classical promise of a finite pedagogy which will secure the ideal self. Our quest is endless, which makes for a restlessness that can approach the frantic. Today, we see people divorcing their spouse at 50 years old in order to find themselves. A Greek would likely say that if you haven’t formed or found yourself by then that you will not be able to do so after either. Foucault summarizes: “it would be too late to rectify matters if Alcibiades were fifty. This is not the age for taking care of oneself.”​[348]​ The never-ending search for oneself is likely a product of the forms of our askesis as well as our telos. Our practices of the self or askesis are centered on knowledge of the self rather than care of the self, which often results in precious little change in the subject. Our telos too is unclear so it is difficult to know if one has achieved the vaguely stated objective of “happiness,” “fulfillment,” or “freedom,” and certainly there must be instances where happiness and freedom are incompatible. Ours is a supremely optimistic (or perhaps utopian) ethics which thinks that knowledge of every dark recess of the self, freedom, and happiness all naturally coincide.
Hellenism was able to bring together the care of the self and involvement with others. However, we presently have trouble squaring our intense concern for the self (in terms of feelings, desire, and freedom) with a relation to others. Foucault’s references to this contemporary struggle are brief, but his point is clear. “All these [Hellenistic] injunctions to exalt oneself, to devote oneself to oneself… sound to our ears like—what? Like a sort of… moral dandyism… or else they sound to us like a somewhat melancholy and sad expression of the withdrawal of the individual… [from] a collective morality.”​[349]​ Elsewhere, Foucault made the point in a similarly compressed yet straightforward fashion. “We are more inclined to see taking care of the self as an immorality, as a means to escape from all possible rules” and as a rejection of “ a social morality which seeks the rules for acceptable behavior in relations with others.”​[350]​ And yet we use all of our verbal techniques solely to know the self​[351]​—we are far from sacrificing or ignoring the self in order to the collective. We clearly hold out an ideal that the concerns for the self and for others can be brought together, and Foucault shows that they were successfully united in Hellenistic ethics. In expressions such as “you have to love yourself before you can love or be loved,” the desire to care for self and other reciprocally can be seen. But success is far from guaranteed. Classical ethics not only dismissed the other in terms of all women and all slaves, but even struggled to include the other partner if he were a free male. Certain specific forms of ethical attention to the self have great difficulty integrating and having concern for others. Our strong desire to integrate self and other is by no means proof that we in fact do so. Perhaps in our particular form of the relation to self there is no room for others, or conversely, we may be overly devoted to others in a way that undercuts our proper attention to the self.
Foucault’s wide-ranging presentation of Hellenistic practices of the self raises a few related questions about the present. If Foucault is right that every ethics has at least minimal forms of askesis, then we should understand that we too possess such practices. However, if we do not recognize what our practices are, then we likely employ them without much thought. The great former wealth of effective practices of the self seem to have shrunk in number and diminished in importance. No doubt this no-longer emphasized element of ethics deserves more attention. Perhaps we should have more of them at our disposal—we should at least insist that ours are effective techniques which stabilize our current strengths and make drastic improvements more realistic. Askesis may have been the aspect of ethics which most interested Foucault.​[352]​ He at one point had planned to devote a whole text solely to the historical variety of practices of the self.​[353]​ I am of the mind that someone should write this book on askesis which Foucault began but never finished, which would be a history of subjectivity, psychology, and pedagogy all at once, as well as a useful manual for those wishing to transform themselves. 
Briefly, let us just note that the importance of askesis shows that one needs to make a certain life possible for oneself before one can act well. Neither choice nor knowledge are sufficient to becoming good. Askesis tells us that a subject may not even be able to desire rightly until it has been trained to do so. Something in addition to truth is required to really know what it means to be good, and something besides the mere existence of a ‘will’ is necessary for certain ethical actions. The privileged status of askesis among the other four aspects of morality is consistent with the Foucauldian theme that everything (knowledge, power, ethics) is informed by the history of its production, and that this genesis arises in tandem with specific practices. The subject which you are now is the result of practices which you have undergone. If you are to become a different subject, that will be the result of the deployment of different practices of the self. If we embrace philosophy as a way of life and its attendant practices, we might significantly recast questions of will and knowledge.
Since ethical questions are not often asked in terms of training, exercises, and practices of the self, it is not clear to me which of our everyday behaviors are the askeses constituting our subjectivity. What are our ethical practices? Psychoanalysis, its popularized variants of self-help and self-analysis, and even the ways in which we express our feelings by “venting” to family and friends must count as askeses of a hermeneutics of the subject. I believe we would have to include love relations as ethical practice, since romantic relations are said to “complete” us and “make us better people.” Additionally, there is much journalistic advice on which relationship “techniques” work best. Additionally, relationships cover a wider swath of people than do talk therapy. We need to pursue questions about exactly what counts as a practice of the self today, for whom, and with what effects. When does the way one uses social media cross over from something one does, to something which makes one what one is? College is supposed to be a time of “finding oneself,” as the rhetoric goes—but does it often achieve this result? What does it find that differs from other ways of “exploring,” as we say, such as travel abroad? For those who are deeply enmeshed in psychotherapeutic practices of the self, do they find them effective? If not, what practices could better effectuate the same sought-after changes?
Foucault points out, by way of comparison with Hellenistic care of the self, that our practices are impoverished in number. However, he also indicates that they are impoverished in terms of their results. Generally, they have but one meager central effect, which is knowledge of self. Today we think that what matters most is discovering what we really want or who we really are. Our practices are geared toward truth, rather than toward effective change, and they focus on personal truths to the exclusion of other forms of truth (such as the ethically relevant cosmological truths of Hellenistic Stoicism).​[354]​ But what if you found out that what you genuinely desired was impossible, given who you really are? Does this kind of question even occur to us? It seems to me that we assume that anything is possible if and only if you truly know yourself.​[355]​ Self-knowledge is supposedly guaranteed to liberate us. Allegedly, all it takes is that “they” neither silence our words nor deceive us and that we are brave enough to ask who we are.​[356]​ 
There are some surprisingly links to the present found in early Christian monastic ethics. For instance, one place where it may seem that we have absolutely nothing in common is the constant worry of monks that Satan was directly tempting them and force-feeding them evil illusions. However, while the specific reference to Satan-as-other has largely disappeared, we have an unexpectedly similar attitude of suspicion and fear that our thoughts are not always our own. I believe that references to “the media,” “corporations,” or “society” are substantially similar to early Christian attempts to ferret out all the “manifestations of a stealthy, resourceful, and dreadful power.”​[357]​ When one takes oneself to be a permanently mysterious cipher, one cannot trust the very ideas one thinks. For instance, the complaints of “media bias” from both the left and the right are manifestations of shared fears that “corporations” or “ideologies” distort our mind and seduce us, much as Cassian was worried that his soul might have been sullied by Satan.​[358]​ The question for Cassian was “where did this idea come from?,” more so than the content or even the truth of the idea. If it came from outside him, it required intense scrutiny. Our contemporary privileging of a negatively defined freedom also means that we are suspicious of any idea which we know to originate “outside” of us. Not only would this be unfree, but how could a thought or desire be authentically mine if it did not originate deep within me?
The links of the Christian telos of purity to today should be worked out in more detail. We think that the ethical substance of the “true self” is at bottom deeply mysterious, as well as only our own (with no outside influence ever being “proper” to it),​[359]​ and the two of these generate constant worries. Both early Christians and many today fear that all-powerful agencies might be conspiring to fool all mankind, and have effects everywhere which are openly acknowledged nowhere. Our ethical goal also requires an all-out, permanent victory which would purify the self of all external influence. (I cannot make a convincing case for it here, but if this attitude is as prevalent as I think it is, it would explain why many misread Foucault as if he theorized about the evil, omnipresent, and omnipotent “Power,” and why they were so disappointed that he did not point the way to the Promised Land without Power.) We too assume we must fight for the liberating truth against unseen enemies who plant falsities in our soul.​[360]​ Our insistence on a telos of autonomy-as-purity both reflects and produces our fears that others will have “power over” us, as seen in popular images of rapists, drug addicts, and robbers who by unveiled force violate our will. The same fear that others will (or already do) control you, as well as the utopian hopes to be utterly free of all constraint, can be seen in suspicions about deceptive machinations of politicians, hidden sleeper cells of terrorists, and of the immigrant sneakily “taking advantage” of us. 
However, we have to be careful not to identify Christian subjectivity with our own. Even in the similarities, there is only a partial overlap of broad themes. However, there is a danger of overestimating some of the differences as well as one of neglecting some of the similarities. We might smirk today at former “obedience” to Church authorities and praise our contemporary freedom from such overbearing sexual overseers, yet we accept—and even demand—the advice and regular supervision of doctors, psychologists, and demographic experts. Patients who wish they could see their psychoanalyst more than the weekly fifty-minute-hour are something of a cliché in certain circles. As Foucault said, we want sexual overseers so badly that ours is “the only civilization in which officials are paid to listen to all and sundry impart the secrets of their sex.”​[361]​ We presume to have taken direct charge in our lives, and yet our ethics remains deeply intertwined with institutions and authorities, though not exactly with obedience. We obligate ourselves to speak to others about and decipher our authentic inner life, as seen in our hermeneutic scrutiny of the self through confessions to experts. As Foucault said, we are now (we are still) confessing animals.​[362]​
On another point, we seem to differ greatly from the early Christians. While they more or less renounced pleasure, our pleasure is not illegitimate as such. However, our mode of subjection reveals that, in practice, we partially resemble them, to the extent that our pleasure is also reduced to a means to an end, and requires transformation in order to be truly legitimate. We no longer fear or renounce pleasure, and yet, insofar as we justify pleasure on the condition that it reveals our truth, we too ‘sacralize’ pleasure externally in order to legitimate it. That is, we seem to tolerate pleasures on the condition that they reveal our desires, and thus the truth of our selves. We aim to replace our existing desire with a truer, higher desire, although we do not use techniques of obedience, and the higher desire will be closer to our true self, while the monks aimed to renounce their selves.​[363]​ These are the kinds of complex similarities-differences that work focused solely on subjectivity can begin to address. 

4. An Experimental Prescription: Spinozistic Ethics to Take Us Beyond Description
The use I am making of Spinoza is rather narrow. I make strategic use of a certain recent style of reading him, in order to make an intervention in a specific interpretative issue in Foucault, so that I may begin formulating a better way of life. My interpretative claim is that Foucault is most useful if we read his descriptions and then attempt an experiment which goes beyond him: Spinozistic subjectivity is the form of subjectivity which best counters the desiring subjects which Foucault has diagnosed us as and thus should be our way beyond his diagnosis. Spinoza is being made use of strategically, for a narrow goal, which is shaped by my interpretation of Foucault. I am not attempting to combine every aspect of their philosophy. I do not claim that one must know Spinoza in order to understand Foucault’s thought. I am not looking to Spinoza to supplement some shortcoming I see in Foucault.​[364]​ I am not claiming in principle that only Spinoza can counter desiring subjectivity, but instead claim that in actual existing forms of ethics and existing solutions offered by Foucauldians, none seem as well suited to the task as Spinoza. 
Part One- “Historical Digression”: Can a Foucauldian Project “Go Back” to Spinoza?
Foucault’s Historiographical Commitments
If we are to take up Spinoza in service of this Foucauldian project of changing our subjectivity, however, we must first deal with a number of very pressing difficulties. The dangers of such a combination are manifold. I would not want a combination which somehow upends or ignores key positions from either. I also would not be happy with the kind of claim that shows a shortcoming in each, which only the other can supplement. These are risks that any syncretic or eclectic combination runs. However, one immediately sees that, with Foucault, there are unique difficulties when seeking to combine him with a figure from the past. Foucault’s histories do not present examples for us to redeem.​[365]​ Responding to a question about what to take from the Greeks, Foucault says there is “no exemplary value in a period that is not our period… it is not anything to get back to.”​[366]​ If we cannot go back to the Ancients, that would also seem to prevent going back to Spinoza. However, it would be too simplistic to think that the past is entirely walled off from present concerns. For instance, our contemporary era is primarily marked by power-relations of biopower and of neoliberalism, but it contains some holdovers from disciplinary power. If every present element of power were decisively severed from every past form of power, it is hard to understand how the 18th century’s disciplinary practices could coexist with novel and unrelated forms of liberal interest, as well as biopolitical norms.​[367]​ 
More pertinent to my project is that The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self present forms of subjectivity that are partially continuous with much from the later forms as well as with our present.​[368]​ Many Ancient practical techniques of the self were taken over by Christianity,​[369]​ which also shared some elements of self-mastery or “spiritual combat” in common with the Classical mode of subjection.​[370]​ Three distinct ethical forms spanning 800 years, in which time some elements of subjectivity most certainly disappeared, while others were modified and continued on into later eras. Similarly, while not putting the burden solely on Descartes’ shoulders, Foucault says the Cartesian moment is “still significant for our modern mode of being subjects.”​[371]​ Despite many important changes in subjectivity, we still have a subject-truth relation which puts knowledge of self before care of the self, as did Descartes. 
However, despite the partial persistence of select elements of past forms of ethical subjectivity, for Foucault the past is not a repository of “solutions” or options which we can just pick up just as we please. If that were the case, then our struggles to change our power relations would quickly be over. It would simply be a matter of returning to the non-disciplinary pedagogy of the Ancients, or the Renaissance treatment of the insane. If the past can be made useful within Foucault’s philosophy, we will have to tread carefully. To that end, I will discuss Spinoza’s relationship to his era of seventeenth-century thought, how he might be a useful critique of the present moment, and then, how he specifically can be integrated into Foucault’s discussion of ethical subjectivity.
Contemporary “French Spinozism” 
First, we need to establish the precise ways in which I mean to read Spinoza in light of Foucault’s insights. I will not be reading Spinoza through an archaeological lens, but am instead using a contemporary style of philosophizing to add prescriptions to Foucault’s descriptions. My approach to Spinoza is through contemporary readings of him which are mostly French or French-inspired and from the last 60 years. I will argue below that, with the contemporaneity of my textual supports and of the use which I aim to put him, ‘my’ Spinoza cannot be reduced to a product of the past. The subjectivity which I will present below is not a ‘return’ or ‘going back’ to seventeenth century, “Early Modern,” or “Classical” subjectivity. 
There are many recent works which argue that Spinoza is especially valuable for thinking pressing contemporary issues. For instance, Heidi Morrison Ravven shows that Spinoza is uniquely able to help us “search for an embodied and situated kind of thinking,” demonstrate “the indelible marking of every person by history [and] social location,” reject transcendentalist philosophy (including post-Kantian thought), and present challenges to compatibilism.​[372]​ These are issues of our time,​[373]​ which shows that Spinoza is not trapped in the past. Hasana Sharp’s concept of “renaturalization” is also a new concept responding to current pressures in thought and politics,​[374]​ drawn from Spinoza but surely not accessible from the same texts 335 years ago. As she notes, he has undergone “many posthumous births,”​[375]​ and we are currently seeing the fruits of a very contemporary reborn Spinoza. Spinoza is not merely experiencing a surge in popularity, but genuinely offering new possibilities for thought which only became possible after the Second World War (roughly).​[376]​ Spinoza can be essential for the most contemporary of thinking—not just for these authors, but, I aim to show, for Foucauldian projects as well.
This rebirth did not start yesterday.​[377]​ A central strand that winds through many of these thinkers is the prior generation of French thought on Spinoza.​[378]​ In the late 1960s, there was a veritable explosion of published work on Spinoza in France. Major texts begin springing up on Spinoza by Martial Gueroult (Spinoza: Dieu, in 1968), Deleuze (Spinoza et la Problème de l’Expression, also in 1968), and Alexandre Matheron (Individu et Communauté, in 1969).​[379]​ Althusser’s reading group, which produced Reading Capital in 1965, gave rise to notables such as Macherey and Balibar; all three thinkers are deeply informed by Spinoza.​[380]​ Spinoza was on the agrégation as some of these figures were passing through their higher education; indeed, when Foucault passed the exam (on his second try, in 1951), he received a question on Bergson and Spinoza regarding eternity.​[381]​ Two massively influential teachers, Alquié and Gueroult, discussed Spinoza not only as a figure but as a way to understand philosophical method and the very stakes of philosophy.​[382]​ Seeds were being planted across a whole generation, even when they do not go on to publish on Spinoza. It is this general milieu, and readers of these figures, which are typically referred to as “French Spinozism” and with which I am primarily concerned. 
In “French Spinozism” there are divergences, of course. It is justifiable to refer to them collectively, however, based on their mutual influences, teachers, citation together by other authors, and most importantly, their considerable convergences. For instance, these readers tend treat Spinoza’s metaphysics, ethics, and politics as mutually reinforcing rather than isolated.​[383]​ They almost unanimously reject Hegel’s misreading of Spinoza as propagating an immobile and dogmatic system.​[384]​ They refuse to see Spinoza only as a reflection of Descartes or simply as a “rationalist”​[385]​ because their treatments often give imagination and the affects roles beyond obstacles to be surmounted. None of them shy from once shunned facets of Spinoza,​[386]​ such as his highly unorthodox God, or his ethics ‘beyond good and evil.’ The general “French Spinozist” attempt to counter certain contemporary ideas will of course be of relevance for my Foucauldian project.​[387]​ 
Their approach does not limit Spinoza to being a function of the Early Modern era, as an archaeological reading of him might. For instance, experimental science was being born in Spinoza’s day, which fascinated him and his cohorts,​[388]​ whereas it is a minor issue for most of what we call “French Spinozism.” The correspondence of Spinoza gives a sampling of what issues preoccupied the scholars of his day: religious matters such as God’s will and how to interpret holy texts, questions on the number and unity of attributes, advances in “natural philosophy,” and epistemological-methodological issues (of definition, ordering of questions, confused fictions versus merely imagined things, and so forth). Suffice it to say that alchemy, the status of omens delivered by ghosts, and the experimental use of nitre do not to any great extent motivate the French Spinozists. However, they show up in Spinoza’s correspondence, and if we were to read him in terms of the episteme of the Classical era, for instance, such themes would be relevant.
It is thus clear that this brand of Spinoza scholarship is of our own age; indeed, some of these authors emphatically declare the ‘of the moment’ nature of their readings.​[389]​ Still, while I am not reading him using Foucauldian archaeology, I would not want to ignore Spinoza’s historical situation altogether.​[390]​ Below, I will outline non-Foucauldian various ways of situating Spinoza within his era. I acknowledge the seriousness of the risk I run by mixing different kinds of history. However, these thinkers show that Spinoza has in fact always been out of joint with most of Classical philosophy. My aim is to justify at a general level my use of Spinoza as a counter to the present, since Spinoza was already distinct from the Classical philosophy to which we are largely heirs. Spinoza runs little danger of the ‘baggage’ of Classical philosophy of which a Foucauldian project should be wary.
Spinoza as Alternative to the Legacy of Descartes and the Classical Era
Like any other figure, Spinoza is in some ways a child of his era. For instance, one cannot deny that his politics relies on Machiavelli and Hobbes or that his physics is one from the seventeenth-century. If we attempt to draw on Spinoza for a critique of contemporary desiring subjectivity, are we not liable to draw the dangers of Early Modern thought into Foucault? At first glance, they make for rather strange bedfellows. In fact, in one of the rare references by Foucault to Spinoza, Descartes and Spinoza are treated in the same breath as representatives of the 17th century on the topic of madness.​[391]​ Perhaps Spinoza is representative of a problematic and outdated age, compromised by Lockean possessive individuality, Hobbesian sovereignty, and Cartesian certainty, which would no doubt render him unsuited as a response to Foucault. 
However, when we pay close attention to the actual historical surroundings of Spinoza, we see that he was in fact untimely and argued against so much of what became dogma in the 17th century. If we approach Spinoza historically, what becomes apparent is that he is antithetical to most of those around him, in part because Spinoza was decisively shaped by the Judeo-Arabic tradition, which renders him a distinctly atypical seventeenth century philosopher. Additionally, since strains of Early Modern thought still remain with us, Spinoza’s almost antagonistic relationship to his time allows us to have a special relation to him today.​[392]​ Thus, it is not regressive to consider him within a Foucauldian project. He will allow us to fulfill the promise of thinking differently. 
Recent historically grounded approaches to Spinoza have shown that while Spinoza was shaped by what we take to be standard “Early Modern” philosophical currents, he also ran counter to many of them. One way of demonstrating his difference from Descartes or Hobbes is to illuminate his lesser-known Judaeo-Arabic Aristotelian sources. Scholars such as Julie Klein and Idit Dobbs-Weinstein show that Gersonides and Averroes are decisive for understanding Spinoza. A whole Judaeo-Arabic Aristotelian tradition animates Spinoza’s texts, a tradition with which few are familiar and which cuts across the grain of his era in multiple significant ways.​[393]​ I will outline the research securing Spinoza’s relation to this tradition, its import on understanding him, and its relevance for contemporary use of Spinoza. 
Klein says that to understand Spinoza well, we must grasp his “simultaneous refusal of Cartesian dualism and Hobbesian materialism.”​[394]​ Doing so complicates readings of Early Modern philosophy’s birth as synonymous with Descartes’ rejection of Scholastic Aristotelianism, since Spinoza in fact used “the Judaeo-Islamic Aristotle—i.e., the Hebrew language Aristotle—as an alternative to Descartes.”​[395]​ Understood within an Aristotelian frame of reference, central aspects of Spinoza take on “deeply non-, even anti-Cartesian implications.”​[396]​ Just one example: in the attributes of thought and extension, one could easily imagine that something similar to Cartesian substances of mind and body is at work. However, in an Aristotelian fashion of understanding the same thing in different ways, we see that a given mode’s attributes are not really distinct, but only perspectivally distinct: now considered as extended reality, now considered as mental reality.​[397]​ The problems associated with Descartes’ mind-body dualism are deftly avoided by Spinoza’s relation to an opposed tradition. 
However, Spinoza is not using the Thomistic or Scholastic Aristotle with which scholars of his time were most familiar. He had recourse to a Gersonidian Aristotle, which he then radicalized.​[398]​ For instance, regarding natura naturans and natura naturata, “Spinoza’s use of the terms… is a clear case of de-theologizing received vocabulary.”​[399]​ Additionally, in Spinoza there is a total absence of Aristotelian teleology, which he thinks deserves to be “reviled and ridiculed”​[400]​ as a backwards form of thinking which explains nothing.​[401]​ His contemporaries could not square him with Descartes or with the Thomists, and he presented major innovations in terms of the Judaeo-Islamic tradition. On many major issues, his views were “to say the very least, heretical in the eyes of Spinoza’s readers”—no matter who those readers were, it would seem.​[402]​ On so many fundamental issues, we see that Spinoza directly contested much of what we put under the umbrella term “Early Modern Philosophy.”​[403]​ For my work, the relevance of Spinoza’s manifest distance from most of Classical thought is that use of his ethics need not be an attempt to go back to Classical subjectivity, which would be undesirable and impossible according to Foucault. 
Additionally, Idit Dobbs-Weinstein finds that Spinoza’s unusual relation to his era has a contemporary critical function. Her position is clear: Spinoza is not just an alternative to Descartes, but he is in fact the best tool against the descendants of Early Modern “canon” that exists.​[404]​ Spinoza has an odd place in the canon of philosophy, having the strange distinction of being one of the very least-read of major philosophers. Dobbs-Weinstein shows us that “to the extent that Spinoza’s works are read (or taught) at all, his thought has been distorted by its incorporation into the one Christo-Platonic, philosophical canon, by Descartes’s and Kant’s heirs alike.”​[405]​ Due to a specific set of political and theological forces, Spinoza has been unread, or distorted when read alongside others so as to fit him neatly ‘inside’ of them.​[406]​ 
In order to present “the” canon of philosophy as monolithic and hence as inevitable and unassailable, certain texts were “occluded, or more often, violently repressed.”​[407]​ An image of “Early Modern” or “Seventeenth-Century” philosophy was constructed in part by silencing Spinoza’s scathing criticisms of it. For those who want to critique dominant themes of that image (such as reductive appeals to mechanistic science, and political rights grounded in stable, distinct individuals​[408]​), allowing Spinoza to be absorbed into that image negates our strongest possible ally in that critique. Spinoza’s emphasis on ethical and political affect is crucial for critiquing our philosophical inheritance. “Insofar as human choice concerns the pursuit of what is (imaginatively) perceived as good and bad… it occurs first and foremost, in the order of the affects/desires,” not in the order of reason.​[409]​ The implications are far reaching, concerning the theological (we are not a rational soul, but a complex of affects​[410]​), the political​[411]​ (states are not founded on contractual right, nor on Hobbesian mechanics of force), and the epistemological (the power of reason is real but limited).​[412]​ We must read Spinoza against this tradition to make proper sense of him, which also reveals his viability as the starting point of radical critique. 
Revisiting Foucault’s Own Uses of Past Thought
To see in what way past thinkers remain viable today in Foucault, let us quickly summarize the subject matter of the 1982 lectures, The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Foucault centered that year’s lectures on the care of the self, despite (or exactly because) the fact that “everyone knows, says, and repeats, and has done so far a long time, that the question of the subject… was originally posed in… the famous Delphic prescription of gnothi seauton (“know yourself”).”​[413]​ Foucault demonstrates that for Socrates (and other Ancient philosophers), care had to precede knowledge of the self. This common misunderstanding about philosophy (that “know thyself” is the origin of philosophy) is one part of Foucault’s genealogy of the desiring subject, insofar as it helps explain why performing hermeneutics of our selves desiring seems like an obvious and necessary ethical task. “Now it seems to me that by only considering the gnothi seauton in and for itself alone we are in danger of establishing a false continuity and of installing a factitious history that would display a sort of continuous development of knowledge of the self” which also allows an “undeveloped theory of the subject to run behind it all.”​[414]​ Notably, over two pages, he says phrases like “for us,” “us, now, today,” and “modern world” a dozen times.​[415]​
It is in relation to such themes that Foucault names Spinoza and distances him from 17th-century philosophy. According to Foucault, “know thyself” is crystallized in Descartes, and to a lesser degree, in Kant. Does this mean that Spinoza would be caught in the middle of these two?​[416]​ In fact, it is not so simple. First, Foucault notes that care of the self was not eclipsed all at once. It is not the case that Descartes made the moment alone (so not everyone who follows Descartes will be as marked by this moment), and Foucault seems embarrassed at having named it “completely arbitrarily” after someone.​[417]​ Second, Foucault says that Spinoza is not representative of the move to “know thyself,” representing instead what Foucault calls “spirituality,” which is (in short) placing the care of the self before knowledge. 
Take, precisely, the first nine paragraphs of Spinoza’s Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding. You can see quite clearly there… how in formulating the problem of access to the truth Spinoza linked the problem to a series of requirements concerning the subject’s very being: In what aspects and how must I transform my being as a subject?​[418]​ 
Thus, it is no surprise that Arnold Davidson recalls that Foucault remarked “that on this understanding Spinoza is one of the last ancient philosophers and Leibniz one of the first modern philosophers.”​[419]​ 
Thus, Foucault distances Spinoza from Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant. That is, Foucault says that Spinoza is out of step with the Early Modern era (at least in this important respect). Notably, these lectures critique the Cartesian moment (which Spinoza does not really represent) as an eclipsing of ethics in favor of knowledge, which is complicit with the desiring subjectivity under critique. However, beyond the generalized ‘difference from today’ that Foucault attributes to Spinoza and the Ancients, we must note that elsewhere Foucault shows that certain past figures remain an element of how we can, and do, philosophize today. Of obvious importance for Foucault are Kant (in the form of critique) and Nietzsche (in the form of genealogy). In “What is Revolution?,” Foucault says that it is “this form of philosophy that… founded the form of reflection within which I have attempted to work,” linking Kant to the present and to his own work.​[420]​ 
While his piece on Nietzsche does not so directly link their names, it is hard not to think that Foucault is describing uses of history he learned from Nietzsche. For instance, passages that state that genealogy “seeks to reestablish the various systems of subjection” and that “humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules” and that “a comprehensive view of history… as a patient and continuous development must be systematically dismantled” sound like Foucault naming the Nietzschean impulses within his own work.​[421]​ In his various pieces on Kant and the birth of modern critique around the Enlightenment, Foucault attributes to Kant an attitude of questioning the limits of the present. In the spirit of Nietzsche, Foucault highlights the ways that our fractured past needs to be studied. While the Kantian lessons and the Nietzschean lessons overlap significantly, if one could artificially link Kant to thinking the present and Nietzsche to thinking the past, we can perhaps use Spinoza’s name to signal a Foucauldian future thought. To that end, I will show how Spinozist “subjectivity” gives us specific practices of the self which will effectively bring about future selves that are beyond desiring subjectivity. 
What I aimed to do above was not to obliterate every possible concern about a composition of the forces of Spinoza and Foucault, but only to reduce the bulk of them. Foucauldians who know “going back” is not an option may be soothed somewhat by the contemporaneity of certain readings with Foucault and our own age. Those who acknowledge the very real problems of “Early Modern” thought might take comfort in knowing that Spinoza shows little contamination by those problems, and in fact argues strenuously against many of them. And now, for those who are not concerned with historiographical methodology but simply doubt that Foucault and Spinoza could ever be contained in the same text, we move on to demonstrating that they do indeed combine well, forming an effective tool for my specific concerns. 
Part Two- Broad Philosophical Compatibility on Non-Humanism
While it may seem an odd fit, first I will argue that on a number of broad philosophical issues, Foucault and much of contemporary Spinozism are working with similar assumptions, and joining these two sets of ideas presents the best existing solution to the critique of the desiring subject. One way of putting this in Spinoza’s terms is that a mind (such as mine) which is constituted by Foucauldian ideas as well as by Spinozistic ideas, will not vacillate and be at war with itself but will have many ideas which lead to yet more ideas. This will be a mind capable of thinking very many things. Specifically, such a mind will have more ideas capable of countering the sad affects which are specific to desiring subjectivity. Foucault gave many ideas which raise doubts about the subjectivity common to our contemporary age, and Spinoza supplies additional ideas which turn that doubt into full denial. Further, Spinoza presents a form of subjectivity which is perfectly suited to counter or displace desiring subjectivity. It would not be enough for my project to merely show some generic “similarity,” and I am not arguing that there are shortcomings in Foucault that need patching up by another thinker. Rather, I am proposing that the ideas go beyond “agreement” on certain issues, and that a way of thinking which is constituted by both Foucault and Spinoza is a consistent, novel and productive way of thinking. 
Many of the ways in which I join Spinoza and Foucault can be thought of under the general rubric of non-humanism. To the extent that Spinoza and Foucault are both non-humanists, they travel a little-used road together. Beyond that generality, though, the specific modes of Spinoza’s non-humanism are highly effective counters to desiring subjectivity. Most obviously, Spinoza emphatically denies the free will as an uncaused choice. In addition, Spinoza also does not rely on a “thick” notion of a human nature. What he does say about “human nature” is minimal and is not a timeless essence in which we find our origin. Reductively, we can say that human nature is an effect, not a cause. “Man” is not the founding subject of the world. A ‘self’ in Spinoza is not primarily reason (that is, second-order knowledge) nor is it an atomistic, sovereign individual. Instead, it is dispersed outside of itself, includes necessary links to other individuals, and is wholly constituted (both in its creation and in its continuation) by things which it does not control, the workings of which it will never come to fully understand (much like the forms of constitution of Foucault). Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, the ideas which are at the core of our ethical or affective lives, the ideas which Spinoza analyzes in such detail and which he says are so useful for improving our lives, are just as impersonal and ‘non-human’ as those things which form our bodies. Ideas are cosmological, and do not belong any more to humanity than does motion; they happen to us and we receive them, but we do not craft them, much as in Foucault’s epistemes. Even the ‘freedom’ which adequate ideas give us is not personal, indeterminate freedom. As Spinoza says, adequate ideas are necessary, so their effects happen whether you will it or not (like the internal angles of a triangle which can only ever be believed to equal 180 degrees). 
Minimalist or Thin Human Nature in Spinoza (Subjectivity Without “The Subject”): “Essence” and Nominalism
Though he uses phrases such as human nature, human essence, and laws of one’s nature,​[422]​ if there is anything like a “theory” of human nature in Spinoza, it will be of the most minimal and non-transcendental sort.​[423]​ Against Descartes’ definition “Man is a thinking thing” and its attendant arguments, Spinoza simply states, “Man thinks (2Ax2).”​[424]​ We must note that this is an axiom. Spinoza does not argue for nor prove this as an essence or definition, but gives it forth as an obvious fact. Note that he does not define our essence as thought or mind: thinking is a kind of acting which we do (and not the only kind). This is less a theory of human nature than a description of what experience shows to be true of existing human individuals. Thinking does not ground the dignity of humanity, it is not the image of God, and it is not deduced from our alleged separation from animals.
The only reason that we can think is because substance expresses itself in the attribute of thought. Because the universe has ideas in it, it is thinkable (just as because it has matter in it, it is movable). Thought is a power of the world before it becomes ours. And while much of the Ethics details the complexities of particular acts of human thinking, that complexity does not need—and will not be given—a deep foundation. Spinoza does expand “Man thinks” somewhat, though never into anything like the grounding of a universal nature. He adds that a mind can do many things, and more still as its body is more capable (2P14), and that a human body (with which a human mind is identified at 2P11-13 and 2P7) can move external things in a great many ways (2Post6). Spinoza would rather detail the actual activity of thought than define thinking substance as did Descartes. For Spinoza, it is the acts of thinking in their concrete variety, not an essential link unifying them, that will be most useful for improving our ethical lives. If something is unvarying, then it cannot be changed, and both Spinoza and Foucault are interested in diagnosing that which can be changed. 
Spinoza is a thoroughgoing nominalist. Most ‘essences’ concocted reflect more about the speaker’s own scattered history of thought than about things. As the examples below show, the human “essence” is given a nominal definition. It is not essences which cause things (except in the case of Substance),​[425]​ but rather a chain of immanent causes.​[426]​ Spinoza says that “there must be, for each existing thing, a certain cause on account of which it exists” and so 
if, in Nature, a certain number of individuals exists, there must be a cause why… neither more nor fewer exist. For example, if twenty men exist in Nature… it will not be enough… to show the cause of human nature in general… there must necessarily be a cause why each exists. But this cause… cannot be contained in human nature itself, since the true definition of man does not involve the number 20 (1P8Sch2). 
The existence of all actual things, including your own existence, “does not follow from the nature of these things, but from the order of the whole of corporeal Nature (1P11).”​[427]​
Spinoza goes much further—he usually does—and adds that not only existences, but even essences, are caused efficiently. “God is the efficient cause, not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence (1P25).” There is only one form of causality in the world: efficient causality.​[428]​ For Spinoza, an essence does not come to be because God wills it or thinks it in an infinite intellect. Idealism is thoroughly eliminated here. Things essentially are, that is, really are, just the real chain of events which produced them. They are not caused by a transcendental species form. It is things which bring forth or are their essences, just as much as the other way around: “the essence is what the thing can neither be nor be conceived without, and vice versa, what can neither be nor be conceived without the thing (my emphasis, 2P10Sch).” 
Spinoza, therefore, denies real existence to all universal and transcendental categories. While Foucault does so as well, his grounds are archaeological or genealogical, and Spinoza’s are epistemological. However different the justifications, though, a shared nominalism leads both of them to reject essential definitions of “Man.” Both refuse a timeless, pre-existing, or teleological “Human Nature,” instead defining us through the actual variable causes which made us. Essences are real, but they are real along with the individual thing whose essence they are. They do not pre-exist the thing, they are not genuinely shared with other things, and they do not make the thing act the way it does (indeed, a thing’s essence just is the actual ways the thing acts: 3P7).  After defining the adequate common notions of reason, Spinoza is quick to point out that he does not include as adequate those “Transcendental… terms like Being, Thing, and Something” and just as little those “notions they call Universal, like Man, Horse, Dog, and the like” (2P40Sch1). Instead of being produced by a human mental power or faculty, universals are “confused in the highest degree,” since they depend on a limitation of our body and our memory, whereby we take whatever we currently recall under the universal word-term (which happens to be whatever is easiest to recall), ignore the differences between objects (as they have less force on our minds because they have by definition been repeated in our perception less times), and we each do so based on a highly idiosyncratic random experience (“experientia vaga,” which is neither shared with nor agreed upon by others). Universal terms are not the core reality of a thing, and they do not come from any higher power of thought or rational abstraction. Indeed, they cause more “controversies (2P40Sch1)” than they solve, since people are not used to treating them like imaginary verbal markers, which is all they are in fact. 
Book 1 ends with an important discussion of how “controversies” occur when we “take the imagination for the intellect.” In imagination, “each one has judged things according to the disposition of his brain” which in this context is a highly variable bodily organ, as Spinoza indicates with reference to the saying, “‘there are as many differences of brains as of palates’” (1Appx, II/81-83). Spinoza extends the critique of the Appendix of Book 1, as Book 2 demonstrates how few of our ideas are adequate how many are imaginative. We should be mindful of his insistence on general nominalism and his specific refusal to give an essence to human nature when he later employs terms like human nature (e.g. 4P19-31). We must recall that universal terms, including universal essences​[429]​ are just “modes of imagining” or “names”—“beings, not of reason, but of imagination (1Appx, II/83).”​[430]​ 
The Absence of Human Exceptionalism: Humans are Only a Part of Nature, and Are Not the Only Individuals
As I said, however, essences are real and you do have an essence, according to Spinoza. However, you do not participate in a shared human nature, but have a particular essence understood through its real causes, which are very often non-human. Since universals cause more confusion than knowledge, Spinoza prefers instead to define singular things. Under the attribute of extension, the simplest physical bodies are distinguished only by their motion (2Lem1).When many of these small bodies “communicate their motions to each other in a certain fixed manner, we shall say that those bodies are united with one another and that they all together compose one body or individual, which is distinguished from the others by this union of bodies (2Def, II/99-100).”​[431]​ Such individuals can then become composed into larger, more complex individuals, and it is these “composite individuals (2L7Sch)” which we actually experience. A human body is such an individual, Spinoza states in the scholium. 
However, let us expand some on what has already been said. First, a thing is defined at the most primary level by the motion and rest of efficient causality. However, we do not experience pure motion and rest as such. Therefore, the better unit of analysis is the “certain and fixed manner” in which a thing moves, that is, what the thing can really do and characteristically does. It is at the level of a ratio (a characteristic fixed proportion of motion and rest), when we have definable “individuals” and not mere moving “things,” that Spinoza begins to speak of an individual’s “nature” (beginning with 2Lem4). Notably, its nature is “distinguished from the others” by its ratio: its essence distinguishes it from, rather than linking it to, other things. What we share is always least important to understanding our actual existence.​[432]​ Nominalism is thus reinforced by an ontology of singularity at the level of individual objects of actual experience. 
Also, Spinoza has told us that humans are a composite individual, that composite individuals are made up of parts which are themselves individuals, and that the whole of the universe is itself a highly composite individual. Individuality, then, is not unique to humans—our organs are individuals, and the world itself is an individual.​[433]​ So we cannot take individual, here, in the sense of desiring subjectivity’s personalistic “individuality.” Spinoza denies any specific qualitative content to human individuality:
the things shown so far do not pertain to man more than to other individuals… so whatever we have said of the idea of the human body must also be said of the idea of any thing. However,… the difference between the human mind and the others, and how it surpasses them [is]… that in proportion as a body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, or being acted on in many ways at once, so its mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once (2P13Sch). 
Human beings differ from most other things—however, this is only by degrees, and not a “substantial” or essential difference. We do not possess faculties which separate us out. A baby can do much less than an adult chimp,​[434]​ and the very reason for our complexity is that we include real individuals within us. Our complexity is dependent on other things with as much ontological reality as ourselves.
Non-Humanist Subjectivity in Spinoza: Essence is Neither an Origin nor an Uncaused Freedom: a Human is Always Constituted or Determined to Exist in a Certain Manner
Already we have a strong framework for joining the ideas of Spinoza and Foucault. We can now add another fundamental philosophical proposition that Foucault and Spinoza share with each other: the essence of each individual thing is what it is only because it has been constituted in a specific and determinate way. A thing’s essence or nature or real existence is reducible to its historical formation. 
As we have seen, an individual is initially defined as its characteristic pattern of motion and rest. We can highlight again that for Spinoza, your individual essence did not precede your existence, did not precede the coming together of parts which you are: “when… or if they [bodies] communicate their motions to each other… we shall say that those bodies are united (my emphasis, 2Def, II/99-100).”​[435]​ You are nothing but the particular configuration of the parts which make you up, therefore, you were nothing until such time as they came together and you do not come to have a transcendental essence which is more than (or otherwise dissociable from) these parts. A determined—but not destined—crashing together of things made another thing—you. Coupling this with Spinoza’s insistence that nothing exists without a cause (1ax3 and 1ax4), and that all effects are known through their causes, we understand that a person’s existence, and any true knowledge of it, only come through the causes that formed her. We are working our way toward the specific ways in which Spinoza supports genealogical work as formulated by Foucault. “The body is molded by a great many distinct regimes… Nothing in man—not even his body—is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition.”​[436]​ There is no real you, plopped into a world which is foreign to you. Rather, there is a world which, from among its infinite component individual things, has smashed together enough of them that you became necessary. You are now the site of causes and effects of the same order from which you emerged.​[437]​ Your existence is not an origin, but an result, and an effect more so than a birth. In terms of Foucault’s forms of subjectivity, it is clear that if you were born in another era (within a different form of subjectivity or within another causal chain), you would be wholly different than you are now.
Your continued existence is just as variably constituted as your birth.​[438]​ Once more, we will be nothing but these changes—much like Foucault said, the self is not a substance which undergoes changes, it is everything which changes and everything which remains the same at once. This will ground the power of practices of the self, since practices do not merely touch lightly upon a fixed core, but can in fact potentially reshape subjectivity as such. Neither the change nor the fixity is more real than the other. Notice the glaring lack of the language of accidents attending the term essence in Spinoza; he does not seem interested in making the ratio or essence into the stable core around which hover all the variations that happen to us.​[439]​ In fact, human ratios have variability built into them as such, since they are defined by the ability to experience many things, to affect and be affected in many ways, by having a body which is capable of becoming more the cause than the effect of what happens around it, and so on. After affirming that every thing strives to persevere in its existence (3P6), Spinoza then identifies essence with such striving and every actual effect which follows from it. “So the power of each thing, or the striving by which it (either alone or with others) does anything, or strives to do anything… is nothing but the given, or actual, essence of the thing itself (3P7Dem).” In 3P11, Spinoza makes clear that the striving is not radically distinct from what follows from it. 3P57 makes explicit all the connections: that desire is essence, that desire can be aided or restrained, that affects (of joy and sadness, respectively) follow from this, and that these affects are nothing other than the actual desire in its real fluctuations. That is, all of our shifting affects are our desire which is our essence. Our changes are essential to us, and these changes or fluctuations count as part of your “given, or actual, essence.” 
In connection with Foucault, we notice that while there is essence, it is nominal. “Man” is not an essence, but a mere word. As a corollary, your essence (that which explains what you are) is neither shared within nor caused by a real, universal category of “the human,” but is a particular, singular effect of other things. Second, your essence is not singular in the sense that a soul is said to be singular. Your essence did not make you, or draw together the parts which make you, but is just what these parts happen to make if they collide together in such a way. Your real existence is entirely constituted by the laws and rules which shaped your formation through the things that determine what you are. The temporally existing (historically existing) essence which you have, is not a nucleus around which changes happen. The changes which you have undergone were not things that happened to or around you, but are instead nothing but the (constitution of the) real you. 
Like many terms in Spinoza, we have now seen that what we would call individual human essence, personal singularity, and everything associated with a soul, has been pared away, one proposition or axiom at a time. Spinoza has argued directly against much of what Foucault only hinted was of recent birth, contingent, and harmful. That is, these hinge points which “Man” and desiring subjectivity require to function can be dismantled through Spinoza. Since we are all the changes we undergo, and the use I am making of Spinoza is helping to intensify Foucault’s critique of “Man” and “desire,” continuing the combination of Spinoza and Foucault will cause our constitution to gradually shift. If we can take this further still, more fully displacing desire and introducing new causes in its wake, then we can become new kinds of subjects.
Non-Humanist Subjectivity in Spinoza: “Inner Life” is Constituted in Large Part by “Externals” (by Others and Their Affects)—Transindividuation 
Even further, your individual essence does not atomistically isolate you from other individuals, because you are continually constituting and constituted (affecting and affected) by other people and other non-human individuals. This not only denies atomistic individuality, thus setting the stage for critiques of liberalism and humanism, but also gives a genetic explanation for Foucault’s analysis of power relations. That is, if we are constantly interacting with other things and other people, and the constitution of our subjectivity is wedded to these forces as soon and as long as we exist, then of course relations of power and forms of subjectivity will not merely change or shape us, but make us what we are. We are not atoms of self, buffeted by foreign attacks, since these forces constitute the self and our actual actions. Foucault similarly insists that power is everywhere, without thus denouncing power as alienating. It just is the nature of human beings to be formed in some way by everything with which they interact. Similarly, Spinoza refuses to bemoan the fact the we are inevitably linked to others imaginatively. 
Beginning at 3P15, Spinoza begins describing the complex processes by which others constitute our own individuality. 3P27 lays out what he calls the “imitation of affects,” which determines us to experience affects based upon the affects we perceive others to be having. 3P16-3P48 shows how the imitation of affects is as unavoidable as breathing. And as air circulates through the body, the affects of other people constantly move through all parts of our minds, interacting with specific ideas, changing our minds as they go, and then being expelled in non-identical metabolized form (perhaps a different affect), which can then be absorbed by others.​[440]​ 
The basic process by which we automatically imitate affects, is that if we see something which we imagine to be like us, when we see it affected, we automatically think of ourselves as so affected (because per hypothesis, we think we are like it). Thus, we feel the joys and pains of things we take to have something in common with us. However, since for Spinoza, anytime we feel pain, we seek to exclude it, and this thing imitated is feeling (and thereby causing us) pain, we seek to exclude its pain to exclude our own. Quickly, imitated affects turn to action, as do all affects.​[441]​ Affects always involve some desire to act for or against something.​[442]​ The complexity rises quickly: we want to exclude (that is, destroy or harm) those people who hurt those we love, we rejoice in those who hurt those we hate (3P22), we nonetheless feel pain in the harm done to those whom we hate and feel something in common with (because their pain still makes us think of our own pain). 
The inescapabilty of our tendency to imitate others mirrors the inescapabilty of our constitution via forms of subjectivity and power—and yet, this does not mean that we are repressed or tyrannized. For neither thinker is our constitution by others (governmentality, sive, imitation of affects) opposed to a more real, freer self—the situation is infinitely more complex than this. “Power is relations… a relationship which is such that one can direct the behaviour of another or determine the behaviour of another. Voluntarily determining it in terms of a number of objectives which are also one’s own.”​[443]​ Power is “a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult… always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions.”​[444]​ Combining Spinoza’s detailed analysis of the power of acting, which can be greater or lesser, better or worse, reinforces Foucault’s underappreciated statements that power is not evil or repressive, and that our form of subjectivity can be enabling as well as crippling. 
To speak broadly, Spinoza on power speaks against Hobbes. Spinoza shows a variety of ways in which man can be a God to man, and not just be a wolf to man. Foucault must be read to the letter, against his appropriation by others whose views on power equate it to domination. Being governed in Foucault is not a problem as such. 
I do not mean… a kind of face-off by the opposite affirmation, “we do not want to be governed…” [Instead,] we identify a perpetual question which would be: “how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures…” Facing them head on and as compensation, or rather, as both partner and adversary to the arts of governing… transforming them… with a basic distrust, but also and by the same token, as a line of development of the arts of governing.​[445]​  
As Spinoza notes, “daily experience… provides so much and such clear evidence that this saying is in almost everyone’s mouth: man is a God to man (4P35Sch).” And yet humans are the sole cause of civil war, when imitation-as-ambition and the differences between singular bodies collide.
We cannot opt out of the imitation of the affects, though we can selectively diminish certain affects through counter-affect (to be discussed later), including those induced by imitation. However, each affect would require its own process of diminishment, and one will never reach a non-imitative stage. As in Foucault, our constitution is inescapable, foundational, and never finished. The goal is not to reject imitation of affects or evade power, but simply, to find ways to better re-constitute the subjects we have become. Since affects (as much as any other idea including adequate ideas) become part of your mind as soon as you have felt them once, even when alone you have at least some ideas and affects that had their origin in another. There is no extricating yourself from others and their effects on you, just because they are not present.​[446]​ As is the case for subjectivation in Foucault, you are your ideas, whether or not they were caused by another. These ideas are a part of you until something excludes them. While Foucault says that we will remain desiring subjects until we engage in new practices and conceive of a new form of self, he presented very little himself that might exclude desire. In Spinoza, we find a different self as well as the practices needed to exclude the ideas of our current constitution. 


5. Applying Foucault’s Four Aspects of Subjectivity to Spinoza
The details of Spinozistic ethical subjectivity can now finally be presented. It should be kept in mind that much of what follows is emphasized because it runs counter to the desiring subjectivity which is my main target of criticism. Recall that Foucault analyzed the axis of subjectivity through four main aspects: ethical substance (the “prime matter”​[447]​ of ethics), mode of subjection (why one ought to be ethical), askesis (practices of the self that allow or help one to become ethical), and the telos (the overall state achieved by an ethical life). We can condense these as an ethics’ what, why, how, and where to.
Ethical Substance: Affects (Particularly Sad Affects)
The ethical substance—what matters most for human life, what is properly judged better or worse—of Spinoza is affect. “By affect I understand affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections. Therefore, if we can be adequate causes of any of these affections, I understand by the affect an action; otherwise, a passion (3Def3).” Affects in Spinoza are not body-things which the Mind controls.​[448]​ “The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, and the mind cannot determine the body to motion [or] to rest (3P2).” We must keep in mind that ethical affects are not linked any more to the body than to the mind,​[449]​ and are never cast as an opposition between mind and body. Affect, then, can be considered under both attributes. An affect is of, or belongs to, the mode, not just the mind and not just the body.
Affect is largely rooted in the imagination, which means that it is a permanent feature of our lives. Spinoza is not trying to do away with affect in general, and even passive affects are to be managed, not eliminated (as I discuss below). It is impossible to live without affect, unless you somehow did not interact with anything (4P2-4) and also had no memory (which would effectively mean you had no ideas at all). The highest goal for Spinoza, which only the rare philosopher will achieve, is an increase in active affects and a reduction of passive affects. Affects remain a part of life even for the ethically excellent, and there is no sage in Spinoza. There is not even a theoretical possibility of becoming free from either affects or passions. Affects are not evil, not even the saddest of passions. Spinoza does not “bewail, or laugh at, or disdain, or… curse” affects and refuses to call them “vice” or “weakness” (3pref).​[450]​ Spinoza includes desire as a primary affect (3P11Sch), which immediately indicates that every action of ours has an affect as its cause. Also, just to be clear, affects should not be reduced to ‘feelings’ or ‘emotions.’ Sad affects are caused primarily by the object, and thus these affects are not purely subjective or personal. 
Affects, since they include desire, are the motor of all of our behavior, all that motivates us or causes our behavior (see 3P6-9).​[451]​ They are involved in absolutely all of our behavior: physical motion, appetites of which we are not aware, known desires, mere daydreams or fancies (3P9Sch), even the combination of adequate ideas is prompted by affects. Joy and sadness immediately imply action just as much as does desire; any joy or sadness which is associated with an external cause (and all imaginative life involves an external cause) necessarily prompts love or hate respectively. “We see, then, that one who loves necessarily strives to have present and preserve the thing he loves; and on the other hand, one who hates strives to remove and destroy the thing he hates” (3P13Sch). Interaction causes change, and every change for the better or for the worse prompts a reaction for or against the thing (3P19-26 and 3P28). As for Foucault, ‘ethics’ in Spinoza consists of much more than codes (codes saying with whom you can sleep, etc.); it is about life in general, and refers to what this person is (and what she takes herself to be), how she acts (both bodily and mental actions), why she acts, and her judgments about what is better or worse. Affects are not just feelings but are indexes of desired actions caused by a nexus of the real state of your body and the real state of the thing.​[452]​ 
Ethics requires sorting the ethical substance into good and bad. For Spinoza, good and bad equate to activity and passivity. Affections are by definition changes in us, and these almost always either increase or decrease our power of existing, that is, they make us more capable of doing and acting (whether in body or in mind). When your power increases (or you think of your power), you experience the affect of joy; conversely, if your power decreases (or you think of a decrease in your power), you experience sadness (3P11Sch). Since what you are is nothing other than your power of existing, to diminish this is the only thing which is bad for you, just as maintaining or increasing your force is your sole good. 
Ethical analysis should specify exactly what of the ethical substance, practically speaking, matters the most. For Spinoza, the affects with which we should be most concerned are our sad affects (which are always passive, by definition​[453]​). There is a reparative or therapeutic element to Spinoza, with the important caveat that there is no original self to “repair (to)” nor are there universal causes of health. We study our affects in order to find which are least powerful or most debilitating, and then to reconfigure them so they produce less sadness. For all the nearly unrivaled positivity in Spinoza (everything is perfect in its kind, all is a necessary expression of the infinite power of substance, and so on), and the refusal to bemoan, curse, or mock passive affects, Book 3 does not even get to active affects until its final two propositions (although 3P3 and 3P53-54 set them up). While adequate ideas are important in their own right for knowledge (of course), and are useful on limiting the force of certain sad affects, they are not what we spend most of our ethical work handling or analyzing. They are not the focus; and of the passive affects, desire and certainly joy are not especially problematic.​[454]​ Ethical substance in Spinoza consists primarily of sad affects. 
We should note that almost every affect is a mixture of passivity and activity,​[455]​ and thus passivity is a matter of degrees. In fact, very often we have multiple conflicting affects toward one and the same object (3P17); this vacillation between affects often ricochets between a joyful affect and a sad affect—as anyone who has been in love can attest. So affects often cause both sadness and joy. As we will see, ethics is not about fleeing evil or about finding some unsullied good. Instead, it is about reducing the force of the less-good. In very broad strokes, this sounds like Foucault’s style of critique: pragmatic, immanent and local rather than utopian, transcendental and global.
Affects tend to be highly complex, in and of themselves—the complexity only increases when we understand their linkages to other affects. A single affect has parts, and it goes on to interact with other affects’ or ideas’ parts in complex groupings. Already, an affect such as gladness contains parts: “a joy, accompanied by the idea of a past thing which has turned out better than we had hoped” (3DefAffXVI).​[456]​ My present affect of joy (my experience of my increase in power), linked to past affect toward another thing, which is linked in contrasting fashion to another affect toward the thing in the present, and a current affect toward the difference between these two (the better ‘surplus’ causing an affect of its own, since unexpected good affects us more than expected good), all combined.​[457]​ Recall that Spinoza’s famous dictum that he will “consider human actions and appetites as if it were a question of lines, planes, and bodies” (3Pref). Beyond its non-humanist determinism, these words surely also mean that, as in geometry, affects can be understood through analysis of the constituent parts which compose larger entities. Affects are not immediate, subjective, and irreducible datum to be felt. They are natural complexes to be known and adjusted. Analysis will imply what is to be done with any given affect; for instance, an affect with sadness in it generally should be weakened.
There are further layers of complexity requiring analysis. Affects, like anything else, only exist in causally determined chains (2P7). If we see two things at the same time (2P18), if we are used to associating multiple individuals with the same word (2P18sch), if an object and an affection of our body often happen together and we experience either one in isolation (2P17, 3P14, and 3P18), or if any random imaginary connection exists between two affects (3P15), then ideas get fused, and they will be automatically thought or felt together unless something prevents this. Almost all the propositions from 3P15-57 and 4P32-58​[458]​ refer to things imagined to be like us, to others, to imitated affects. As I have mentioned, the affects of others are absolutely central to our own and are as much a part of us, as is the oxygen in our lungs. Others, whether they are truly are like you or not, whether you are actively thinking of them or not, are a constant feature of your affective makeup. There is no ‘real you’ outside of society and its pressures, any more than you have a ‘real body’ independent of atmospheric pressure and oxygen and water. The effects that our relations to others have on our affective life, which can be good and can be bad, is not always apparent until we analyze our affect into its component causes; we see how easily imitation of affect will support Foucauldian understandings of power-relations and of ethical subjectivity. Indeed, Foucault’s analytics of the “micro-physics of power” could largely be re-described as Spinozist imitation of affect, physics of the conatus, analysis of affects and other ideas into component parts, and the swirling, ever-shifting webs of causality between all of these.
Mode of Subjection: Conatus or Striving
Affects, analyzed as ethical substance, are natural, causal of behavior, social, composed of parts, ineradicable but thankfully not evil or even harmful as such, and most in need of being understood when sad. But why seek to understand them, to increase our activity, to break them into parts and modify them? In Foucault’s terms, what is the Spinozist mode of subjection that suggests or demands that we become better? The mode of subjection in Spinoza’s ethics is a naturalism. You should preserve your existence, decrease your sad affects, and increase your power because this is what you already strive to do naturally and necessarily. In fact, properly speaking, he will not say you ought to do but that you already do and will do more if certain determinate conditions are met.  One does not need to be persuaded, but only to have perceived. If you are shown how to increase your power, then you will necessarily execute those actions to the extent you are able. 
The mode of subjection in Spinoza is expressed centrally through the concept of the conatus. “Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being,” and this “striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing” (3P6 and 3P7).​[459]​ Each thing maintains itself, as well as it can. Spinoza’s naturalism here is so radical that it refers to all of nature, not ‘human nature’ or even just to life. Causal determinism is radical in another respect. No thing, under any circumstances, can possibly do otherwise than affirm its own existence, resisting that which would diminish it, and striving for its power of existing at any opportunity. To do otherwise would involve a manifest contradiction, since to not affirm your existence would mean to deny it. Then your essence would involve its own destruction, or, the actual conditions of your existence would also explain at one and the same time your non-existence or impossibility (3P4, 4P20Sch). Can a triangle’s definition explain the absence of a triangle? Can the actual specific conditions which made this triangle also be solely responsible for eliminating it? Manifestly not, for Spinoza, and just as little can any other thing deny itself.​[460]​ 
Our virtue consists just in this persevering in and expansion of our existence. “The striving to preserve oneself is the first and only foundation of virtue” (4P22Cor).​[461]​ From the general definition of virtue, we can deduce more specific content: acting to our advantage, pursuing what is useful, avoiding things which are contrary to our natures (e.g. 4P30-31), experiencing a varied set of interactions (4P45) so that we can do more things and have more power. These ideas were already vividly expressed in the Theological-Political Treatise,​[462]​ where power, virtue, and right are identified, which I will now quote at length. 
By the right and order of nature I merely mean the rules determining the nature of each individual thing by which we conceive it is determined naturally to exist and to behave in a certain way. For example fish are determined by nature to swim and big fish to eat little ones, and therefore it is by sovereign natural right that fish have possession of the water and that big fish eat small fish… each individual thing has the sovereign right to do everything that it can do, or the right of each thing extends so far as its determined power extends… Here we recognize no difference between human beings and other individual things of nature, nor between those human beings who are endowed with reason and others who do not know true reason, nor between fools or lunatics and the sane (TTP 16.2).
Spinoza’s mode of subjection, then, is clearly not one of prohibition; he adds that “from this it follows that the right, and order of nature… prohibits nothing but what no one desires or no one can do; it does not prohibit strife or hatred or anger or fraud or anything at all that appetite foments” (16.4). Spinoza notes that law in the proper sense, is not made by a prince and then freely obeyed or not by other people, but that law only properly applies to natural determinate universal causes.​[463]​ Spinoza boldly declares (TTP 4.9 and Ep. 19)​[464]​ that God’s supposed order to not eat the apple is only a law in a sense which approximates that of a physical law of nature. God’s Law is only knowledge of natural determinations. God revealed to Adam that bad effects (that is, death by poisoning) would be the natural determinate effect of eating the apple. Unsurprisingly, God gave sound advice, proven by the fact that Adam died after eating the apple. God’s commandments are nothing other than practical advice from God (i.e., based on true knowledge) on how to avoid ‘poisoning’ ourselves with dangerous affects. Failure to adhere to sound advice tends to have bad results—including death—however, these are not punishment for freely choosing against God. A true ethical prescription never takes legislative or juridical form backed up by threat of punishment, but is only an accurate prediction about the effects of real things on an individual’s actual constitution. I hear an echo of this prudential advice, based on particular concrete experience, in Foucault’s rejection of the universal intellectual. He indeed calls it a prophetic and legislative function, which he rejects. 
Because each individual’s constitution varies significantly, goodness and badness vary too. A friend of mine has a peanut allergy, so it is “bad” for him to eat peanuts (despite the fact that he is noble and generally quite virtuous). Since I lack such an allergy, peanuts are good, since they allow me to easily snack while working, improving my ability to use the ideas which I have. Good and bad are not illusions, but are as real as can be. However, they are never based in a transcendental order from God or reason or conscience, and they vary depending on the constitution of each individual.​[465]​ Metaphors of health help us imagine what is at stake here, comparing what is useful to our bodies with what is useful for our mind.
A naturalism, to be sure. Naturalism plus determinism in Spinoza add up to a mode of subjection which does without the words ‘ought’ and ‘should.’ He is not pleading his case, but stating a proof as a geometer would. Ideas, understood properly, motivate action all by themselves. Naturalism and determinism are related in Spinoza, of course, but we may artificially isolate them to make a point. Naturalism in Spinoza shows us that you are naturally already pursuing your good. You are already as virtuous as your nature will allow, just as fish need no convincing that they should swim. Determinism shows that if new causes are introduced into your life, they will necessarily determine you to act differently. However, if you were left just as you are now, there would be absolutely no reason (no cause) to act any differently, that is, to act any better. If there is such a cause, however, you can only actualize the effects of that cause. Though I would not class Foucault as a naturalist, he is another determinist, beyond good and evil: in this relation, then, we can justify Foucault’s silence on what we should do today. We each, despite or without his protestations, were affected by his ideas based on our different constitutions. Some had violent allergies while some invented powerful new experiments of the self. Spinoza does not appeal to goodness as a transcendental category which evaluates externally to things. Goodness is relational (my reaction to the thing) but immanent to the interaction. There is just this world, and any goodness you achieve will be in and of this world and will build on what goodness or virtue you already possess. If I may say it bluntly, the mode of subjection in Spinoza is beyond good and evil. It is a naturalism which claims, not that you should be good, but that you already pursue what seems good to you, and will do so more effectively if and only if you are exposed to ideas which determinately cause you to live more powerfully.
Askesis or Practices of the Self: Counter-Affect or Joining and Separation of Ideas
But we need concrete means—a set of askeses—in order to more effectively guide our exposure to ideas and things. Spinoza gives us such a method. In Foucauldian terms, Spinoza is within the camp of philosophers for whom ethics prioritizes care of the self over knowledge of the self. As we will see, knowledge alone is not enough to dispel sad affects, though it is of course necessary. Spinoza gives us that necessary theoretical knowledge of affect, followed by the practices and exercises which can make ethical use of the theoretical principles we have learned.​[466]​ After getting a certain amount of knowledge required for the purpose of ethical formation of subjectivity, we do not require more knowledge. We do however require practices of the self that turn those ideas from matters of technical assent to matters of actual determination upon our behavior. Askesis in general, and Spinozistic askesis in particular, uses concrete practices to turn true ideas into tools which we use on ourselves. 
We do ourselves a disservice if we rush through these sections, because they show us in detail how to effectively determine ourselves to our betterment, and because they have greater practical import for ethics than, say, third-order knowing (which is notoriously difficult to pinpoint the meaning of, and not likely a typical experience). Foucault would not be surprised by those who are indifferent to Book 4, according to his statement in The Hermeneutics of the Subject that we now read philosophy primarily for knowledge of the self instead of for practical techniques of the self. Even with the Ethics, we pass over ethical practices.​[467]​ The ethical training of askeses may, in fact, be required before one can successfully love God, since they precede the intellectual love of God in the idea-chain of the propositions.​[468]​ 
Recall that we have no independent faculty of willing, judging, or affirming, so the force or reality of an idea is what prompts us to affirm it; insofar as the idea and our own self both remain the same, the idea will be affirmed to exactly the same degree, whether true or false. We strive to maintain each idea we have whether it is adequate or not (3P9), that is to say, we will continue thinking or believing an idea regardless of falsity. While ideas can be actively opposed, affirmed errors do not exactly show themselves out the door—they do not even show themselves to be possibly dubious (2P49sch[I]). Sad affects, like any other idea, affirm themselves of their own power, so a method or process using ideas of equal or greater power will have to be brought to bear on them to disrupt their inertial force. Often, affects quite stubbornly “cling” to us (4P6), even when we are trying to remove them.​[469]​
Beside the persistence of any individual idea, Spinoza also points out that truth, all by itself, is not enough to dispel falsity, error, confused imaginative ideas, or affects.​[470]​ “Nothing positive which a false idea has is removed by the presence of the true insofar as it is true” (4P1). Falsity, he explains, is merely partial positive truth (4P1 and 2P32-35) or a “privation” of full adequacy; how could a true idea destroy the truth of another idea?​[471]​ Most affects are just kinds of imagination,​[472]​ where one’s 
power of acting is increased or diminished: they are not contrary to the true, and do not disappear on its presence. It happens, of course, when we wrongly fear some evil, that the fear disappears on our hearing news of the truth. But on the other hand, it also happens, when we fear an evil which is certain to come, that the fear vanishes on our hearing false news. So imaginations do not disappear through the presence of the true insofar as it is true, but because there occur others, stronger than them (4P1sch). 
This is crucial. Truth by itself does not effectively dispel affects, so counter-affects must be deployed to eliminate bad affects. While Spinoza is referring to knowledge in general, knowledge of self would not be immune to the point. Askesis in Spinoza will focus on counter-affect, not on banishing affect through reason.​[473]​ In fact, even in instances where it seems that reason replaces an affect, what actually happens is more complex. Reason in fact modifies the affect, which remains an affect while becoming more active. It must be remembered that in Spinoza, “reason” refers not to a faculty but only to a certain class of ideas, which are certain, adequate, and very powerful. So the modifications that reason makes on ideas is always just the effect of one idea mixing with another, or two ideas interacting in a causal fashion. Spinoza thus does not seek to supplant imaginative life with reason.​[474]​ Foucault’s genealogy is a broadly similar method, which disrupts ideas, not by showing them to be false, but by presenting information which forces us to imagine them in a different light.
Spinoza, knowing full well that Descartes is not the only person who thinks that we have near-infinite power over the affects, states his contrary position repeatedly. In addition to saying that truth does not easily dispel error (4P1), he says that an “affect cannot be restrained or taken away except by an affect opposite to, and stronger than, the affect to be restrained” (4P7) and that “knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an affect of joy or sadness” (4P8). “No affect can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered an affect” (4P14). Truth, to the extent that it plays a role in decreasing sadness, is knowledge-as-affect. The game we will play is inter-affect and counter-affect. Truths of reason often have a role, but often that role is to show initially which counter-affects to deploy against our sadness, rather than confronting the affect directly with reason. Regardless, affect remains the privileged tool in Spinoza’s ethical askesis.
Since a counter-affect needs to be stronger than the targeted sad affect, Spinoza tells us some general factors that increase or diminish the strength of ideas (4P9-13, 4P18), allowing us to strengthen good and weaken bad affects. Affects stemming from interactions with things imagined to be present are stronger than images of past or future events (all other things being equal, of course; 4P9-10); thus, remind yourself that your present motivations tend to reflect and rest upon undervaluation of past and future events; remind yourself that the present affect is intensified just by virtue of its immediacy, and use this as its own motivation to give non-present things a chance to more forcefully constitute your desire. An example might be if you are torn by desire for and desire against something you think is good for you, for instance, beginning a task instead of procrastinating. The present pain of starting this task is compared against past pleasure of other work which you finished. If they are roughly equal in determining your desire which leaves you vacillating between competing desires, remind yourself that present affects are felt fully, but past ones less forcefully. This will focus you more on the past affect, as if it were present, making it more intense, which increases your behavior-causing desire for that pleasure. The balanced scales will begin to tip in the favor of the desire to begin work. If one can have a habit of recalling the general fact (present affects punch above their weight) in the throes of a competition between desires, one can boost the power of the better affect. Not through the truth of the matter in itself, but through modifying the affective force of ideas which constitute desire. Not by ignoring pain as rationally indifferent, but by giving more propulsive force to one affect, so that it will carry you away from danger. 
Other general principles of askesis follow. For instance, an affect of love or hate toward a thing is destroyed if you can transfer the idea of cause away from that thing (3P48), and supposedly free things cause greater affects in us (3P49). Anytime someone causes a sad affect in you, remind yourself that they are not actually free, which changes the general affect you have toward them; considering them now as a caused force means that they seem smaller, in effect; therefore, the affect which they cause in you is smaller too. As much as unexpected rain showers might be annoying, do people ever have the violent affect of anger toward the weather? Never. Even if the weather ruins your new shoes, since it is obviously unfree, you do not get angry. But many might get angry if a waiter spilled water on their new shoes. Transfer the cause in your mind to the intuitively unfree water, away from the allegedly free person, and see your sad affect decrease in force. 
Such processes reorient affect, more so than they give truth. First, you already knew water is unfree, so comparing a person to the water does not reveal any truth. Second, you remain affected, you just have a more preferable affect now (disappointment instead of fury). Another practical principle of care is that joyful affects are stronger than sad affects (4P18). When trying to motivate yourself to undertake something, focus on the powers you now have and the powers you will get when you succeed, rather than on the difficulties you are having at present and the risks you run if you fail. Develop the habitual reflex of appealing to what you can do, not what you cannot. 
Spinoza reminds us that ideas as well as bodies exist only in an order, or in linked chains of cause and effect (5P1). When you undergo an affect, it is never an isolated event, because an affect always triggers linked ideas. If you can disrupt part of a connective chain or shift the relations between ideas, then you can disrupt the final effect. When you are experiencing a bad affect, knowing the chain in which it exists allows you to disrupt its lifeline or ‘supply chain.’​[475]​ An illustration: 
a soldier, having seen traces of a horse in the sand, will immediately pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and from that to the thought of war, and so on. But a farmer will pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plow, and then to that of a field, and so on. And so each one, according as he has been accustomed to join and connect the images of things in this or that way, will pass from one thought to another (5P1, which cites 2P18Sch). 
If, through repetition of affect-centered practices of the self, you can gradually become accustomed to link different images, a horse-affect would no longer lead you to fearful war-affects. Manipulation of the habitual connections is a key method in Spinoza, which a Foucauldian lens helps us see as a method and training technique, instead of something like a psychological theory of imagination. Foucault’s bracketing of the theoretical foundations (and their truth or falsity) of Ancient askesis shows us how analyze their functioning qua practices. These are not truths to learn or refute, but forms of care of the self.
As an extension, if an affect is related to more causes, this diminishes the intensity of the affect (5P9). Oversimplifying, we can say that if you have an affect of a certain degree, and consider just one cause of it, you locate all of the affect in one place. However, if you can be compelled to consider other things as related to this affect, you have spread that same affect more thinly, diluting its force for any given cause. Remind yourself that political decisions which enrage you did not happen just as one document got signed, but required multiple actors, institutional policies, and so on. You will become less fixated on a figurehead who, as the intense locus of your hatred, reduces you to fuming over your alleged powerlessness compared to their alleged omnipotence. Investigate further, and discover other causes of which you are ignorant, which not only gives you knowledge, but at the level of affect also reduces the intensity of your sad affect by spreading it over multiple ideas.
One might ask whether these are really practices of the self, however, and not just replacing feeling with knowledge. Are what I am calling practices simply rational knowing? An example will illustrate the difference between acknowledging a truth, and practices which cause particular affects to animate your activity.​[476]​ Spinoza follows the next proof (which hardly moves the minds of most), with a scholium, not to ‘convince’ the reader, but rather as an exercise in thought, a practical training in affect management. Such exercises must be presented to us repeatedly, if they are to have a consistent effect on us. “The more this knowledge that things are necessary is concerned with singular things, which we imagine more distinctly and vividly, the greater is this power of the mind over the affects” (emphasis mine, 5P6Sch).​[477]​ Knowledge of necessity, while absolutely true, is one level (cognition); connecting it to singular things is another level (cognition plus ethical force). 
Spinoza then practices or actualizes the principle by noting a pair of “singular things.” Spinoza first points out something of which you no doubt personally have “experience.” When someone realizes that losing some particular thing was inevitable, he says, their grief over the loss is reduced. Spinoza has placed a concrete experience which you already affirm before your eyes (rather than an abstract truth that seems worthy of affirming), which will therefore be easily recalled next time you lose something, thereby reminding you that considering the alleged ‘possibility’ of counterfactuals only increases your grief. Second, Spinoza presents a hypothetical, the very oddness of which will make it stand out in your memory. Spinoza notes that the level of power in babies is a weak state compared to that of adults, and, that nobody pities (i.e., sadly regrets) their low state. But, hypothetically, imagine that most people were born adults, and just a few were born babies. Surely, we would then pity babies their inability to speak, walk and reason, imagining it as “a vice of nature,” he says. (Imagine all the world shuddering with disgust at the shame of crawling on all fours.) However, since all recognize that infantile inabilities are unavoidable, nobody pities them, and their weakness affects us with no sad regret. When Spinoza forces you to consider—likely for the first time—this rather unusual scenario, he not only gave an example of necessity and its relation to our affects, but also has given you a wonderfully​[478]​ vivid example to recall to yourself and to recount at cocktail parties or baby showers. Spinoza has given you the principle and has shown you how to employ it and has induced the affective change he described in you while you read. Vividness of singular things causes even abstract ideas to be vivid—that is, full of life and power—which means you think them longer and more often.​[479]​
It is a technique of forging links, tethering affects instead of letting good ones float away and fade. Spinoza is not merely demonstrating that the human mind is associative—he is practicing a method of how to harness such truths. While good affects often use certain clear and distinct ideas, they also often simultaneously rely upon imaginative ‘games of truth’ with oneself. For instance, in your hatred of another person, do not add other reasons to your hatred—even if they might be true!—do not fuel the affective fire.​[480]​ Every time you add to yourself, “he is also a jerk in this other way,” you supply the painful affect with fresh causes to nourish it and trigger it. Joe did not give you a promotion at work, which angers you; if you then recall that he also never paid you back for the hotdog at the baseball game, ignore the truth of the latter—if you do not, baseball and work both will trigger your hatred. You cannot rely on a momentary flash of the will which would “choose to forgive” Joe; you need to diligently practice separating related affects, in order to gradually wear down the intensity of sad affects. 
Spinoza’s askesis combines care of the self with true knowledge, by joining vivid singular things to abstract truths, and by forging mental connections between common imaginings and the most powerfully joyful affects so that former often lead to the latter. The true path to blessedness in Spinoza requires not only the logical propositions of Book 1, but also requires linking those abstractions to particular things in your own life. Spinoza shows you how to craft practices that compel joyful affects as effectively as logic compels assent, so that you will feel at the affective level your own involvement with the infinite power of immanent substance.
We will look at one last detailed example, to highlight how central techniques and practices of the self are to Book 5, the pinnacle of the Ethics. 
The best thing… is to conceive a correct principle of living, or sure maxims of life, commit them to memory, and to apply them constantly to the particular cases frequently encountered in life. In this way our imagination will be extensively affected by them, and we shall always have them ready (5P10Sch, II/287).​[481]​
 The order of operations is as follows: conceive general and certain principles, then memorize them (that is, deeply embed them by repetition, by linking to other ideas, so that they are more likely to be reactivated), and finally integrate them fully with your particular affects (especially with existing well-developed desires). In this way, you will modify your future behaviors.​[482]​ These are specific training techniques, if one attends closely to these propositions qua directives for askesis, and not simply qua “propositions” of reason. Beyond conceiving—and even beyond memorizing—it takes repetition and application to a variety of particular cases “beforehand” (5P10Sch, II/288). If askesis is undergone consistently, right action will not merely occur to you as one desire among many, but will overwhelm other affects and desires, until it is sole idea possible for you to think at that moment. One desire alone would produce decisive and quick action, whereas multiple desires can compete, causing vacillation and even paralysis.​[483]​ Having ideas “always ready” means nothing else than automatic active determination, the result of training oneself out of vacillation into effective and joyful action.​[484]​ 
Spinoza continues, saying that it is common to feel anger in the face of wrongs done by others (5P10Sch). If you could instead inculcate in yourself an affect of nobility (the desire to return love for hate​[485]​) which outweighs your desire for revenge, then you would be better off (remove the sadness, without causing oneself an extra sadness of vengeful anger​[486]​). However, merely acknowledging that revenge is dangerous and petty is not enough to remove the affect of anger nor increase the desire of nobility, as the experience of all the world well attests. Merely restating the generic maxim is not going to effectively change behavior, but linking it to a particular case which one actually desires to have happen can do so. One must imagine all the good things that will happen when one is more noble and of all the threats “warded off best by nobility.” 
Note too, that this is a preparation—it is not applying knowledge or reason at the instant of sad affection. It is a practice of training oneself in advance to have the reflex of nobility, the reflex of countering affect of anger/vengeance with affect of love for nobility. Consistently locate everything good about scenarios which you might actually achieve, and you will become more accustomed to thinking about the real benefits of virtue, real benefits which you naturally desire, which you automatically will pursue. Constant reinforcement is required to make the desire powerful enough that it does not just move you somewhat, sometimes, some of the way, but forceful enough that it consistently pushes past the opposed affect of anger or revenge. Build up desires over time, attach in advance as many forceful ideas as you can to it, prepare an affect-constellation so dense that every affection of pain is immediately swept up into the joyful orbits of other, non-hateful ideas.​[487]​ Their force in tandem can come to overwhelm the force of hateful anger. 
Spinoza does not often go into this level of detail.​[488]​ However, the culmination of his ethics lies in these concrete practices of the self, and they present a full-fledged “subjectivity” in Foucault’s sense. The examples given are nothing but the empowering of prior propositions by their combination, which integrates, activates, and animates those ideas. Ideas are not, as Spinoza reminds us, like mute pictures on a tablet.​[489]​ Ideas are in fact forces, and Spinoza teaches you how to harness these forces for an askesis of affects. Instead of merely assenting to a few general principles, take the next step in the method: combine general principles with concrete desires and existing affects that you actually already have. While we must begin with “pre-practice” knowledge (such as the infinity of Substance), and some of us might later progress to third-order knowing, this thick middle layer, which stretches across Books 3, 4, and 5 of the Ethics, is the heart of Spinoza’s ethical thought. It certainly is where we can see the indispensability of askesis and care of the self most clearly.
Telos: Increased Determined Power or “Freedom” 
For Spinoza, the state that one achieves if they consistently undergo askesis is freedom. He also calls this blessedness or salvation, but these are rather freighted terms. Of course, so is “freedom,” but once we have again touched upon Spinoza’s denial of the free will, we can proceed to what Spinoza means by freedom. For Spinoza, goodness and badness are a matter of degrees which are inversely related, so the sought-after ‘good life’ is not qualitatively different from the bad life. Good and bad are not opposed. The good life is instead a quantitative, relative reduction of badness through techniques of askesis.
Book 5 of the Ethics treats “human freedom.” Its preface, however, again rules out the free will, and shows that whatever the freedom we might win will not be “absolute.” Spinoza denies the Stoic position that some portion of a human is completely undetermined, instead arguing that “much practice and application are required” if we are to have any power over our affects. Freedom is not our starting point, but requires training (exactly the askesis just covered) as a means to an end. “I pass, finally, to the remaining part of the Ethics, which concerns the means, or way, leading to freedom” (5Pref). He expresses astonishment that Descartes expressed such strong faith in the illusion of a purely free will, “a hypothesis more occult than any occult quality.” We are as dumb as a rock, Spinoza perhaps implies, when we believe that we are free (Ep. 58). If a stone could think, he says, and it were pushed without knowing it, it would be conscious only of its motion, which it would attribute to its own self, that is, to a non-cause which it would name its free will. Humans commonly “boast” of the same kind of freedom, which is born only of our ignorance of causes.​[490]​ When we desire food, we have no problem admitting that our hunger is not freely chosen, because we more or less understand the basic non-chosen causes of hunger. However, when a common person desires something and cannot think of its cause, it is imagined to be free—indeed it feels like an expression of a free and true self. Freedom in Spinoza will have nothing to do with this “conviction of the multitude… For most people apparently believe that they are free to the extent that they are permitted to yield to their lust” which in fact is only “to obey fortune rather than themselves” (5P41). Not only is the free will a false imagination, but the more one believes in it, the more one obeys.
Let us now give some positive content to freedom, having restated that it is not free will, by returning to the stone example. A stone surely will not move from a dead stop unless impelled by another force, which obviously makes the external force a cause. However, what often is not noted is that the stone is also a cause of its rolling—a minor, partial, or passive cause, we might say. If I shove a round stone down a slope, it will roll—however, if I shove a tree on the same slope with the same force, it will not roll. And why not? Because the nature of the stone (roundness) is such that it permits (that is, passively causes) rolling when it is combined with certain other forces. The tree’s nature is such that it helps to cause, when combined with the same force, a different overall effect. But if the difference must be explained partly through the things, indeed their very natures which are their essence and power in Spinoza, then we have to say that they are partially what explains the total result, that is to say, partly what caused it.​[491]​ All causation involves the nature of at least two objects, which all contribute their power to the final result. Neither is free, but neither is absolutely the cause of the other as pure effect. 
All singular things, including human beings, have a distinct nature which is always some degree of the causal force of each of their interactions. Human freedom in Spinoza is won by changing your own nature such that, in varied interactions with things, you are a greater degree of the explanatory force behind the resulting effects. If you do not want to roll when pushed, train yourself such that you have flatter edges, since only round stones roll when pushed. Slabs do not roll downhill, even if very strong forces are imparted to them. You will still be determined, since your newly acquired nature does not miraculously birth a free will. However, you are now what largely explains what happens with you, more so than you were prior. You are the determined active co-cause, rather than the determined passive co-cause.
Determination is always a co-causality or result of the interaction of multiple things, each of which has at least some causal power (or else it would not even be able to maintain its existence).​[492]​ Thus, being a ‘major cause’ and not a ‘minor cause’ (i.e. freedom) will always be a proportional matter of degrees, always quantitative rather than qualitative. Freedom, as well as related terms like joy and wisdom, are almost always couched in proportional language in Spinoza. Even the intellectual love of God is proportional, producing “a mind whose greatest part is eternal” (5P39, my emphasis).​[493]​ “But for a clearer understanding of these things, we must note here that we live in continuous change, and that as we change for the better or worse, we are called happy or unhappy” (5P39Sch). (And this in a proposition about the eternal!) Even when wise, we are active “insofar” as we have clear and distinct ideas (3p58 and 3p59), meaning that insofar as we have other, inadequate ideas, we are to that extent passive. Joy and sadness, the affective reactions to increase and decrease in power, are themselves relational and proportional: “the mind can undergo great changes, and pass now to a greater, now to a lesser perfection. These passions, indeed, explain to us the affects of joy and sadness” (3P11Sch). Such passages are a matter of degree, not a matter of crossing a pure threshold to an absolute state, but must be understood as a relative, proportional increase in power. 4P38 is typical of Spinoza: “Whatever so disposes the human body that it can be affected in a great many ways, or renders it capable of affecting external bodies in a great many ways, is useful to man; the more it renders the body capable of being affected in a great many ways, or of affecting other bodies, the more useful it is; on the other hand, what renders the body less capable of these things is harmful (my emphases).” Useful (good) and harmful (bad) are a matter of proportion, relative increase or decrease; the height of goodness, that relative increase in power to the level of consistently major cause which is called freedom, is also a matter of proportion. Freedom can only be called perfection in the most proportional or relative of ways: “the more it acts, the more perfect it is” (5P40). Spinoza presents a modest goal or telos. Freedom, instead of being an original given which somehow is nearly impossible to recover, is instead a difficult but achievable increase in relative power. Repurposing words of Foucault’s, we might say that the telos of Spinoza’s ethics is brought about by “a patient labor giving form to our impatience for liberty,”​[494]​ where liberty is a relative increase in the things of which we are the greater cause, and an ability to avoid being passively determined as often.

6. Detailed Applications Within the Axis of Subjectivity Made Possible by Methodological Focus on Later Works
Part One- Countering Desiring Subjectivity by Adopting a Spinozist Subjectivity
There is a final step we must make if we are to effectively displace desiring subjectivity. This final step consists of showing that Spinozistic subjectivity is not only a non-desiring form of subjectivity, but indeed is counter to desiring subjectivity in many important respects. In the last chapter, I demonstrated that Foucault and Spinoza are not contradictory, showed their shared non-humanist themes, and applied Foucault’s four ethical aspects of subjectivation to Spinozist ethics. However, for Foucault, we cannot simply opt out of or choose not to be the kinds of subjects we are, solely because its functioning has been explained to us. They must be displaced through counter-practices, and thus the final step is to show how to displace concrete practices of desiring subjectivity. To that end, I will indicate those elements of Spinoza which are directly counter to, and thus can effectively displace, desiring subjectivity. For instance, a Spinozist “care of the self” at the level of affects can effectively counter desiring subjectivity’s hermeneutic practices which require that we rely on others (such as psychiatrists) for diagnosis and care. If we did not counter the specific practices of desiring subjectivity, it would largely retain its hold over us despite its constituent elements having been analyzed. In addition to the description of the ills of desiring subjectivity, I wish to prescribe a Spinozist counter, which I now present.
Spinoza’s Impersonal Subjectivity as Effect, to Counter a Secret Self as Original Cause
Desiring subjectivity has a few major elements which Foucault highlights. First, there is the supposedly secret nature of the self, which has to be hermeneutically decoded. There is supposedly an authentic self, lurking somewhere in the shadows, which we need to draw out. A unique and mysterious “special” self—in short, a secular soul. Mystery, of course, does not lend itself well to explanation, as 
when today we see the meaning, or rather the almost total absence of meaning, given to some of the nonetheless very familiar expressions which continue to permeate our discourse—like getting back to oneself, freeing oneself, being oneself, being authentic, etcetera… without ever giving it any content.​[495]​ 
Much important work has been done on how power-relations wed us to various identities​[496]​ (pervert, hysteric, delinquent, homosexual), and yet in our individual relations to ourselves, we go out of our way to find an identity (not necessarily that of the pervert) which we want nothing more than to be truly wed to for the rest of our lives. Though surely lacking a categorical label “from the outside,” ethical identities built around a self hidden from all the world, mysterious and unlabeled, are just as much products of a historically constituted relation to an axis. If readers of Foucault respond to “norms” by rejecting norms in favor of a secret self, unsullied by the “power” of “others,” they will find themselves unchanged ethically, with their problems (outlined below) just as forcefully present as before.  
While the Stoics put the self at the center of ethics, they did so in a way which de-personalized the self, and which indicates how we might do so today. Foucault points out how Stoic knowledge of the self reduces attachment to the self, in an implied critique of Platonic and Christian traditions. We are more centrally heirs to these latter traditions, which can be seen in the kind of attachment we so greedily demand today in terms of our identities. Stoic technique “enables us to dismiss and exclude all the false values and all the false dealings in which we are caught up, to gauge what we really are on the earth, and to take the measure of our existence—of this existence that is just a point in space and time—and of our smallness.”​[497]​ In Spinoza too, real knowledge of the self means giving up many of the feelings and opinions you currently have (as merely imaginative), giving up yourself as the sovereign center of your acts (you are the site or scene of effects in a broader causal nexus), and the specialness of your motivations (which while complex are not freely willed and are partially caused by objects). In Spinoza, there is no origin (in the sense of an ex nihilo springing forth of an essence) of an individual, which is just one series of causes and effects within an infinite chain of causes and effects. Contra the desiring subject, which posits a perfect self in an originally unsullied state, both Spinoza and Foucault agree that subjectivity is not a primal, unitary ur-cause, but a complexly constituted effect.​[498]​ There is no origin to seek in Spinoza. What matters is not a “real you” at some mythical starting point, but the actual ways you are determined to act in this moment. Spinoza too makes us less attached to the subjects we are now, because our current or past states are no more ‘really you’ than any self you will become in the future. There is no core you to be protected from outside influence, or to be clung to fiercely. Desiring subjectivity wants to uncover what is really or always-already ‘there’ inside of you, which reveals its nostalgia for a mythical time of purity. Foucault and Spinoza recognize that we should be oriented, not to an imaginary perfect future return to innocence but toward the present self, to which we should add capacities and new ideas.
The theme of a “return” to the self (which, with varied contents, floats throughout the history of ethics since Plato​[499]​) presently has the content of an obscured, secret self, which we are duty-bound to discover and reveal. Our form of return to self will “entail or call for a fundamental and continuous task of knowledge of what we will call the human subject, the human soul, human interiority, the interiority of consciousness, etcetera,” which employs an “exegetical function of detecting the nature and origin of internal impulses produced within the soul.”​[500]​ Self as original and final-in-advance, needing discovery (not formation) and understanding (not improvement). There is a distinctly humanist narrative at the core of desiring subjectivity, in which a romanticist secret is hoped to be discovered at the end of a long journey through obscuring mists.​[501]​ You are a snowflake, naturally perfect and unique—but because your uniqueness is invisible to the naked eye, your secret is in need a microscopic analysis to achieve its destiny of self-revelation. 
As we have noted, the Spinozist individual is counter to this. First, since the concept “individual” is not particular to humans, you are not even a “self” (in the strong senses typically associated with souls, atomistic individuality, liberalist personhood, or Kantian humanity). You are constituted as much by non-human objects and the environment as by anything particular to yourself, and your affective life is entirely linked by reciprocal causes to affects of others.​[502]​ Second, despite the persistence of the confused imagination, an individual is not a secret in principle. Whether through quasi-Freudian pop psychology or quasi-Marxist pop ideology critique many discourses about subjectivity today claim that the self is, by definition, obscured and falsified.​[503]​ For Spinoza, understanding the individual you are is like math: “as if it were a question of lines, planes, and bodies” (3Pref), not like reversing the false accretions of ideology or deciphering a palimpsest. No doubt, understanding oneself is difficult, and rarely achieved, and always an ongoing process—but in principle it can occur because truth reveals truth (instead of truth undoing obscurity). “What can there be which is clearer and more certain than a true idea, to serves as a standard of truth? As the light makes both itself and the darkness plain, so truth is the standard of both itself and of the false” (2P43Sch). No doubt we will make more progress toward improving ourselves if we work in the light of causally determined affects, rather than the darkness of a secret self; we will have more success with the concrete techniques of difficult—but absolutely achievable—askesis, rather than a Sisyphean pursuit of an ineffable trace.
Spinoza’s Adjustment of Affects as Self-Care, to Counter Talk Methods as Self-Knowledge
Since a desiring self is invisible and mysterious, a method is required for cracking its codes. While he did not have time to discuss it in any sustained way, this was a leading point of the lectures The Hermeneutics of the Subject, as reflected in the title. Our practices of the self are largely hermeneutics which decipher secret thoughts and words, and thus have a stronger resemblance to early Christianity than to Classical/Platonic or Hellenistic/Stoic relations to the self.​[504]​ The invisible, indeed hidden, soul of the Christians gave rise to hermeneutic techniques for eliciting and deciphering verbal traces of the truth. For our secular souls—for a unique, precious, and hidden self, which one has primary duty to purify, discover, know, and reveal, can fairly be called a secular soul—we too rely on hermeneutic methods. Foucault says the most important methods for desiring subjectivity are verbal practices of the self.​[505]​ Psychoanalysis, written self-help quizzes, psycho-medical diagnostics, talking through feelings to reveal your inner life, and religious confession all share similar techniques. While I will not presume to make detailed claims about where these verbal methods differ, since neither Foucault or I have presented the necessary research,​[506]​ what they generally share is an emphasis on knowledge, on showing of the self rather than working on the self. Hermeneutic techniques dovetail with humanist assumptions that language is particularly important to the poetic beings that we are, that will and feeling are largely independent of other (“external,” visible, or otherwise measurable) factors, and that each person is unique such that only each one can speak her truth. They also work with liberalist and utilitarian models, where each individual is the only one who can tell others how they feel, and has the right to be counted.
Obviously, since in Spinoza there is no secret self to know, he does not employ hermeneutic techniques. Spinoza’s methods typically involve mental joining of ideas—however, they are not verbal externalizations of feelings about oneself. Foucault is not opposing techniques for knowledge of self to some sort of ‘real’ techniques, say, those involving the body.​[507]​ The critique of hermeneutics of the self would rather be that the self they look for is constituted and constructed as such an ineffable mystery, that they have very little success in finding it.​[508]​ In addition, since the self is so mysterious and these techniques aim only to produce knowledge of what it is, many of the verbal exercises of the talk method are ineffective—they change very little about us, and hence cannot be very useful for improving us—and their only effectiveness is limited to changes in knowledge. Other techniques, even those analyzing mental contents, are typically more effective, and change more than how much one knows. Instead of talk as a method which reveals who you really are, Spinoza’s methods seek to change what you are, thereby making you more capable and powerful. We verbalize today to better know what we are, that is, we speak so that our secret will manifest itself.​[509]​ However, other than knowing yourself better (if it even succeeds at that), this leaves most things about you unchanged. As a method for ethical improvement, it is hard to see how you are made better if you are largely unchanged—unless knowledge, for its own sake, is your sole ethical goal. Spinoza presents a different set of ethical methods to counter the talk method we reflexively employ now, which will allow us to do more than voyeuristically follow the faint tracks of subtle soul movements. 
Spinoza sets up this difficult intricate psychological and epistemological apparatus in Book 2, as well as a detailed list of affects and their natures in Book 3. He does this, however, not so that we can know our most authentic selves, but so that can change what we are. Spinoza does not recommend knowledge of the self for its own sake, but only those kinds of self-knowledge which can be effective levers to increase powerful affects, reduce sad affects, and in short to modify what one is. Spinoza on many occasions stops short form going into more detail, because he says, he only wants to touch on what is most useful. For instance, after laying out the basics of what can be called his psychology, Spinoza “thought it worthwhile to indicate some of the advantages of this doctrine” and why “it is quite necessary to know it, both for the sake of speculation and in order to arrange one’s life wisely.”​[510]​ The most useful notions, he notes (2P40Sch1), are those which are adequate, not those imaginative ideas personally particular to each individual.​[511]​ We find ourselves recounting dreams, as if those could be particularly useful—but we like their mysterious nature, we like that they make no sense to others, that they happen only to the dreamer. We recount childhood memories (which are likely poorly remembered, or combinations of many memories), as if these were the key to what will happen to us tomorrow. It is a cliché but it is true, that the text is titled Ethica for a reason. It builds up a body of knowledge so that you can reform your ethos, not so that you can know yourself. Spinoza is interested in those ideas which have the most relevance for us in this moment; it is hard to believe that unconscious ideas have that force, unless you are already invested in/constituted by a subjectivity that prizes the secret as the most real. Forms of thought which privilege the invisible are usually theological, humanist, or both. If we want to move away from such forms of ethical thinking, it is not enough to challenge them as ideas. We also need to stop using the techniques that produce and reinforce the constitution of ourselves as desiring subjects. We cannot do without techniques of the self entirely (nor would we want to); we should use other techniques—Spinoza’s techniques—to constitute ourselves differently.
Spinoza’s Therapeutics as Self-Treatment, to Counter the Power-Relations of Confessional Professionals
If you are a deep mystery to yourself, it stands to reason that you would enlist the help of experts to decipher your self. Whether the vanguard, a priest, a psychologist, or a doctor, when a subjectivity is constituted as a secret self, professional decipherers of esoteric codes will be present as well. The “injunction” to speak the truth of your sex, while not solely coming from these professionals, is certainly taken up by them.​[512]​ The ethical demand that one exacts from oneself to speak oneself is spoken to the experts, and this imbricates subjectivity and these power-relations.​[513]​ If your secret self is important to know, and you cannot know it but by speaking it, and speaking implies an recorder of your speech which can relay it back to you, then another person is required. That your self is so mysterious means this other must be skilled, trained in some institutional practice of decipherment. 
If one does not want to be quite so firmly enmeshed in these particular relations of power, then one should not use talk methods when understanding subjectivity, when treating oneself, or when acting. We cannot opt out of power in general, and we cannot modify to our liking every particular form of power which currently exists. But if we use methods which do not require these professionals, such as Spinoza’s joining and separating of images, then they will come gradually to be an ever-smaller part of our constitution. For example, Foucault links biopolitics to the spread of confession outside of religious institutions and its ensuing mutations;​[514]​ for those looking to avoid biopolitical power relations, then, they should find ways to treat themselves that do not rely so heavily on talking. Spinoza’s method, as stated, denigrates language rather than deploying it. Notably, as well, he does not present himself or anyone else as an ethical technician to whom one must submit; rather, he teaches you how to treat your own affects.​[515]​ The only indispensable ethical supervisor you need is yourself. You are not in principle mystery to yourself, so other people have no default ‘divinatory’ function.​[516]​
Spinoza’s Effective Askesis Well-Suited to Its Goal of Increased Power, to Counter Fruitlessness of Utopian Search for Authenticity and Liberation 
What has placing our desire into this discourse and these relations of power brought us? Are we comfortable with and clear upon what our original selves are? Are we free, happy, empowered? Scattered remarks which Foucault makes in his introduction to The History of Sexuality imply that many of us are currently spinning our wheels. The particular methods do little to improve us ethically on their own terms—which, instead of discrediting these methods or the manner of conceiving the self, has so far only convinced us to double down, to dig deeper for that authentic feeling. Claims that desire is massively repressed and authenticity constantly distorted function in a subtle way to excuse our inability to liberate desire and become our true selves. The ethical goal of “liberation” is not so much false as it mystically rapturous, ‘on a pedestal,’ or utopian, which thus excuses itself for the fact that the means to its goals do not deliver what they promise. As Foucault says, those who imagine that their subjectivity is forcibly repressed from all sides will not be 
surprised, then, if the effects of liberation vis-à-vis this repressive power are so slow to manifest themselves; the effort to speak freely about sex and accept it in its reality… is bound to make little headway for a long time before succeeding in its mission.​[517]​
I am reminded here of Don Quixote by Cervantes, an author who was quite important in Foucault’s estimation.​[518]​ The difficulty experienced in liberating the entire world only further proves to the “knight” the importance of the task. If signs about whether the fight was with a dragon or with a windmill were not always quite clear, that is to be expected when dealing with an enemy which represses not only people but even the truth itself. 
That their methods or practices of the self may be causing more obstacles than improvement is not—cannot be—considered by proponents of desire. Nor do they consider the vagueness of the aims and near-impossibility of reaching them. But these are considered by Foucault. 
Briefly, my aim is to examine the case of a society which has been loudly castigating itself for its hypocrisy for more than a century, which speaks verbosely of its own silence, takes great pains to relate in detail the things it does not say, denounces the powers it exercises, and promises to liberate itself from the very laws that have made it function.​[519]​ 
What if, instead of liberating every single desire and knowing the deepest of all secrets, we had a more modest ethical goals, as in Spinoza? Reducing sad affects seems a workable and totally worthwhile ethical mission. The lack of vacillation between sad affects, for instance, is a describable psychological state which we all have experienced at some point, instead of the vague “happiness” proposed by neo-liberal seekers of “free expression.” What if we rejected passing along something that is not yet (the authentic self or liberated desires) to trained hermeneuts who supposedly could never access it without our speech, who then teach us about this not-yet thing, so that we mystically metamorphose into it by virtue of being given back our own words? This byzantine method translates inner feeling multiple times to reveal it in its pure state, and demands to hear only from the person who is said to be the most blind to the relevant ethical substance. It estimates that practices of knowledge are so essential that they are the only ones which matter—that merely being clear about (knowing better) what you have desired, will make you become what you want. 
It aims at a past perfection that is just around the corner, seems to rely on complex techniques that fail at their own goal, and prevent us from acknowledging that the goal itself seems unworkable. Instead, we could follow Spinoza, and take as ethical material certain analyzable objects (affects) with non-mystical causes, which we can patiently work on ourselves, and expect modest, but real, moderation of what is bad for us. Surely, less utopian and more workable, as Spinoza hopes for in an introduction of his own, mirroring Foucault’s skepticism toward utopian hopes shown above. Most ethical and political thinkers, Spinoza says, 
are clever enough to bestow manifold praise on such human nature, as is nowhere to be found, and to make verbal attacks on that which, in fact, exists… Whence it has come to pass that, instead of ethics, they have generally written satire, and that they have never conceived a theory of politics, which could be turned to use, but such as might be taken for a chimera, or might have been formed in Utopia (TP 1.1).​[520]​ 
Spinoza, rejecting these utopian methods, instead says that “on applying my mind to politics, I have resolved to demonstrate… not what is new and unheard of, but only such things as agree best with practice” (TP 1.4). The methods set for unearthing authenticity, to my mind, are not achieving their self-appointed task very well, because that task is vaguely defined and perhaps impossibly utopian. ​[521]​  
The telos very likely may be hard to achieve in most ethics. For instance, I seriously doubt that many monks achieved perfect obedience or that most Stoics became sages wholly detached from material concerns (Seneca seemingly did not), and Alcibiades most certainly failed to become a good Greek. Spinoza too admits that the telos of his ethics is “difficult” and “rare,”​[522]​ but on my understanding, achieving a degree of that freedom seems perfectly realistic. At the least, it is plain what the goal consists of: reducing psychological distress over the inevitable, growing more powerful and capable, thinking better ideas, avoiding harmful forces. What the trifecta of happiness, freedom and authenticity would look like, and how these three different things can even be thought as a unified goal, is not something that contemporary ethical discourses of desire have cleared up for me. As notoriously difficult as Spinoza’s Ethics is, I find its goals more clear than “be yourself,” which is nearly a koan in its paradoxical simplicity. Spinoza gives methods for knowing how you are constituted so that you can successfully achieve the goal of constituting yourself otherwise. 
Part Two- Diverse Rewards of Being Attentive to Ethical Subjectivity 
Arguments Against Undervaluing Subjectivity
As I have argued already, subjectivity is undervalued relative to some other themes of Foucault’s, most obviously, power-relations. Subjectivity is important for many reasons. It is one of three forms of the constitution of possible experience: subjectivity, knowledge, and power. It is also an inherently interesting topic, this “whole rich and complex field of historicity in the way the individual is summoned to recognize himself as an ethical subject.”​[523]​ It is has greater depth and breadth, too, than the term “ethics” implies. Subjectivity structures many particular practices and forms of living, such as the way one reads, views dreams, eats food, acts towards friends, views death, relates to others, uses and produces certain truths of the self—as well as more narrowly “ethical” concerns, such as what is good or bad, what impulses should be acted on, and which avoided. 
Another reason that subjectivity should be of greater interest, is that making adjustments to our ethical subjectivity is entirely plausible, whereas it is hard to imagine concocting a new episteme, and power-relations are notoriously hard to adjust because they can involve large institutions as well as the behavior of others. Foucault does not directly say so, but it seems to me that ethics is the easiest axis to change. Certainly this is the impression many readers have, although it remains for them and for me at the level of an impression, a possibility neither confirmed nor denied by Foucault. If ethical subjectivity were easier to adjust than power, it absolutely would not be because we are more free as subjects, but rather because there are less parts to move than in power. The forms of our constitution are always difficult to change, no matter which axis is being considered, since we have no way to simply jump “outside” of our constitution. However, it is hard to experiment with epistemes, and it would require convincing others to operate differently to even begin experimentations with power. The ethical relation to self seems to me more amenable to experimentation. 
In a series of thematically consonant interviews from 1981-1983, Foucault indicated that he saw important changes already beginning to be made to ethical subjectivity, at least within the sphere of gay relationships. He seems hopeful that such changes will grow even more important as time goes on.​[524]​ 
It’s a fact that people’s everyday lives have changed from the early sixties to now, and certainly within my own life. And surely that is not due to political parties but is the result of many movements. These social movements have really changed our whole lives, our mentality, our attitudes, and the attitudes and mentality of other people—people who do not belong to these movements. And that is something very important and positive. ​[525]​
We can say with confidence that Foucault thought it possible that new ethical modes could be created within homosexual relations. He says that some of these changes could be transferred from gay to straight relations,​[526]​ and there is the implication that these changes in fact are already occurring now, with at least mixed success. In these interviews, Foucault speaks of change as occurring in love relations, gay askesis, and other ethical modes of life. In these pieces, when power relations are spoken of it is mostly with reference to the many changes occurring in the ethical sphere.
Another important reason to focus on subjectivity is that any successes in modifying subjectivity could lead to positive adjustments in other axes, since the axes intersect or intertwine at certain “nodes.” An ethics-truth node (spirituality), and an ethics-power node (“freedom”) will be discussed below; it is important to study such intersections in detail, because a change in the node who likely force a more general mutation in the dynamic systems in which it plays a role. In short, making ethical adjustments to a node of governmentality, where power and ethics intertwine, would prompt changes in the power-relations in question. Such tactics would be especially powerful if indeed ethics is more susceptible to change
How particular results of Foucault’s research link up to some significant questions will be shown through a handful of case studies, to emphasize further the dividends which come from focusing on Foucault’s analyses of subjectivity. These case studies are care of the self (showing that practices of the self or askesis is the very core of any ethics), the Cartesian moment (which is a portion of a genealogy of philosophy as commonly practiced today), and the subject-truth node of spirituality (which shows the possibility of emphasizing ethics first over other axes, and shows the radical changes which doing so can bring).  I will also discuss how Foucault’s discussion of ethics, especially when coupled with Spinoza, undermines the freedom on which neoliberalism relies. 
Care of Self: Askesis as Core of Ethical Subjectivity
Outside of The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, where each of the four aspects of ethical subjectivation receive approximately equal weight, Foucault elsewhere spends more of his time discussing askesis and practices than the other four. He gave lectures devoted primarily to Technologies of the Self (that is, practices of the self); The Hermeneutics of the Subject returns to askesis repeatedly, begins with the care of the self, and ends on a discussion of Stoic practices of self-examination. Also, before he changed the plan for The History of Sexuality so that it discussed the Ancients rather than 19th century sexuality, he was already interested enough in askesis that he meant to publish a work on Ancient practices of the self. Even in The Use of Pleasure, where he sets the methodological stakes of analyzing “ethics” (as the self-formation and self-relation of self to self) instead of “moral codes” (as a list of the forbidden and the required), askesis or practices of the self are basically identified with “ethics.”​[527]​ Work on the self, or practice of the self, is listed as one of the four aspects of ethics,​[528]​ but Foucault also repeatedly identifies ethics in general with “practices of the self” and askesis.​[529]​ He certainly is more interested in askesis than ethical telos, for instance, which rarely receives sustained attention.
One of the reasons which draws Foucault’s attention to practices of the self is that he wants to elevate care of the self to knowledge of the self’s current level of importance and cultural saturation. Foucault emphasizes care for our moment, to counter our over-privileging of “know thyself.” However, we should not understand them as strictly opposed. Both self-care and self-knowledge are elements of ethics, and it is still knowledge of the ethical self. Specifically, care and knowledge of the self can both be an askesis.​[530]​ Confession, “practiced through a decipherment as painstaking, continuous, and detailed as possible, of the movements of desire in all its hidden forms, including the most obscure,”​[531]​ leads to knowledge of the self, but insofar as this is self-knowledge which is specifically used to have effects on the subject, it is most certainly a practice of the self. What is interesting is that even ethics which are centered around knowledge still must have practices which modify the subject. Every ethics apparently takes the subject as an object to be worked upon, not only as an object to be known, requiring “work that one performs on oneself, not only in order to bring one’s conduct into compliance with a given rule, but to transform oneself into the ethical subject of one’s behavior.”​[532]​ To be any kind of subject whatsoever demands practices, even if your subjectivity is focused on knowledge. Early Christian ethics, despite its focus on self-knowledge, still had numerous practices requiring detailed, constant, exhaustive, and difficult practices of purification, elucidation, renunciation, and decipherment, including examinations of hidden impulses, and precise methods for the control of representations, images, and desires.​[533]​ 
In a sense, it is not surprising that Christian confession is an ethical practice of askesis. However, further underscoring the importance of askesis is that even Cartesian ‘first philosophy’ required practices of the self.​[534]​ This is surprising because for Foucault Descartes was the central representative of philosophy’s move away from care, spirituality, and in general, away from questions of ethical subjectivity. The method of philosophizing, over time, has come to have less and less connection to practices of the self. The short story is that, for Descartes, all one needs to know about the subject is that it can be certain. Method (or practice) involves securing knowledge, and ignores questions of ‘securing’ the ethical subject. 
However, before Foucault began The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, he treated Descartes twice in terms of ethics, and once fought tenaciously to demonstrate the ethical practices at the very center of the Meditations. First, in History of Madness (published in 1961), Foucault argues that in Classical era (16-17th century), one has to make the ethical choice against madness prior to philosophizing.​[535]​ One has to choose reason, not unreason: only then can one think truthfully. Second, in a much later (1972) combat with Derrida’s criticisms, he goes further still. The Meditations cannot be properly read without noting the exercise which it is, and which prepares the way for the certainty which results from ethical formation of whoever undergoes these meditations.​[536]​ He even gives a political goal to Cartesian ethical formation in Government of Self and Others I (1983). 
After all, if Descartes’ Meditations are in fact an enterprise to found a scientific discourse in truth, [they are] also an enterprise of parrhesia in the sense that it is actually the philosopher as such that is saying “I”… The moral project, present from the start of the Cartesian enterprise, is not just something added on to an essential project of founding a science.​[537]​ 
Foucault goes on to elaborate that the famed anti-Aristotelian sentiments of Descartes are a form of counter-conduct to pastoral governmentality—Foucault says that Descartes says “I” against the pastoral institutions of Church and Scholastic university, not merely against the philosophical positions held by certain individuals. He succinctly names this tension within Descartes—a refusal of ethical subjectivity, made possible by ethical transformations—in the interview with Dreyfus and Rabinow:
we must not forget that Descartes wrote “meditations”—and meditations are a practice of the self. But the extraordinary thing in Descartes’s texts is that he succeeded in substituting a subject as founder of practices of knowledge for a subject constituted through practices of the self.​[538]​ 
That Foucault is making statements about ethics in Descartes across his career indicates two very important themes. First, as I argued in an earlier chapter, Foucault’s work on ethical subjectivity cannot be considered a reversal of his earlier work. I do not think that Foucault later contradicts his earlier claims that Descartes replaces ethics with non-ethical knowledge; they are scattered across his discussions of Descartes, before and after he names the “Cartesian Moment.” 
Second, I think these various comments show that even in Descartes—who went so far to prioritize knowledge over ethics, who identified “the subject” to the greatest extent possible with “what the subject can certainly know”—ethics forces its way into the discussion as an omnipresent element of philosophy. Even pursuing certainty alone (and bracketing ethical concerns until he is done founding first philosophy), he must form himself into the kind of subject who fervently desires certainty (such desire being provoked by first dizzying himself with infinite uncertainty) and who is comfortable releasing strongly held beliefs if they do not meet his criteria of clear and distinct ideas. 
If indeed ethical subjectivity is one of three axes, central to experience, permanently constituting us, then one cannot entirely opt out of ethical reflection even one when is explicitly trying to do so. It would seem that ethics is unavoidable when philosophizing, if it is found so centrally, and in multiple ways, in Descartes when he is least attentive to the self. If practices of the self, askesis, training, and exercise are as important as I think, and we have so barren a field of practices from which to choose today, we are struggling in an absolutely crucial arena. Pointing out practices’ centrality in Descartes, not just in the “Golden Age of the care of the self” which was Hellenistic ethics, can remind us that we can, should, and must return our attention to the constitution of subjectivity. 
Recognizing that practices form an element of any ethics is important. It will shift the way we view a range of philosophers. What if Kantian practical reason requires practices of askesis? Who reads Descartes’ Passions of the Soul as an “exercise” manual first, as a necessary step before pursuing clear and distinct ideas? After placing ethics at the forefront of his investigations, Foucault was lead to claim that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit “has no other meaning” than the “transformation of the subject’s being” and thus, “without saying so, rediscovers the care of the self.”​[539]​ Foucault’s patient exploration of subjectivity allowed to him find a novel way to read Phenomenology of Spirit, in the midst of so many readings and entrenched traditions around that text. His novel grid of intelligibility which produced entirely novel research and new ways of thinking is another one of Foucault’s idiosyncratic approaches, which allowed him to view texts from a completely different angle than those we are used to. If we take as methodological assumptions that subjectivity is always one of three axes, that ethics is tied most importantly to askesis, and that askesis will thus play some role even in the most ‘knowledge-centric’ of philosophies, we will see elements that previously were impossible to see. No doubt, if the askeses thus revealed are at all effective, to see them will allow us to practice them, which would implant that philosophy more firmly into our subjectivity.
More narrowly, focusing on practices (rarely noticed but perhaps always present) no doubt will increase the efficacy of the ethics which we practice. If you want, for instance, to be a Kantian, you will find that it is not easy to put duty before inclination. However, there are practices of askesis that would make it less difficult. However, my main point here is to extend the effects of askesis beyond the obviously ‘moral.’ Recall the wide scope of Foucault’s “ethics,” which encompasses much more than right and wrong. Ethics for Foucault extends to what guides everyday action, how you take yourself to be, how you want to be eventually, and so on. Ethics is the formation of subjectivity writ large: specific practices make us think, act, hope, and live within the conditions of possibility of a certain subjectivity. A dearth of practices, or ineffective ones, will produce you as one less able to do your work and live your life, whatever kind of work or life that may be. There is a form of subjectivity, only made possible by askesis, of the revolutionary, the prophet, the scientist—and of the philosopher.​[540]​ To be ignorant of those askeses renders one a badly formed version of those styles of living.
Cartesian Moment: Philosophy Today is ‘Dead’ Truth
The forms of philosophical subjectivity within which many operate today are shaped by what Foucault calls the Cartesian Moment. I have discussed this ‘moment’ already, but here, I will highlight what it shows us about the conditions of possibility structuring philosophy today, the internalized assumptions about what philosophy can, cannot, and should do. Indeed, the very slighting of the subject in those who study Foucault is structured by these conditions of possibility. If everything has a history, then everything has something which made it possible and is exposed to changes over time. Philosophy too has a history. In this case, that would be a history which lead it to denigrate care of the self and ethics specifically, in favor of knowledge of the self and eventually (ethics-less) knowledge in general. Once the necessary supports or pre-conditions to philosophy were ignored, philosophy came more and more to think of itself as unsupported by anything whatsoever, as wholly unconstituted, pure, and universal. 
Even now, when we think of philosophy as having a history, and as intertwined with other discourses and social institutions, the link to ethical subject formation has been so obscured that it remains largely unthought. Foucault notes that contemporary Marxism—which of course recognizes historical production of ideas, of Marxism itself, and denies that philosophy would be exterior to, prior to, or superior to, materialist processes themselves—cannot think “the problem of what is at stake in the subject’s being… of what aspects of the subject may be transformed… There has been an attempt to conceal the conditions of spirituality [that is, “the subject’s preparation for access to the truth”] specific to these forms of knowledge.”​[541]​ Many contemporary forms of “science” (including philosophy, psychoanalysis, and Marxism) can admit that knowledge is conditioned. However, they seemingly cannot conceive what the Ancients showed so often, what Foucault implied, and what Hadot has so aptly emphasized. Philosophy requires a way of life built upon spiritual exercises (askesis). That is, one of the necessary conditions of philosophy is ethics as Foucault defines it, for which askesis and practices of the self are central. “I think that if we do not take up the history of the relations between the subject and truth from the point of view of what I call, roughly, the techniques, technologies, practices, etcetera,… we will hardly understand what is involved in the human sciences,” or in “the model of scientific practice,” or in “Kant and Descartes,” each of which is a representative element of “the enormous transformation that is, I think, really essential for understanding what philosophy is, what the truth is.”​[542]​
Since Foucault connected contemporary intellectual practices to the ignorance regarding philosophy’s necessary constitution through ethical practices of the self (which he summarized as the Cartesian moment), I think we can make a further connection to the “Derrida-Foucault polemic” (present in “My Body, This Paper, This Fire” and the interview “Reply to Derrida”) despite the absence of the term “Cartesian Moment” in those texts.​[543]​ Foucault is clearly discussing there what he will later call practices of the self and askesis, using phrasing such as “exercise,” “takes effect in the meditating subject [and] troubles the subject,” “a risk to which one exposes oneself, [a] risk for the subject that he might be modified,” the “central test of the exercise,” saying that we need to analyze “what is happening in the meditation, on the level of events that succeed one another; acts carried out by the meditating subject… [and] effects produced inside the meditating subject.”​[544]​ Foucault develops these themes in detail, already sketching out what he will later call spirituality:
meditation implies, in short, a subject who is mobile and capable of being modified by the very effect of the discursive events that take place… [which] modify the subject as they develop, and liberate him from his convictions or induce systematic doubts, provoke illuminations or resolutions, free him from his attachments… induce new states.​[545]​
Philosophy involving meditations and other practices of the self show that philosophy should be understood “as an intersection of the demonstrative and the ascetic threads,” an intertwining of knowledge and other-than-knowledge elements.​[546]​ It is not only the relation of ‘practices’ to ‘texts’ that Foucault discusses here. It is also ethics’ relation to philosophy. Both of the latter are constituted by both of the former, but current practitioners of philosophy tend to neglect or deny it.
Foucault calls out Derrida for being an exemplar of a manner pf philosophizing which Foucault is striving to do without.​[547]​ Foucault is vicious—perhaps the better to differentiate himself. “I would not say that it is a metaphysics… that is hiding behind this… I would go much further: I would say that it is a historically well-determined little pedagogy… A pedagogy which teaches the student that there is nothing outside the text… that it is never necessary to look beyond it” for any so-called externals which might actually constitute it.​[548]​ In order to maintain the purity and universality of its knowledge, philosophy refuses to investigate the ethical self-formation that is a necessary precondition to its possible functioning. 
Derrida is recalling an old tradition in his reading… [that of the] classical commentators… a system of which Derrida is today the most decisive representative, in its waning light: a reduction of discursive practices to textual traces; the elision of events that are produced there… so as not to have to examine the modes of implication of the subject in discourses… in order to avoid situating discursive practices in the field of transformation where they are carried out.​[549]​ 
In a separate but nearly simultaneous piece, Foucault restated these same objections to what philosophy around him was like, and it centered again on their inability to see practices of the self. Derrida’s challenges to Foucault are said to rest on 
postulates… [which] form the framework of the teaching of philosophy in France. It is in their name that philosophy presents itself as the universal criticism of all knowledge (the first postulate), without any real analysis of the content or the forms of this knowledge as a moral injunction to awaken only by its own light (the second postulate), as a perpetual reduplication of itself (the third postulate) in an infinite commentary of its own texts and without any relation to any exteriority.​[550]​
The Cartesian moment is part of the genealogy of contemporary philosophy, insofar as it is a “nice little pedagogy” that places itself as the arbiter of all truth (including its own) which floats above the muck of exteriority, un-constituted and timeless. Philosophy too has a history, Foucault is showing, and rejecting Descartes’ mind-body dualism (for instance) in no way is enough to dodge the charge that we, today, remain heirs of the Cartesian moment. 
Viewed in light of his remarks on Descartes in his later, ethical works, the debate with Derrida goes beyond questions regarding Foucault’s relation to history, to structuralism, or to Derrida as an individual thinker. It opens us up to questions about philosophy today, and whether it can again become a way of life. Foucault establishes how philosophy, by neglecting the subject generally and how to change the subject specifically, has forgotten an eminently philosophical question:
what can the form of life be such that it practices truth-telling? From the origin of philosophy, and maybe in fact until now, still and despite everything, the West has always accepted… that the practice of philosophy must always be more or less a sort of life exercise… But while loudly proclaiming that philosophy is fundamentally not just a form of discourse, but also a mode of life, Western philosophy… progressively eliminated, or at least neglected and marginalized the problem of this philosophical life… the question of the true life has continually become worn out, faded, eliminated, and threadbare in Western thought.​[551]​ 
In Courage of the Truth, Foucault links the forgetting of philosophy as a way of life to the scandal that was Cynic philosophy. He implies that the sense of scandal comes less from the extreme nature of certain Cynic behaviors and more from our own shame at failing to lead a philosophical life.​[552]​ This shame is appropriate if philosophers are in fact able to establish a better mode of life, yet are squandering this possibility. Many identify as a philosopher but, truthfully, what does this mean in terms of the life they live? If it means knowing more, or mastering a specialty, or being a certain kind of cosmopolitan élite, these are likely not robust or distinct enough to count as a way of life or as a form of subjectivity. Foucault says that
we have entered a different age of the history of relations between subjectivity and truth… [which] will find reward and fulfillment in nothing else but the indefinite development of knowledge… We can no longer think that access to the truth will complete in the subject, like a crowning or reward, the work or the sacrifice,  the price paid to arrive at it. Knowledge will simply open out onto the indefinite dimension of progress… the institutional accumulation of bodies of knowledge, or the psychological or social benefits… As such, henceforth the truth cannot save the subject.​[553]​ 
Philosophy is “currently presented as an object of academic or university study”—despite our proud declarations to the contrary—philosophy is rarely lived as a way of life, as a manifestation of a truth, or as a militancy of thought. ​[554]​
Subject-Truth Nodes via Axial Interpretation
The axial reading which I discussed in Chapter 2 is especially useful for understanding certain phenomena which Foucault discusses in his lectures from 1980-1984, and these phenomena are themselves useful for demonstrating concretely how the axes have in fact interacted in the past. The axial interpretation of Foucault says that there are three axes (subjectivity, power-relations, knowledge) which interact while maintaining a relative autonomy. Axes are irreducible to each other, and their very non-identity allows them to combine in infinite ways. They sometimes couple smoothly, other times with significant friction, they can contest each other, or they may simply coexist. Gros gives a clear explanation of the axial reading, which Foucault himself endorsed in his last years. 
[A]s in the previous year, in the first lectures [of 1984’s Courage of Truth] Foucault sets out again the triptych of his critical work: a study of modes of veridiction (rather than an epistemology of Truth); an analysis of forms of governmentality (rather than a theory of Power); a description of techniques of subjectivation (rather than a deduction of the Subject)—the stake consisting in taking a determinate cultural nucleus (confession, care of the self, etcetera) as the object to be studied, which acquires its volume precisely from the intersection of these three dimensions.​[555]​ 
When part of one axis is indispensable to the functioning of another, I call this a ‘node’ of the relevant axes.​[556]​ For instance, recent medicine is a node of power-knowledge, because epistemic portions of medical knowledge are indispensable for certain techniques of controlling bodies and populations. On the other hand, care of the self in general would not be a node, since one has little need to refer to any axis other than subjectivity when discussing it.
Any explanation of what Foucault calls “spirituality,” on the other hand, requires reference to ethics and truth simultaneously. Spirituality is thus a knowledge-subjectivity node. In line with my interests in this study, I would like to both maintain a focus on the axis of subjectivity, and also highlight what the node’s axial nature can tell us about non-ethical issues.​[557]​ For spirituality, I will show the radicality of the changes it makes possible within a self (subjectivity), while also showing that there may be truths to which our access is blocked if we have not undergone a certain conversion of self (truth-subjectivity node). Insisting on the relative autonomy of the axes allows me to temporarily isolate ethics from the other axes, and then to show another relevant side of the phenomena by showing its nodal intersections with another axis. 
All forms of ethical subjectivity seem to have relations to the axis of knowledge. An ethics may require its own form of special thought (categorical practical reason in Kant, divorced from hypothetical calculation); another will need truths which are fully continuous with other, non-ethical modes of knowing (physicalist ethics); a mode of subjectivity may utilize truths regarding the unique individual (psychoanalysis) while another would draw upon shared human truths (Thomistic natural law); some use reason to restrict the kinds of thoughts which are allowed to have ethical relevance, while still retaining minimalist necessary ethical truths (Epicureanism and Hume); on the whole, each form of subjectivity requires some reference to a particular kind truth (whether revealed, aesthetic, deductive-logical, romantic-excessive, personal, or impersonally empirical).​[558]​ The episteme of the time one is living in delimits the available forms of veridiction or truth-procedures available, though a subjectivity might hold on to older forms not otherwise used in the era, and certainly they can forge their own forms of knowledge, as did Christianity when it created the hermeneutics of the self, which differed greatly from the existing truths generated by hermeneutics of the text.​[559]​ It is important to note, in order to remind ourselves that the relation is never one-way, that the axis of knowledge is as likely to take up an ethical form of truth, as a subjectivity is to follow an episteme directly. 
For instance, the (more or less Platonic) relation to truth, described in the chapter “True Love” in The Use of Pleasure, developed a way of getting at truth that could not have been lifted wholesale from existing mathematical knowledge. Similarly, the analysis of “natural impulse” was mainly discovered or invented on the side of human psychology (i.e., ethical subjectivity), and then imported into descriptions of the physis of the natural world (i.e., the axis of knowledge). Foucault also notes the Ancient medicalization of ethics,​[560]​ but shows how this was a mutual contamination. The doctor, rather than teaching knowledge alone or making ethics into applied medicine, was just as much conforming to the requirements of ethics or being made useful by ethics.​[561]​ From what I can surmise about what the axis of knowledge would have been in Classical Greece, even acknowledging the influence of religious and epic-poetic truths, Classical ‘moralists’ seem to have largely generated new kinds of thought and truth and to have forged a novel set of discursive practices. Additionally—as I discuss below—ethical rightness was said to have been a precondition for making certain truths possible (which is spirituality, briefly defined). I am only just mentioning these, because if treated with the seriousness they deserve, the relations to knowledge in The Use of Pleasure could take up an additional dissertation. I just mean to highlight them to show that there is a mutual bleeding into each other of knowledges and ethics, leading to truth-subject nodes of various sorts. However, we would be poorly equipped to understand them as nodes—that is, to understand the actual ways they are constituted by multiple axes—if we have not spent a great deal of time and effort on Foucault’s later works. 
So, any ethics will have some manner of relations to truth.​[562]​ For Classical Greek ethics, the role of knowledge was real but minimal, always instrumental (it was for ethics), finite and thus something one could master or capture securely, and never knowledge of a personal self (it was knowledge of things, useful for changing the self, but not about the self).​[563]​ There was a know-how of chrēsis aphrodisiōn (use of pleasures) which needed truth, but was not a particularly complex theoretical edifice, and was definitely learnable by young men who, at a certain point, no longer needed to learn more. Classical askesis or training (teaching-strengthening) used mainly trials by experience, practices that just were the thing you were meant to get better at, with a non-complex and natural goal. We can supplement Foucault’s claims by referencing Epicureans, for whom one needs to know just enough cosmology to assert that there was nothing to know of any possible ethical consequence about the gods or an afterlife. They needed just enough physics to demonstrate hedonism and reject a few pointless and painful fears. There was aesthetic truth too in Classical subjectivity, which required little more than being exposed to the glory of other great men, and which one could hardly avoid learning—their culture was saturated with such examples. At the other extreme, for those in a Christian monastery or convent, truth is paramount (and hardly less so for the laity). Their ethics and subjectivity make no sense without certain doctrinal truths of the holy text, the avowed personal truth of faith, as well as the intensely personal truth of one’s sins.​[564]​ 
Instead of the old questions of whether ethics is ‘free’ in the face of power, acknowledging all three axes allows us to see these truth-subject intersections, which were much more a focus of these texts than were power-subjectivity intersections. The questions that would arise in a close study of the history of truth-subject intersections are not trivial, either. One such question: can one actually do without truth, and still live an ordered life of evaluations? (This question could be of especially pressing importance in the present moment, as our relation to truth seems to be in flux or even diminishing, if the drumbeat of claims that we live in an age of relativism are to be believed.) Are there modes of truths which can understand ethical substance, while being of the same order as the rather more technical techniques of askesis, and must these be changed or left behind once one achieves the ethical telos? If they must be of different orders, or, if in any given ethics they happen to be of different orders, how does one square the different requirements of truth all within the same system? For instance, today we might have a hard time squaring a naturalist understanding of the self, with an aesthetic goal, though it worked for Classical Greece. It would also be difficult to have a mode of contemporary aesthetic understanding of the self which did not devolve into a subjectivism, or be articulated such that it did not endlessly face that charge. Greek aesthetics of the self can avoid this—but it is difficult to think consistently in their mode of “aesthetics” today. These questions are hard to see (even though they are thematically important in The Use of Pleasure, The Care of the Self, and The Hermeneutics of the Subject) as long as one continues to read Foucault as if power were ontologically prior and produced all other axes.​[565]​ 
Spirituality as a Specific Subject-Truth Node
So far, I have only dealt with subject-truth intersections generally. One subset of subject-truth relations is of particular interest to me: spirituality, that class of ethics-truth nodes which say that ethical practices should be prioritized, because a change in ethical subjectivity can give you access to important truths that cannot be got at otherwise. That is, one must become a different kind of subject, through an ethical conversion, in order to be able to accede to certain truths. Foucault formulated his conception of “spirituality” thus: 
I think we could call ‘spirituality’ the search, practice, and experience through which the subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth… which may be purifications, ascetic exercises, renunciations, conversion of looking, modifications of existence, etc.… [which are] the price to be paid for access to the truth.​[566]​ 
Think of a bildungsroman but with effects which potentially reach much farther, and crucially, where the ethical changes are prior to changes in what one learns. 
Spirituality postulates that the truth is never given to the subject by right… It follows that… there can be no truth without a conversion or a transformation of the subject… [However,] once access to the truth has really been opened up, it produces effects that are… quite different and much more [than knowledge]… which I will call “rebound” (“de retour”), effects of the truth on the subject… [which] transfigures his very being… a certain transformation… not of the individual, but of the subject himself in his being as subject.​[567]​ 
Certain ethics postulate a subject-truth relation such that one cannot automatically know every kind of truth; however, if one converts to another kind of subjectivity, that subject could have access to those truths; and indeed if so converted, the knowledge one gets does more than teach—it radically transforms the subject. We could call it an epiphany or a rebirth, this access to exceptional truths which do so much more than ‘teach’ us, and indeed, do more than simply improve us. 
Though Foucault’s selected terms “spiritualité” and “conversion” have distinctly religious connotations (as do my terms “rebirth” and “epiphany”), Foucault shows that Hellenistic subjectivity (primarily Stoicism and Cynicism​[568]​) demanded spiritual conversion well before Christianity was a potent cultural force. Not only does pagan spirituality show up prior to Christianity, but the two modes of conversion are completely different in multiple respects. They are brought about by different techniques, with different aims, and with different subjectivities at issue before and after conversion.​[569]​ Thus, “it would be quite wrong to view and gauge the importance of the notion of conversion only in connection with religion, and with Christian religion.”​[570]​ Similarly, revolutionaries and artists in recent history have demanded a conversion of the self before their “true life” could be lived, without these thereby being religious movements.​[571]​ Foucault denies that there must be crypto-Christian subject-truth relations in 
forms of knowledge like Marxism or psychoanalysis. It goes without saying that it would be completely wrong to identify these with religion… However… questions [which are] absolutely typical of spirituality, are found again at the very heart of, or anyway, at the source and outcome of both these knowledges.​[572]​ 
As a final irony that ‘secularizes’ spirituality, Foucault briefly claims that it was scholastic theology which initially began stripping spirituality from ethics.​[573]​ 
Foucault’s claims on spirituality do more than parse the differences and filiations of pagan and early Christian self-truth linkages. The stakes are much higher. Foucault wrote that “Western philosophy can be read throughout its history as a slow disengagement of the question… how, at what cost, in accordance with what procedure must the subject’s mode of being be changed for him to have access to the truth?”​[574]​ Today our sense of truth has narrowed, whereas in some other forms of philosophy, one “cannot have access to the truth if one does not change one’s mode of being”—which, let us note, means one can have access to more truths if one does change. Noting that Descartes and scientific practice “played a major role” in the shift away from spirituality, Foucault says that “there came a time when the subject as such became capable of truth… To be capable of truth you only have to open your eyes and to reason soundly and honestly, always holding to the line of self-evidence and never letting it go. The subject, then, does not have to transform himself. The subject only has to be what he is.”​[575]​ This has the correlate that whatever knowledge was made possible through ethical change, is lost to those who do not undergo such ethical changes—those truths are lost to us.​[576]​ The kind of knowing available to us today, prior to conversion to another form of subjectivity, changes almost nothing. To repurpose a well-known phrase, we could call it “trivially true.” It is true, and you now know something you did not before, but it says nothing to you about your life, it cannot become your life, and it does nothing extraordinary to you. A mere absorption of preexisting facts, waiting to be picked up and then ignored likes stones on a beach, possible for any generic “one” and having minimal effect on the future. 
While it puts subjective transformation before knowledge, spiritualties are not anti-knowledge; neither was Foucault and neither am I. Rather than being indifferent to knowledge in its privileging of ethic self-relation, spirituality dreams of a newer, better way of knowing. Spirituality’s claims that there is the possibility of relating to knowledge in a wholly new way, of radically springboarding into heretofore unimagined ways of living, knowing, and being, is perhaps the most exciting and most exalting way to speak of truth. There seems to be a quasi-spiritual recognition that some lives are extraordinary, that some people have acceded to ways of life foreign to ourselves, in the way in which people refer to certain exceptional individuals. The detached attentiveness of the Dalai Lama is said to deeply affect people who are otherwise rather jaded, and many still are overwhelmed by a certain awe in the presence of artists. Imagine if you could become capable of seeing the world how Kandinsky painted—imagine if, like him, you experienced synesthesia, and knew the colors of sounds, and the smells of words. Or if you had a radical conversion like Diogenes the Cynic, who defaced every common currency of his time and milieu, afterwards becoming the first cosmopolite. His spiritual conversion rendered him equally at home everywhere and made him subject only to universal reason (never subject to any localized person, statute, or custom), transforming him into superhuman who really inhabited the cosmos in a way which you and I can hardly even recognize. 
Subjectivity is malleable—perhaps even indefinitely malleable, without any known bounds. If truth and subjectivity intertwine, and subjectivity is profoundly modified, what unforeseen truths will a radically novel self call forth? Is it impossible that certain great people know things you and I simply cannot, that they see what remains only darkness for us? Not merely that some live differently, but that some have wholly other ways of knowing? Spirituality claims that such ethical otherness is possible. It also crucially reveals that one is not born ready for every truth, but, that subject to certain conditions and the achievement of a certain constitution, that then—and only then—are certain things possible. To achieve this “other life,”​[577]​ it is not required—no, it is not even helpful—to continue to build perpetually on what you already know and already are, nor will some esoteric knowledge alone catapult you into this other world hidden within our world. What is required is that you radically transfigure the subject which you are. The novel knowledge will follow as a reward for ethical transformation.​[578]​
Conclusion
I had three related core motives for writing this dissertation. I wanted to address the question of how to live well; specifically, how to live better by doing without broadly shared assumptions about what we are; and to offer another option which avoided recourse to notions of authentic desire, undetermined freedom, or a deep subject. An ethical motive, according to a genealogical method, with a non-humanist aim. At the most general level, I meant to ask what I should change about my life, in terms of two specifications: an acknowledgement that my life is deeply informed by broader patterns of thought that are specific to our moment in time, and an attempt to avoid motivations or legitimations reliant upon humanist notions of originary freedom or a deep authentic self. I think the best way, in fact, to call humanist ethics into question, is to show a plausible alternative that works without requiring the trappings of free will, indeterminate personal desire, and so on. So I aimed not so much to deny or disprove humanist conceptions of the subject, as to fashion an alternative subjectivity which might displace them. I fashioned a counter-subjectivity through Foucault’s diagnostic descriptions of our current and past ethical forms of subjectivity, and by going beyond those descriptions by prescribing a way of life in the style of contemporary French Spinozism.
I wanted to establish an ethos, to evaluate and improve the style in which I live. This is the common philosophical question or project of asking, “how should I live?” But such a question does not exist in a vacuum; I am historically determined, having absorbed certain ways of living before I was ever even conscious of them (or of any other possibilities), a historical inheritance which is not identical to the past but also contains novel shifts from what has come before. Thus, to ask how I should live today requires a genealogical analysis of ‘living today.’ Additionally, the “I” in the question “how should I live?” is fundamentally shaped by certain of my other philosophical commitments. I do not affirm any version of a free will, and only on occasion flirt with hypotheticals regarding universal truths about human nature, but I still think that positive adjustments to our own selves are entirely possible, and can be justified and argued for without strong universal norms. So I wanted to elaborate an ethos which calls for changes to the particular kinds of lives many of us lead today, without relying on utopian futures or a mythical origin, which rejects certain features of a commonly lived ethos without leaning heavily on a likely fictitious sense of what we all are deep down, and without assuming there is a freedom which if motivated can simply conjure a perfect life ex nihilo. It should not be surprising that I turned to the later works of Foucault to ask how to live, against portions of the present moment, without recourse to humanisms. Foucault’s later works treat relations to self, use his genealogical method of critique, and retain his earlier suspicions regarding a “founding subject.” 
Though Foucault is indispensable for my project, answering such questions through him raised certain interpretative difficulties. Central among these difficulties were two: what is the relation between a form of constraint and the possibility of changing it (often incorrectly understood as the relation between power and subjectivity), and, what answers, if any, were given by Foucault to the question of how we ought to live today? Hopefully, my interpretative responses will be of use even to those who work on any aspect of Foucault, and not only to those few focused on subjectivity. To the first, I showed that constraint and freedom are not simply opposed in Foucault, and that we absolutely should not think of power as evil domination and ethical subjectivity as the good freedom opposed to power. For instance, we all learned to read (and many other skills besides) through relations of power, something which I am grateful for and which I really doubt harbors some secret repression. Foucault explicitly denied that power was always repressive or dominating. Also, forms of subjectivity and relations of power are equally unchosen elements of an inherited constitution. For instance, ancient Greek men did not choose to understand themselves as masters of natural impulses and of other people. This was the only way that they had available to them to relate to themselves, just as in the Renaissance, scholars inherited ‘resemblance’ as the unchosen episteme, or condition of possibility for thought. 
Additionally, a key component of ethics is askesis, those practices of the self which one undergoes to induce ethical change. We do not freely choose a way of life—we train to make a way of life possible for the first time. Many ethical changes are possible, but not because we have an unlimited freedom; they are possible because subjectivity is malleable, and through training can come to have a wholly distinct constitution. Finally, the particular form of ethics today which Foucault subjected to scrutiny was desiring subjectivity, which thinks its original, authentic and free self is being repressed by others. His critique of ‘free and deep desire’ is impossible to square with a definition of subjectivity as such as authentic freedom. To oppose freedom and domination is to miss the subtlety of Foucault on power, and to oppose subjectivity and power-relations is to ignore the content of the works on subjectivity. My insistence on decoupling power from conceptions of repression forced on you by others, and decoupling ethics from conceptions of free choices that must resist power (that is, decoupling each from non-Foucauldian notions of originary subjects), will hopefully clarify notions of resistance, the possibility of change, and the ways which power-relations limit us—notions found throughout Foucault’s work.
Foucault scholars also have to wrestle with his exact role in terms of advice about what should be done today. This too is a question which vexes anyone working in Foucault. His writing often makes its readers feel that its objects of description are most sinister where they claim to be humanitarian and are least true when they make use of sciences. Foucault’s implicit message can seem to be that everything is war continued by other means, all the while carried out under the banner of truth and community. (If that were the case, then what could we possibly do and whom could we possibly trust?) He also shows that his objects of study arose without necessity and thus could be done away with, and expressly claims that his motives for writing are to show that what he describes can be undone, and even how to do so. 
However, exactly what to attack, by what precise methods, and (especially) what to replace it with, are left largely to the reader. Where does he tell us how to counter biopower? When did he tell us what form of power should follow it and usher in a better way of conducting our behavior? Commentators have tried, really quite valiantly, to locate which phrases and concepts give the answer. However, problems abound with locating the answer in Foucault. Why that formulation of (say) ‘aesthetics of existence’ and not the very different one he gave elsewhere? Should we really be looking to the personal biography of a thinker who denounced the “author function,” who conducted an interview anonymously, who shrugged off questions about his life as “without interest?” When what he analyzed was so concrete, can we be satisfied to say some vague “thinking otherwise” is the recommended solution? 
I attempted a different route, that of retaining the genealogical or critical lessons from Foucault and then attempting to go beyond him, by way of an experiment carried out with reference to the present moment’s conditions of possibility which he described. We can avoid all the problems of hermeneutically interrogating scraps, hints, contradictory interview asides, or vagaries, if we assume that Foucault respected his readers enough to leave us the work of solving our present difficulties. He methodologically asked us questions, and we will only wait in vain for a response from him. We should develop our own. He diagnosed dangers, he highlighted weak spots, he even on occasion showed how elements of power, knowledge, and subjectivity come to change. However, he limited himself to description rather than prescription. Foucault left the experimentation to us, having given us the critiques which would enable such innovation. He is not a pastor, leading us into the promised land. He is not a prophetic universal intellectual, in possession of every Truth about what the future holds. He is more like doctor in Ancient times, when people learned many ethically relevant techniques from a doctor, but then went home and took charge of their own day-to-day dietetics. After approaching our maturity through Foucault’s lessons, his only real advice perhaps might be, “healer, heal thyself.” 
Going beyond Foucault, however, does not mean abandoning him. It would of course not do for this project to answer critique with a form of subjectivity which violated key principles of Foucault’s, such as his sense of history, non-humanism, and skepticism of universal claims. It also would not work well to ignore the specifics of his ethical analyses, such as his consistent use of the four aspects (ethical substance, mode of subjection, askesis, and telos) or his critique of today’s desiring subjectivity. The former points guided my selection and use of Spinoza as the best counter to our desiring subjectivity today, who was then analyzed in terms of the four aspects, just as Foucault did for each form of subjectivity on which he wrote. 
Though Foucault and Spinoza have not been paired together in this way before—they have scarcely made contact in the literature, in fact—I showed that Spinoza fits quite well with key principles of Foucault.​[579]​ Spinoza’s non-humanism is well-established, as is his ardent denial of the free will, meshing with Foucault’s forms of constitution. Spinoza’s related explanations of how we are determined by the environment, by ideas (true or false) circulating in the world around us, and by the affects of others, as well as his examples of how repeated shared practices can etch a way of life into our bodies, gives an in-depth theoretical background for the sort of micro-physics which Foucault concretely analyzed. Indeed, Spinoza and Foucault are rare brothers-in-arms on this score, since both speak only of our actual forms of constitution or necessary determination. Neither posits a core, founding, essential “Subject” behind, below, or before what happens to it. Both are fairly radical in their agreement that we are nothing but the total effect of the causes which constitute us.





Appendix: Foucault’s References to Spinoza
1954:		Intro to Binswanger’s Dream and Existence (relevant pages: 43-45)​[580]​ 
1961: 		History of Madness (44-47, 132-141)
1966: 		The Order of Things (50-76, 344-348)
1967: 		“Afterword to Temptation of Saint Anthony” (105, 121 note 3)​[581]​ 
1970: 		“Theatrum Philosophicum” (344, 359-360, 366-368)​[582]​ 
1970: 		Lectures on the Will to Know (2-6, 15-18, 22-28, 29-30 notes 1-3 and 8-13, 226)​[583]​
1971: 		“Lecture on Nietzsche” (202-205, 220 notes 6-8)​[584]​ 
1971: 		The Foucault-Chomsky Debate (47-54)​[585]​ 
1973: 		“Truth and Juridical Forms” (8-16)​[586]​
1975: 		“The Functions of Literature” (310-313)​[587]​ 
1980: 		On the Government of the Living (93-97)
1982: 		The Hermeneutics of the Subject (25-28, 307-309)
1984: 		The Courage of Truth (The Government of Self and Others, II) (235-237)

Abbreviations Used for Common Citations
Foucault
CdF82 	Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-82
CS 		The Care of the Self
HS1 		The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction
“NGH” 	“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in The Foucault Reader
“OGE” 	“On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” in The Essential Works of Foucault, Vol. 1, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth
UP 		The Use of Pleasure
“WIE?”	“What Is Enlightenment?,” in The Foucault Reader

Spinoza’s Ethics
1P16 		Proposition 16 of Book 1
5P36Cor 	Corollary to the demonstration of proposition 36 of Book 5
4P19Dem 	Demonstration of proposition 19 of Book 4
3P22Sch 	Scholium of proposition 22 of Book 3
1Appx	 	Appendix to Book 1
2Ax3 		Axiom 3 of Book 2
3Def3	 	Definition 3 of Book 3
2Def3Exp 	Explanation of definition 3 of Book 2
3DefAffVI 	Definition 6 in the definition of the affects at the end of Book 3
2Lem5 	Lemma 5 of Book 2
3Post2	 	Postulate 2 of Book 3 
4Pref 		Preface of Book 4

Spinoza’s Other Texts
Ep. 12	 	Letter 12 of Spinoza: The Letters (numbers used by Shirley as established by Van Vloten and Land)
TdIE 11 	Paragraph 11 of Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (paragraph numbers used by Curley as established by Bruder)
TP 5.7	 	Section 7 of Chapter 5 of the Political Treatise (section numbers used by Shirley as established by Gebhardt)
TTP 16.2 	Section 2 of Chapter 16 of the Theological-Political Treatise (section numbers used by Israel as established by Akkerman)
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^51	  There is completely comprehensible discomfort with this Nietzschean stance. A whole literature voices this concern; see for instance Richard Wolin, “Foucault’s Aesthetic Decisionism,” Telos 1986, no. 67 (March 1986): 71–86. I am sympathetic to such discomfort and worry. However, to smuggle values back in under the cover of method or Reason or the historical facts themselves, is not the best way to deal with this discomfort. Additionally, I hope that my use of Spinoza will reduce worries about voluntarist relativism leading to nihilism or fascism, since Spinoza is entirely anti-voluntarist. 
^52	  There is the perennially vexing problem of how to evaluate evaluations: if judgments are not solely derived from objects, then what measure legitimately rates various judgments? This issue is not unique to Foucault. It arises in every evaluative account, though in distinct forms. In non-objective standards, we must ask, ‘how do we judge the judgments?,’ while in objective evaluations, we ask, ‘how do we know this knowledge is objective?’  
^53	  Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 386–387.
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^55	  Foucault, The Order of Things, 387. 
^56	  Foucault, HS1, 10.
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^196	  See Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 196 and “The Lesson of the Hospitals,” for a brief summary and for an extended example, respectively. 
^197	  One way of reading “pleasure” in this text would be to see it as an as-yet-poorly formulated element of proto-subjectivity. Dismissing power-as-repression again, Foucault instead posits “a subtle network of discourses, special knowledges, pleasures, and powers (Foucault, HS1, 72).” If knowledge, truth, and discourses are roughly interchangeable here (which they may not be), then that would put “pleasure” in the place which becomes the axis of subjectivity. Other passages also support this reading: Ibid., 71 and 83–84; Foucault, UP, 10, 13, 25–26, and 28–32. 
^198	  That is, after History of Madness and The Birth of the Clinic. These two texts—his earliest post-dissertation books—do not isolate one single axis particularly well. However, if axes are not just a description of content but also indicate a method (one which was developed and modified during its use), then small wonder if Foucault’s method was not (well-)established in his first works. Later, the ‘paradigmatic’ texts of each axis isolate it more neatly: The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Order of Things; Discipline and Punish and the first History of Sexuality; The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self. 
^199	  While subjectivity would be artificially held apart from power for clarity of analysis (held apart as the “individual” of sexuality had not been), it had to be related to the other axes to form a concrete picture.
^200	  The Courage of Truth and On the Government of Self and Others treat parrhesia, the virtue of speaking an ethical truth to another despite a risk of harm.
^201	  Part Three of Care of Self , “Self and Others” (which includes the chapter “The Political Game”), surely must indicate some of the ways Roman power-relations and subjectivity interrelated. However, while Imperial political office or the “vita activa” coincide fairly directly with what we call “politics,” the domain of politics is not identical to what Foucault called relations of power. Regardless, here Foucault would have focused only on issues of relevance for ethical self-relation, so we would have to carefully develop these passages if we want to speak of Ancient power-relations. 
^202	  See Foucault, UP, 192–202 as well as 229-246. The man has a differentiated place from the boy, such that he can give the boy something in their interaction, and, the boy as distinct from the man can present the adult with something that a wife, other adult men, and slaves cannot give him, nor can the adult give himself. Differential relations, which allow or require something to come out of the differential relation, and which could not be produced by one alone: this works as a way to define power-relations broadly. That the boy-man relation is one of power while also one of love is more apparent to those who do not misread power-relations as “dominating Power.”
^203	  I note once again that no axis is prior to and none is opposed to any other axis—neither logically prior, temporally prior, or causally prior. Deleuze’s reading that subjectivity is a fold within power (that is, a reaction to or derivation of power) is a Deleuzian rather than Foucauldian way to think “the inside.”
^204	  Especially in interviews, we find Foucault giving the most varied self-descriptions: he is not a philosopher; he is asking the traditional philosophical questions of self, knowledge, and others. He was never a structuralist; he used structuralist methods and language even better than structuralists did. He wrote nothing but fictions about what he wanted the future to look like; he was nothing but a humble historian of past thought; he was not a historian of ideas. He had only one object of study which was the subject; he only ever studied the history of truth.
^205	  Cf. Paras, McGushin, and Nehamas, who also read the later courses closely, but to different effect than I put forth here. Eric Paras, Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power and Knowledge (New York: Other Press, 2006); McGushin, Foucault’s Askesis; Nehamas, The Art of Living.
^206	  Not to be confused with the inaugural lecture of 1970-1971, also called La Volonté de Savoir. The contents of the book and the lecture are entirely different. Helpfully, the published lecture bears the full title of Lectures on the Will to Know/Leçons sur la Volonté de Savoir.
^207	  The dual-year citation refers to the school year at the College. However, since Foucault usually did not begin his lectures until January, many refer only to the latter year.
^208	  Foucault was on sabbatical during the 1976-1977 school year.
^209	  The last lecture of Society Must Be Defended is devoted to a discussion of “population” and “biopower.” However, in the lecture course titled The Birth of Biopolitics Foucault only mentions biopolitics to note why he is not (yet) talking about it. An editor’s note (96, note 5) sums up and links all three of the instances of “biopolitics” listed in the index. In three lectures, these forms of power-relations and their entanglements were discussed: the pastorate, raison d’État, biopolitics, multiple forms of liberalism, and sovereignty. Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003). Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2010).
^210	  Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 116. 
^211	  Ibid., 116 and 117–120. 
^212	  Ibid., 122.
^213	  Ibid., 123.
^214	  Ibid., 154.
^215	  Ibid., 155. 
^216	  Ibid., 183–184.
^217	  Ibid., 181. 
^218	  Ibid. 
^219	  Ibid., 184.
^220	  In a later interview, Foucault says that “in the religious crisis of the sixteenth century—the great rejection of the Catholic confessional practices—new modes of relationship to the self were being developed.” Foucault, “OGE,” 276. The next lines of his response to Dreyfus and Rabinow mention Stoic practices as well. These comments are of a piece with the research Foucault is detailing in Security, Territory, Population: reformation, counter-reformation and “all these struggles that culminated in the Wars of Religion”, this “great battle [which] traversed the West from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century… [which] was undoubtedly much more a great pastoral battle than a great doctrinal battle.” Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 179. Once more, the links are governmentality, pastorate as a specific kind of governmentality, pastoral spiritual guidance as forming and requiring an individual, the Christian individual/subject acting on itself with practices of the self like confession, and finally, other practices of the self engaged in by Classical and Hellenistic subjects.
^221	  Foucault, “OGE,” 255. 
^222	  Ibid., 254. 
^223	  Whatever his reasons may have been, I would like to note that, after a year lecturing on the liberal and neo-liberal forms of power-relations in an attempt to reach biopower as a power-relation, Foucault did not return directly to biopolitics in any later lectures. He instead spent the next five years on Ancient texts, developing subjectivity or self as its own axis.
^224	  Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 181–184. 
^225	  The three central practices which form (to differing extents, and each undergoing many modifications) the basis of our modern sense of confession are early ‘baptism,’ early ‘penitence,’ and the examination of conscience. The last is directly contrasted with Ancient examination of conscience, at length, in the March 12 lecture. Michel Foucault, On The Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1979-1980, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
^226	  Ibid., 240; Foucault, CS, 62. The next lecture of the former refers to Cassian’s Christian techniques, which are taken over from Ancients and modified (19 March), a contrast which is also alluded to on the next page of the latter (63). Foucault, CdF82, 298–301 makes similar reference to these techniques.
^227	  This lecture has just been released in French but has not yet been translated into English. 
^228	  See the course summary of 1980-1981's “Subjectivity and Truth,” Michel Foucault, The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 1, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), 87. Note that the language is not only that of subjectivity, but is also continuous with earlier works: see references to life, labor, and language with a dismissal of the repressive hypothesis (ibid., 88- 89).
^229	  Most of the language of Gouvernement du Vivants, especially in the first nine lectures, revolves around ‘verité’ while the remaining three lectures begin to use more often the language of ‘soi-meme,’ ‘pratique’ or ‘techniques,’ and ‘subjectivité.’ See editor Senellart’s explanation of the link at On The Government of the Living, 327–333.
^230	  Foucault, Essential, Vol. 1, 88. 
^231	  Foucault, UP, 29. 
^232	  Ibid., 25–32. Indeed, these aspects structure Care of Self as well. That Care of Self makes less formal use of these does not reduce their centrality there: volume 2 and 3 are researched and written at the same time, and Use of Pleasures makes reference to Hellenistic ethics in those terms throughout.
^233	  Ibid., 32. 
^234	  Even McGushin only occasionally references these. McGushin, Foucault’s Askesis, xviii (see endnote 23).  Bernauer summarizes the four in a page but does not use them in his essay on Foucault’s ethics: Bernauer, “Michel Foucault’s Ecstatic Thinking,” 65–66. Hoy references both substance and subjectivation, but defines the ethical substance as what you currently are and the mode of subjection as critique (so one part of subjectivity is defined as the whole subject you are, while another part is defined as the process of becoming another subject): Hoy, Critical Resistance, 87–93. Rajchman mentions all four, but tries to define them through Foucault himself, and exemplifies each with a quote from outside of UP.  He thus identifies either ethics generally, or our ethical task today, with Foucault’s genealogical method. I argue against such a move, but at least Rajchman recognizes that the four are important and need to be given some sort of contemporary content. Rajchman, “Foucault: The Ethic and the Work,” 219–220. 
^235	  Lessons such as: Classical ethics did not have rules, or, Hellenistic philosophy emphasized care of the self. Such general statements do not help us to address matters of genuine critique, such as the fact that it is not clear what force rules have any longer, or what forms of care of the self might be desirable now. There must be more to learn from UP than ‘codes are bad.’ Similarly, care as such is not ‘good.’ Christians care for self through permanent confession, but this is anxious and leads to renunciation of the self. Not all care and not every rule is created equally (a point made clear by close reading).
^236	  Foucault, UP, 32. Roughly, take as an example Descartes’ definition of the subject, the “I”, as a thinking thing: this is the rich foundation of what the Cartesian subject is. When he establishes in the fourth meditation that we should not extend our will further than what we know clearly and distinctly, this rule is important but it hardly exhausts this form of subjectivity which is founded elsewhere. René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and Replies, ed. and trans. John Cottingham (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
^237	  I will largely use the pronoun ‘he’ for a Classical Greek subject, ‘one’ for the Hellenistic or Roman subjectivity, and refer to a Christian in terms of the community, in order to reemphasize differences between the kinds of subjects at issue in these ethical forms.
^238	  Foucault, UP, 26. 
^239	  I think ethical substance can be nicely viewed in the difference between Kantian morality and utilitarianism. For Kant, what we look to in order to discuss morality is the rationality/non-contradictory nature of your maxim, or the respect you show toward autonomy. For a utilitarian, utility is examined. Strictly, neither looks to the act (which is the ethical substance for some moralities). But a utilitarian judges only the results of the act, and these in terms of pain and pleasure; Kant thinks that these results are very real, but do not make up the ‘stuff’ of moral evaluation. He looks to an inner disposition, which precedes any results and analyzable not as pleasure and pain toward the act. These two ethical theories do not merely ‘disagree’; they treat entirely different objects or substances.
^240	  Foucault, UP, 27. The mode of subjection is also defined at ibid., 53. 
^241	  Foucault, UP, 27. 
^242	  Ibid., 28.
^243	  Ibid., 91.
^244	  Ibid., 42–43 for further explanation. 
^245	  Classical regimen “did not operate on the assumption that sexual acts in themselves and by nature were bad,” though it did express “an unfailing concern for the dangers that surrounded the use of pleasures.” Ibid., 117 and 124.
^246	  Ibid., 136-137. That something carries the threat of danger is not the same as judging that thing to be bad; rather, the danger was that of an “involuntary violence and careless expenditure.” Foucault, CS, 122.
^247	  Foucault, UP, 62.
^248	  Here, we can make one of the few direct links to Nietzsche in Use of Pleasures or Care of Self. Master morality is an option for the few, and thus by definition, moral excellence is not expected of all. However, Foucault takes his distance from Nietzsche: Foucault places universality, of a sort, in the Stoics (see below), not in Nietzsche’s slave revolt.
^249	  Foucault, UP, 61. Foucault notes that knowledge is “necessary for the measured use of pleasures, necessary for controlling their violence. But it is important to note that this relation to truth… was not equivalent to an obligation for the subject to speak truthfully concerning himself” but rather was an “instrumental… condition.” Ibid., 89. Those of the elite who opted out of this were not even considered to have missed a duty, but only “were considered ugly” or unimpressive. Foucault, “OGE,” 260. 
^250	  Foucault, UP, 136. Recall all the Platonic and Aristotelian analogies to the crafts of doctoring, guiding a ship, and so on (ibid., 138-139). The mode of subjection can be called a use of pleasures and it can also be called a techne tou biou.
^251	  Ibid., 116.
^252	  Ibid., 91. Food, that serious ethical preoccupation of the Greeks, tends to provide good examples. I will adapt Aristotle’s example of the athlete Milo. Milo requires more food in general than you do. Yet even for Milo, if he has just eaten, then he should not eat again. For him at this time, that would be excessive. Additionally, even if it has been some time since Milo has eaten, if he is about to compete, or this climate is especially dangerous for his constitution, then he should avoid food. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Richard McKeon, trans. W.D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Modern Library, 2001), II.6.
^253	  Ethics is practiced as an “agonistic game by which one sought to manifest and ensure one’s superiority over others [with] the principle of superiority over the self as the ethical core.” Foucault, CS, 95.
^254	  Status and techne are but two of the elements which make up the mode of subjection which can be summed up as “use of pleasure.” Once more, I would simply like to highlight the complexity of Foucault’s analysis, and note that it is only in the complexity that real questions can be raised about our own ethics regarding marriage. At the shallow level, we reject Classical reliance on status because it is linked to domination, as we should. At a deeper level, status shows us something about marriage which we take for granted today. 
^255	  Foucault, “OGE,” 258 (see also ibid., 256-257). 
^256	  Foucault, UP, 183.
^257	  Ibid., 64; askesis took the form of “struggle and combat” with self (ibid., 65). The ethical element of struggle with the self is probably the point at which Classical ethics looks most like Christian ethics.
^258	  Ibid., 72.
^259	  Ibid., 74.
^260	  Foucault’s analysis is quite Aristotelian, since you do the thing that you want to become better at. Hellenistic subjectivity moves to testing in general, but in Classical ethics a practice “was not distinct from the practice of virtue itself; it was the rehearsal which anticipated that practice.” Foucault, UP, 77.
^261	  Philosophy was not Socrates’ only way of practicing for death. His refusal to summon those whom the tyrants wanted to harm, bravery in battles, and standing guard all night while barely clothed and barefoot in the snow: all of these are proof of his virtue as well as further training for his eventual virtue unto death. See the Apology in Plato, The Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, trans. Lane Cooper, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989). Classical practices of the self were continuous with the very challenge for which they prepared one. 
^262	  Foucault, UP, 139. 
^263	  Ibid., 93.
^264	   Ibid., 62. 
^265	  In what I just said about the “brilliance” that a Greek held as his telos, Foucault is in agreement with Hannah Arendt. In terms of just what was manifested, however, Foucault did not reach the decidedly humanist conclusion of Arendt, who emphasizes the singularity of each man, how his true self is revealed in his unrepeatable excellence. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
^266	  Foucault, UP, 92. 
^267	  Ibid., 79.
^268	  Careful attention to the shifts from Classical to Hellenistic, Hellenistic to early Christian, may help us interpret shifts in other eras in terms of knowledge-power. Perennial interpretive questions for readers of Foucault find their material here: such questions as: how fast do these shifts and changes occur? By what causes, if any, are they brought about? To what extent do regimes, say, biopower and neoliberalism, overlap, or do shifts occur as entire ‘paradigms’? If overlapping, do they integrate with one another, or compete, or simply coexist? (A caveat, however: we can neither assume that power-knowledge will shift in the same fashion as ethical regimes, nor that it has a logic or temporality which is entirely different.)
^269	  Foucault, CS, 103. Notice that the medical description is different during Hellenism- a Stoicized medicine is used ethically- and yet the ethical substance is not much changed. A complex relation between knowledge and ethics exists: sometimes the ethics will stay steady as the knowledge shifts, yet, they are intertwined in such a way that the ethics is often quite responsive or ‘reactive’ to the knowledges it employs.
^270	  Ibid., 67. “The physicians of the first and second centuries were not the first nor the only ones to formulate this ambivalence [to pleasure]. But around it, they described an entire pathology, more developed, more complex, and more systematic than that attested in the past.” Ibid., 113.
^271	  Ibid., 239. Strictly, for Stoics, these things could never be evil in themselves, but only neutral indifferents. For Classical Greeks, at least Plato and Aristotle, it might be more the case that aphrodisia were positively good; regardless, Hellenistic fear was not based on an evilness or badness of the feared acts.
^272	  Ibid., 111.
^273	  Foucault, CdF82, 108.
^274	  Foucault, CS, 239.
^275	  A favorite example of Foucault’s is referenced in The Technology of the Self, On the Government of the Living, The Care of the Self and discussed at length in the last lecture of Hermeneutics of the Subject. The Stoic nightly examination of conscience looks over every element of the past day, “in order to bring out all its errors… I show no indulgence, but I do not punish myself. I say to myself simply: from now on you must not do again what you have done.” Foucault, CdF82, 483. 
^276	  Foucault, CS, 67.
^277	  Foucault, CS, 184. He often cites Epictetus on this point: “‘remember, when you eat…that it is God you are nourishing… God himself is present within you.’” Ibid., 168.
^278	  Foucault seems to place the initial appearance of universality in ethics here (particularly with the Stoics),  which is a sharp departure from Classical ethics. A Hellenistic tutor is required to have the same moral relation to the student as its parents do. This is very different from the Greek pederastic model. Ibid., 190. Another example is that marriage was universally required, unless unusual circumstances presented themselves. Ibid., 155-156. In Hellenism, at its most non-misogynistic, there are even occasional claims that gender is as irrelevant as status, in Rufus and more ambivalently, in Epictetus. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Musonius Rufus, Musonius Rufus: Lectures and Sayings, ed. William B. Irvine, trans. Cynthia King (CreateSpace, 2011).
^279	  Foucault, CS, 184-185. See also ibid., 101-103 (ethical variables of place, time, context, and personal constitution render Hellenistic ethics as quasi-universal) and Foucault, CdF82, 74–75.
^280	  Foucault, UP, 21. “They urge individuals to be more austere if they wish to lead a life different from that of ‘the throngs.’” See also Foucault, CS, 40.
^281	  Foucault, CdF82, 112: care of the self is not a universal injunction.
^282	  Ibid., 113, and Foucault, UP,  21. For further context, see A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
^283	  Foucault, CS, 185. See also ibid., 178: marriage now forms the “strongest of individual ties.” Cf. Classical marriage: UP, 183.
^284	  Foucault, CS, 209; see also ibid., 78: Classical “mutual love and consent” are based on “reciprocity.” Reciprocity, however, does not mean perfect equality, but something closer to a patron/client relation: both parties are obligated to the other, because humans owe humans obligations by nature. But the patron obviously owes different things, in different ways, than the client.
^285	  Ibid., 140.
^286	  Ibid., 163. 
^287	  Ibid., 51. Foucault sketches out the “nostalgic figure” (ibid., 82) of the perfectly political Greek polis, and its exaggerated “disappearance” and resulting “withdrawal into self” (ibid., 83) under the Empire (ibid., 81-86). He then (ibid., 87-95) proposes his divergent account of a complex self-other interplay. A close reading of this section could put to rest those readings which emphasize a supposed opposition of ethics and power-relations.
^288	  Ibid., 184 and 91.
^289	  In Hellenistic ethics, a variety of other-relations is clearly visible: Seneca writes consolations to his mother and gives political advice to his friends, and Marcus Aurelius writes letters to his friend-lover Fronto. Foucault, CS, 53. Giving such spiritual guidance gives benefits for both the self and other. 
^290	  I take it that “governmentality” means nothing else than the intersection of the self with others which would mean with a power-relation. Such intersections are not invasions of self-relation by non-ethical forces, at least, Foucault does not seem to take it that way, especially as  he advances further into subjectivity. Can we really think that self-relation of ethical life, properly speaking, takes place in a vacuum? It has and must have a relation to others—how could it not?
^291	  Ethically relevant others in different subjectivities are the family, agonistic competitors, a pastor, or all of humanity. Different roles they serve can be to learn from them, as a site to test oneself, to defeat them, to give them aid, and so on.
^292	  “Power is not evil…We all know that power is not evil!...it’s part of love, of passion and sexual pleasure… [and of] the pedagogical institution. I see nothing wrong in the practice of a person who, knowing more than others in a specific game of truth, tells those others what to do, teaches them, transmits knowledge and techniques to them.” Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self,” 298–299.
^293	  Much of The Hermeneutics of the Subject focuses on Hellenistic askesis, and Ancient “care of the self” more broadly.
^294	  Along with the other aspects of subjectivity, “all moral action…requires [the subject] to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself” (UP 28).
^295	  CS 45.
^296	  Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Michael Chase (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1995); Pierre Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy?, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
^297	  One major theme of Foucault’s emphasis on care (and not only knowledge) of the self: The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 1-19. See as well 24 February second hour, 3 March first hour, and 17 March first hour.
^298	  CS 41.
^299	  Ibid., 48-49. The Epicurus quote is drawn from his Letter to Menoeceus.
^300	  On this theme (which Foucault takes to be fairly decisive), see Foucault, CdF82, 437–450.  
^301	  CS 100: almost every time of day and almost every activity requires medical knowledge.
^302	  Ibid., 51.
^303	  Ibid., 59.
^304	  Ibid., 60.
^305	  CS, 60-62 and CdF82, 481-484.
^306	  CdF82, 432.
^307	  Ibid., 304-306. Ovid suggests the practice of making love in full light “to free oneself of a love”: “the body’s defects, together with the stains and the mess, will be imprinted on the mind, giving rise to disgust” (CS, 138).
^308	  CdF82, 433. There are a whole series of exercises of this sort found at Epictetus, Discourses Recorded by Arrian (Books III-IV), Fragments, and the Encheiridion, trans. W. A. Oldfather, vol. 2 (Ann Arbor (MI): Harvard University Press, 1928), III xxiv. The reasons why these are effective are not always spelled out by Foucault, nor by his Ancient sources, but some indications can be found at CdF82, 327, 338, and 345.
^309	  Ibid.,  214. All of ibid., 10 February 1982 (first hour) is relevant to the use of knowledge in Ancient practices/askesis. See also ibid., January 6 (both hours), February 17 (both hours), and 24 March (both hours).
^310	  CS, 64, and a similar point made at CS, 60-62. Foucault ends CdF82, (24 March, second hour) on this note as well. On the issue of the money changer metaphor, the differing relations of knowledge to practice in Christian and Hellenistic ethics, and the same metaphor’s use in these divergent ethics, see also “Technologies of the Self,” 33-34, 38, 40, and 46-47.
^311	  Epictetus, Discourses Recorded by Arrian (Books I-II), trans. W. A. Oldfather, Revised, vol. 1 (Ann Arbor (MI): Harvard University Press, 1998), I.14, lines 6–14 and II.8.
^312	  CdF82, 12; in fact, the whole first lecture of The Hermeneutics of the Subject (6 January, first hour) is devoted to raising this issue. It is phrased as a question here, because ‘answering’ the question is in one sense the goal of course. 
^313	  Ibid., 236-237.
^314	  CS, 68.
^315	  Ibid., 66.
^316	  Ibid., 66. Foucault quotes Seneca, Letters to Lucilius (letter 72), and also references Seneca’s On the Happy Life (III, 4).
^317	  CdF82, 184-185. Foucault also says that the “self is the definitive and sole aim” of Hellenistic care of the self (ibid., 177). The telos of the Greek world could be said to be the polis; its ‘destination’ was an actual place. Hellenistic subjectivity had no actual place it was ‘heading toward,’ unless one wants to claim the cosmos itself as a place. What they sought was themselves, anywhere and under every condition.
^318	  CS, 65. Strictly speaking, in Stoicism the goal is not ‘more of this, less of that’ but requires a qualitative leap. There are, in Stoicism, free people (very rare), and everyone else. No one is partially free. Any weakness or susceptibility means you have not reached the goal. Yes, practical techniques can be said to bring one ‘closer’ to the goal of the self-possessed self, but there is a world of difference between almost there and entirely there.
^319	  Note that the book-length treatment of Christian ethics, L’Aveux de la Chair (Confessions of the Flesh) remains in manuscript form. It has been written about by very few, because one has to get special permission from the IMEC to read it and cannot take any notes while doing so. Lectures such as “Technologies of The Self,” articles such as “Sexuality and Solitude,” and the recently published Collège de France lecture On the Government of the Living, deal with Christianity, and supply some of the content. Michel Foucault, “Sexuality and Solitude,” in The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 1, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), 175–84. Foucault helpfully often gave comparative summations of all three eras at the end of sections of Use of Pleasures and Care of Self. 
^320	  CdF82,  255.
^321	  UP, 92. The Ancient Greek ethical substance, bodily interaction, may have required a complex combinatorics of multiple forces, but at least one could read one’s body according to general physical properties.
^322	  Ibid., 68. See also ibid., 40-41, on the “manifestations of a stealthy, resourceful, and dreadful power.” Additional difficulties are that a Christian’s own will sometimes masquerades as if it were not really that person’s will, and at other times, there are conflicting wills inside of you and you have to empower one of them against the other.
^323	  CS, 239.
^324	  UP, 138.
^325	  It is perhaps surprising that the Stoic self is more godly than the Christian self, but this point is illuminated if we consider the ethical substance. We can recall the contrast which Augustine makes throughout City of God, between the pagans whose god/s resemble/s them (thus allowing god/s no more goodness than what is basically already present in humans) and the Christians whose God is further away (thus requiring them to cease being earthly and fleshly, to reject their difference from God). Once Christians have renounced the self through humility then they will resemble God, once properly debased then they will be elevated much higher—but until then, a Chrisitan is further from god than a Stoic. Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans, ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
^326	  CS, 239.
^327	  UP, 138, CS, 124, and UP, 116.
^328	  See UP, 116 for the timing of sex determined by the liturgical calendar.
^329	  Ibid., 92. Here, a monk is quite different from a Classical man, who once pedagogically well trained, knew himself well enough to respond to his unique circumstances. A monk is also quite different from the Roman, who may need constant medical treatments, but still thought that having a doctor permanently over one’s shoulder for a whole life would be a counter-productive burden (CS, 101: to always consult a physician would be tiresome and impossible). Thus, in Hellenism, one healed onself.
^330	  Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self,” 291.
^331	  Perhaps we can see another instance where there is a reciprocal influence, though not a necessary logical linkage, between two of the aspects. If an ethos casts the ethical substance as evil, it makes sense that one’s techniques would be purifying. 
^332	  CS, 170.
^333	  CdF82, 299 and 300.
^334	  Ibid., 255-256.
^335	  Since Foucault explains the different kinds of self-examination in even more depth throughout The Hermeneutics of the Subject, we should be attentive to those details to sustain the critique of desiring subjectivity. See ibid., 10-19, 25-30, 67-69, 83-84, 129, 134, 188-192, 207-223, 229-244, 247-263 (esp. 248-258), 271-285, 289-301, 317-320, 322-327, 362-366, and 480-487. 
^336	  UP, 89. Notice how close the language is to The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1. The similarity gives credence to my claim that Foucault had already began researching the ‘desiring subject’ (i.e. as a subject-knowledge node), even if it was not yet called such. 
^337	  These were required of monks, not of laypeople, so their scope should not be overestimated. “The monk must have permission of his director to do anything, even die. Everything he does without permission is stealing. There is not a single moment when the monk can be autonomous” (“Technologies of the Self,” 45). Apparently, for a monk, even to eat bread without asking (ibid., 47-48) is a sin.
^338	  Once more, I think that Foucault has other stakes than merely denouncing rule-following (and therefore, other goals than praising an aesthetics of existence for being without rules). Rule-following can take many forms and have many results, some better than others. Additionally, you could obey someone who was issuing single commands, not general rules, so obedience is not identical to rule-following. Additionally, Kantians follow rules without obedience to others. In the obedient rule-following of the monk, that the Christian effaces himself seems to me more disturbing than the following of orders as such. Bernauer, on the other hand, thinks that a selective self-effacement (as de-subjectivation) is the task at hand today. Bernauer, “Michel Foucault’s Ecstatic Thinking.” Of course, Bernauer’s ‘self-renunciation’ (in terms of his motive, the renounced content, the lack of authority, and no doubt the techniques as well) is totally different than what the early Christians recommended.
^339	  UP, 92.
^340	  See Cdf82, 181-5 and CS, 230. 
^341	  Additionally, Hellenistic “salvation” has a different content, happens through the power of the individual, is of no concern to anyone other than the self at issue, and happens in this life.
^342	  Outside of exceptionally unfree circumstances, more fundamental than what someone else asks you not to do, is what kind of subject you are while doing or not doing those acts. The mode of subjection (the justification of why one should be ethical) structures your relation to thought, truth, nature, others, and self, which seems to me much more fundamental than whether an external authority will punish you if you violate the code.
^343	  Foucault, “An Aesthetics of Existence,” 1988, 49. Liberalism and neo-liberalism are not fundamentally defined by rules or a code. Freedom, interest, happiness, and self-expression are more central. That political liberalism happens within the rule of law, does not entail that its ethical subjectivity must be code-bound. In fact, the essentially liberal division between private and public (or between personal morality and civil law) precisely allows one to do anything morally, bound by no law, as long as it affects nobody else. 
^344	  “OGE,” 263.
^345	  Ibid., 261. See also ibid., 255-256: “I wonder if our problem nowadays is not [that] most of us no longer believe that ethics is founded in religion, nor do we want a legal system to intervene in our moral, personal, private life.” Foucault also says that “it’s not at all necessary to relate ethical problems to scientific knowledge.” Ibid., 261. 
^346	  Responses to Foucault’s provocative musing that we could make our lives a work of art (like a lamp) vary quite a great deal. However, I think the most successful developments of this line of thought avoid thinking of an aesthetics of existence as the production of oneself as a finished work. Instead, they center on processes of working on oneself in order to change and on an aspiration to become a kind of beauty which does not require a model or adherence to a fixed code. Both Carvalho and McGushin exemplify the strengths of an approach to an aesthetics of existence which focuses on process rather than result. Carvalho, “For The Love Of Boys”; McGushin, Foucault’s Askesis.
^347	  Aristotle is the best example of this in Classical Greece, but the earlier Pythagoreans also had processes of ethical purification and preparation, and Socratic elenchus would be an example as well.
^348	  Cdf82, 37.
^349	  Ibid., 12-13: 
^350	  “Technologies of The Self,” 22.
^351	   Ibid., 49.
^352	  Reference to askesis (in its broadest sense) is central to the general displacement of ethical questions that sets up Use of Pleasures. “Here the emphasis is on forms of relation to self, on the methods and techniques by which he works them out; on the exercises by which he makes himself an object to be known, and on the practices that allow him to transform his own mode of being.” And he then says that these ’ethics oriented’ moralities which do not necessarily correspond to those involving ‘ascetic denial’)… in Greek and Greco-Roman antiquity were much more oriented toward practices of the self and the question of askesis than toward codifications of conducts and the strict definition of what is permitted and what is forbidden.” UP, 30.
^353	  “OGE,” 255. See also the introduction to Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, ed. Luther Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick Hutton (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 3, as well that seminar itself. 
^354	  I think that many of us experience a tension today between personal truths and scientific truths (including those of the social sciences). For sexuality, we point to brain scans, hormones such as oxytocin, and supposed truths about the sexes. And yet the attempt to apply those scientific truths to oneself is jarring: it seems we are comfortable applying scientific truths to the sexuality of others more so than to ourselves. 
^355	  It can be objected that this “do it yourself,” “anything is possible” attitude is quite American, and so not broadly representative of the present moment. However, in Foucault’s admittedly quite post-war European milieu (i.e., deeply influenced by psychoanalysis, and in his case, critical of it), he identified a similar basic issue: mere knowledge of one’s “true desire” is supposed to guarantee freedom and satisfaction. Reich and Marcuse are his targets here, and their attitude pointed to a social utopian ideal, while the American attitude points to a personal ideal. But the shared base assumption is that “the truth (of desire) will set you free.”
^356	  See HS1, “We ‘Other Victorians’” and “The Repressive Hypothesis”.
^357	  UP 41.
^358	  For Satan as the power of persuasion, see Book 3 of Augustine’s Free Choice of the Will. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, trans. Anna S. Benjamin and L. H. Hackstaff (Englewood Cliffs: Pearson, 1964). It is technically possible for anyone to resist Satan (he cannot ‘force’ a free will to sin), although only ‘One’ was able to do so.
^359	  The specifically Christian renunciation of self, and the specifically social or juridical privileging of others, are both linked and distinguished by Foucault. Cross-referencing with related ideas should clarify whether (and if so to what extent) the Church’s juridical dispositifs took over more narrowly ethical Christian concerns, and, whether “society” here is a power-relation or an ethical mode of subjection or a node of power-subjectivity/governmentality. See “Technologies of the Self.”
^360	  There are, of course, differences. While we hold on to the notion of an original self hidden behind historical degradations, the history at issue for us is personal, not postlapsarian-eschatological. Also, the sought after effect of our self-suspicion could not be more divergent. We attempt to locate the pleasure obscured by others which our singular desire craves in order to indulge it. The Christian is supposed to renounce those desires implanted by the other and avoid undue pleasures. 
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^362	  Ibid., 59.
^363	  Foucault, “Technologies of The Self,” 49. “From the eighteenth century to the present, the techniques of verbalization have been reinserted in a different context by the so-called human sciences in order to use them without renunciation of the self but to constitute, positively, a new self. To use the techniques without renouncing oneself constitutes a decisive break.”
^364	  I do not think that the need to go beyond Foucault is a weakness; indeed, it is a strength of Foucault’s style of philosophy that he leaves us to answer his questions. So using Spinoza, or anyone else, to go beyond Foucault is not a supplement which covers a weakness in Foucault. 
^365	  Foucault is, after all, not one to perform a redemptory genealogy as does Bernard Williams. (For a contrast of Williams and Foucault, see Koopman, Genealogy as Critique.) Foucault’s relation to history is also not a romanticist fusion with a mythical past, as in Hegelian history. He also is not seeking the missed opportunities of the past in the mode of Walter Benjamin. He also basically disagrees with Nietzsche on how to read the Ancient world. 
^366	  “OGE,” 259. No doubt there were also serious issues with Greek ethics: “pagan ethics was not at all liberal, tolerant, and so on” (ibid., 254). Further, “women were underdogs whose pleasure had no importance,” homosexual love was “a problem” which “they could not integrate” socially because “they could not even imagine reciprocity of pleasure between a boy and a man,” and the whole was “linked to a virile society, to dissymmetry ,exclusion of the other, an obsession with penetration, and a kind of threat of being dispossessed of your own energy, and so on. All that is quite disgusting!” Foucault says all these are bound tightly together, so we cannot subtract their aesthetics of existence and reject the rest. Ibid., 256-258. As important as these many serious problems are, regardless, we can never “find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people” (ibid., 256) even if they had been less restrictive, misogynistic, and illiberal.
^367	  Indeed, Foucault says that we “have not cut off the head of the king” in political theory despite the receding of sovereign power, but goes on to say that very few, yet some, juridical-sovereign forms of power still remain (HS1, 83)—a form of power which more or less ‘died’ in the first few pages of Discipline and Punish.
^368	  UP, “Forms of Problematization,” 14-24, highlights the major similarities while noting dissimilarities.
^369	  For instance, Cassian takes his practices from Hellenism, but shifts the purpose: CdF84, 299.
^370	  UP, 63-69.
^371	  CdF82, 9-14. Also,  the Cartesian moment does “not occur just like that” but can be traced back to the time of Augustine (ibid., 26).
^372	  Heidi Morrison Ravven, “What Spinoza Can Teach Us About Embodying and Naturalizing Ethics,” in Feminist Interpretations of Benedict Spinoza, ed. Moira Gatens (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2009), 127 and 136.
^373	  In addition, Moira Gatens summarizes a common contemporary appraisal of Spinoza as “strikingly modern” and “‘untimely,’ in the Nietzschean sense. Elizabeth Grosz, too, thinks Spinoza can (imperfectly) address questions of feminism and challenge reductionism in neuroscience. Moira Gatens, “Introduction: Through Spinoza’s ‘Looking Glass,’” in Feminist Interpretations of Benedict Spinoza, ed. Moira Gatens (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2009), 2. Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).
^374	  Hasana Sharp, Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2011).
^375	  Ibid., 1.
^376	  Examples of readers claiming special significance of Spinoza for critique today could easily be enumerated: I will just note here the titles of the important collection The New Spinoza and the even more recent Spinoza Now. Ted Stolze and Warren Montag, eds., The New Spinoza (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008); Dimitris Vardoulakis, ed., Spinoza Now (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 2011).
^377	  The rebirth is preceded by a rash of translations into French. Misrahi publishes (with co-editors Caillois and Francès) Spinoza’s Oeuvres Complètes in 1955. Appuhn’s translation of the Ethics is republished in 1953 and his translation of the collected works are republished in 1965. Koyré translated The Emendation of the Intellect in 1937, a second edition of which comes out in 1951.
^378	  Lorenzo Vinciguerra, “Spinoza in French Philosophy Today,” Philosophy Today 53, no. 4 (December 2009): 422; Simon Duffy, “French and Italian Spinozism,” in After Poststructuralism, ed. Rosi Braidotti and Alan D. Schrift, vol. 7, The History of Continental Philosophy (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2010), 149–68. Italians do quite a lot of work on Spinoza, much of it in a roughly similar vein, which is often referred to under the banner of “French Spinozism.” However, beyond Negri, their work is less known to Anglophones. For book-length treatments of this era in French philosophy, with due attention to Spinoza’s role, see Peden and Dosse. Knox Peden, Spinoza Contra Phenomenology: French Rationalism from Cavaillès to Deleuze (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014); François Dosse, History of Structuralism: The Rising Sign, 1945-1966 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
^379	  Daniel Defert transferred Foucault’s “presentation copies “ (books given and signed to Foucault by their authors) to Yale’s Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, and this book is part of the collection. It is the only text centered on Spinoza that I have found in the catalog of over 1400 presentation books donated. While presentation copies are not necessarily representative of Foucault’s interests, the great number of texts in the collection does not imply a great interest in Spinoza. On the other hand, Judith Revel says that Foucault was re-reading Spinoza in his last days. François Dosse, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 320. Gros also tells us that Foucault liked to keep quiet about his love for certain authors, such as Kierkegaard: Cdf82, 23, editor’s note 46.
^380	  Pierre-François Moreau also contributes to Spinoza research through organizing conferences and so forth. Lesser-known to Anglophones are other French Spinozists like Tosel and Zourabichvili who publish important works a few decades later, which have not yet been rendered into English. Zourabichvili has been recently translated, but only two shorter pieces on Deleuze. André Tosel, Spinoza Ou Le Crépuscule de La Servitude: Essai Sur Le Traité Théologico-Politique (Paris: Aubier, 1984); François Zourabichvili, Spinoza: Une Physique de la Pensée (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002); François Zourabichvili, Deleuze, a Philosophy of the Event: Together with the Vocabulary of Deleuze (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012).
^381	  Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 38. There are numerous other connections of Foucault and Spinoza that could be enumerated, such as Foucault’s friendships with Deleuze and Althusser, the lectures of Gueroult which he attended, and so on. However, in my research none of these give any clear indication of Foucault’s knowledge of or investment in Spinoza.
^382	  Knox Peden, “Descartes, Spinoza, and the Impasse of French Philosophy: Ferdinand Alquié Versus Martial Gueroult,” Modern Intellectual History 8, no. 02 (August 2011): 361–90.
^383	  The attention they give to the political works was rare in France until this generation.
^384	  See Pierre Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 2011) for a rejection of Hegel’s reading that still maintains Hegel, in a highly qualified and highly Spinozist manner. 
^385	  This cannot be said of Gueroult, for whom Spinoza was an arch-rationalist so systematic that one can only read him as a systematic rationalist. Martial Gueroult, Spinoza: I. Dieu (Éthique, 1) (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1971); Martial Gueroult, Spinoza II: L’âme (Éthique, 2) (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1974). See Peden, “Descartes, Spinoza, and the Impasse of French Philosophy”; Vinciguerra, “Spinoza in French Philosophy Today.”
^386	  Pierre-François Moreau, “Spinoza’s Reception and Influence,” in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. Don Garrett, trans. Roger Ariew (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 408–33.
^387	  The shared themes of French Spinozists prepare a reading of Spinoza so well suited for combination with Foucault that it is a wonder more has not been done in this direction prior. There seems to be a sense that it would be fruitful, however. Montag asserts that Foucault is nearly part of the French Spinozists, and Grosz places of Spinozism at the head of 1960s French antihumanism and names Foucault as a part of that movement (Grosz, Volatile Bodies, 12–13). Warren Montag, “Preface,” in The New Spinoza, ed. Ted Stolze and Warren Montag (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 2008), ix – xx. Sharp briefly discusses Foucault, but in order to frame her discussion of Althusserian ideology critique (Hasana Sharp, “The Force of Ideas in Spinoza,” Political Theory 35, no. 6 (December 2007): 732–55).
^388	  The relation to science (and to which sciences, and which scientists, and with which scientific instruments) is a topic which is of much more concern to historians of early modern thought, such as those in Mogens Laerke, Justin E. H. Smith, and Eric Schliesser, eds., Philosophy and Its History: Aims and Methods in the Study of Early Modern Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
^389	  Of many examples, just two: Pierre Macherey, “Spinoza’s Philosophical Actuality (Heidegger, Adorno, Foucault),” in In a Materialist Way: Selected Essays, ed. Warren Montag, trans. Ted Stolze (London: Verso, 1998), 125–35; Antonio Negri, The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). 
^390	  French Spinozists do often situate Spinoza within his historical context: as another example, see Étienne Balibar, Spinoza and Politics, trans. Peter Snowdon (London: Verso, 1998); and his “What Is ‘Man’ in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy? Subject, Individual, Citizen,” in The Individual in Political Theory and Practice, ed. Janet Coleman, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 213–41. In a different style of Spinoza scholarship, but with at least as much historical emphasis, see Nadler and Israel. Steven M. Nadler, Spinoza: A Life (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Jonathan I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
^391	  The “Classical” age (Descartes and Spinoza are cited) conceived of madness and reason as being separated by a choice: either one chose madness, or one chose reason. After choosing reason, one applied a method to produce truth. Both reason and madness followed upon an ethical choice one made, for which one was responsible (History of Madness, 139-140). For more discussions of the same issue on Descartes which will contextualize this brief reference to Spinoza, see ibid., 44-47; also see the appendix and an article which are added in 1972, a decade after the original publication. Both are sharp criticisms of Derrida by way of reading Descartes. Michel Foucault, “My Body, This Paper, This Fire,” in History of Madness, ed. Jean Khalfa, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa (London: Routledge, 2009), 550–74; Michel Foucault, “Reply to Derrida,” in History of Madness, ed. Jean Khalfa, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa (London: Routledge, 2009), 575–90.
^392	  Yovel and Israel make similar claims that Spinoza was part of or led to the “Dark Enlightenment” or the “Radical Enlightenment” respectively. There are elements of their work which would support my relation to Spinoza here, but, there are also many elements which would sit uncomfortably with this project. For instance, placing Spinoza within any version of the Enlightenment relies on a relatively continuous and progressive understanding of history, identifies him overmuch with humanist values and liberalism, and, instead of making him a radical alternative to what we are today, casts him as a founding father for what we are and aspire to be in the present moment. Yirmiyahu Yovel, The Marrano of Reason: The Adventures of Immanence, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Israel, Radical Enlightenment.
^393	  Interestingly, this tradition had a longer experience with Aristotle’s texts than did the Thomistic tradition, since they had works by Aristotle which were lost to others for extended periods. While Averroes’ Latin translations help spur the return of Aristotle to northern and western Europe, the tradition of which he is a part had the texts in Arabic longer. His readers maintain a general separation (intellectually and geographically) from the Thomistic tradition.
^394	  Julie R. Klein, “Aristotle and Descartes in Spinoza’s Approach to Matter and Body,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 26, no. 2 (2005): 157. Spinoza knew each figure intimately, as his Descartes’ “Principles of Philosophy” and discussion of the state of nature in the Theological-Political Treatise  show.
^395	  Ibid., 160. If the history of a thinker’s influences matters, we have a new set of sources we should familiarize ourselves with (anecdotally, Gersonides is not even recognized by my spell-check), much as Foucault productively reset our approach to histories. 
^396	  Ibid., 162.
^397	  Ibid., 159-160. Using Aristotle as a reference also shows that Spinoza contested Descartes (and Hobbes) on physics, the relation of bodies to minds, and the particular ways to refer to the mechanism of bodies (neither Hobbesian nor Cartesian).
^398	  See Julie R. Klein, “Spinoza’s Debt to Gersonides,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 24, no. 1 (2003): 19–43, for analysis of both his debts and his radicalizations.
^399	  Klein, “Aristotle and Descartes in Spinoza,” 162. See also Yovel, Adventures of Immanence, 138 and 147–148 for some examples of terms which Spinoza inverts. 
^400	  Klein, “Aristotle and Descartes in Spinoza,” 161. 
^401	  Spinoza, Ethics, 1Appx. My references to Spinoza use the format outlined in a list of abbreviations at the end of the dissertation.
^402	  Klein, “Spinoza’s Debt to Gersonides,” 158. Recall that in 1656 Spinoza was expelled from the Jewish community. While the exact beliefs that got him expelled are unknown (as he had not yet published anything), his ideas were clearly heretical to nearly every community of thought.
^403	  The Spinozistic individual also cannot be squared with a solid, clearly defined holder of individual rights, since it is not “self-identical or self-same in the sense of being a stable, discrete entity” (ibid., 169-170), which I will discuss in other terms below.
^404	  Spinoza is even a better critic of the present than are Judith Butler and Luce Irigaray, she argues. See Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, “Thinking Desire in Gersonides and Spinoza,” in Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy, ed. Hava Tirosh-Samuelson (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 51–77. It must be noted this historically-based critique draws on Benjamin and Adorno, not Foucault (ibid., 53, 57, 60, and 74-75). Dobbs-Weinstein even wants to have Butler’s references to Foucault “replaced or supplemented by Freud, Benjamin, and Adorno” (ibid., 60).
^405	  Ibid., 54. It is not just certain inflections or minor points which are repressed in Spinoza, but fundamental issues about knowledge in relation to the affects, the nature of the human being (ibid., 56-57), and the impossibility of a soul independent from a body (ibid., 61).
^406	  When freed from distortions, it becomes clear that “Spinoza focused his philosophical striving on a radical critique of religion and metaphysics, the dogmata which had the force of law in the seventeenth century” (ibid., 75).
^407	  Ibid., 54.
^408	  Ibid., 66-68. 
^409	  Ibid., 69.
^410	  That ‘some part’ of our minds is ‘eternal’ for Spinoza (see 5P23 and 5P39) is a far cry from an immortal soul on my reading, although this question has caused much debate. First, I would note that it is only some of our ideas that are themselves eternal, and nothing like all of our mind. Second, these ideas would not be particular to the individual, that is, it would not be ‘your’ soul that perdures. Third, these ideas are already eternal. If having these ideas sufficed for immortality or soul-without-body, then you would already be immortal or a soul without a body now, since already possess the ideas fully. 
^411	  Affect—the central explanation for individual behavior—becomes the sole explanation for human behavior when we move to the level of the group (Dobbs-Weinstein, “Thinking Desire in Gersonides and Spinoza,” 70-71). Reason, even though it is highly effective in certain instances, is never deployed in order to tame the body (nor is it effective at affecting a large group).
^412	  The importance of these three forms of Spinozist critique for work on Foucault, in terms of the axes of ethics, power, and knowledge respectively, cannot be developed here. Anyhow, my use of Spinoza is much more narrow than that.
^413	  CdF82, 3. Additionally, Foucault cites historians (Roscher and Defradas) to claim that this precept was a far cry from how we imagine it. It had to do with moderation in general and how to behave in front of the Delphic oracle. Ibid., 3-4.
^414	  Ibid., 461.
^415	  Ibid.,12-13.
^416	  Foucault said so little on Spinoza, that the latter’s status for Foucault is not perfectly clear. For instance, in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault lumps Spinoza with Descartes and Pascal as representatives of a move away from spirituality to knowledge (ibid., 309), but he said very nearly the opposite regarding Spinoza earlier (ibid., 27-28: see below). History of Madness also is ambivalent, placing Spinoza alongside Descartes (both begin thinking by deciding against unreason), yet his later related comments on the same passages somewhat rehabilitate Descartes (“My Body, This Paper, This Fire” and “Reply to Derrida”) by focusing on meditation as a practice of the self. 
^417	  CdF82, 27. He says his phrase ‘Cartesian moment’ must be placed “within a lot of inverted commas,” that “this is again a very schematic survey” which necessarily presents history “in a rather systematic, condensed way, whereas in actual fact it is a series of fairly complex processes spread out over time, over centuries and centuries (ibid., 14, 15, and 486).”
^418	  Ibid., 27.
^419	  Ibid., xxv. Foucault repeated the point during the next year’s lectures: “we might say that with Spinoza we have, as it were, the last great figure for whom philosophical practice was inspired by the fundamental and essential project of leading a philosophical life,” which in this context is roughly care of the self over knowledge of the self. Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 236.
^420	  In Foucault, The Politics of Truth, 95, a book which collects multiple Foucault pieces, including three on Kant. “What is Revolution?” was originally the first lecture of the 1983 Government of Self and Others, which was published before any full lecture as “Qu’est-ce que Les Lumières?,” it has also been published as “The Art of Telling the Truth” in Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (London: Routledge, 1990).
^421	  “NGH,” 83, 85, and 88. Beyond the consensus that “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” is a programmatic statement by Foucault, there is other interpretative proof that Foucault identifies himself with Nietzsche here. Originally, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” was given at a conference held in the memory of Jean Hyppolite, the famous lecturer on Hegel. Yet Foucault never mentioned Hegel or Hyppolite. This would not have been out of disrespect—Foucault admired Hyppolite very much, and wrote the notice introducing the collection (Michel Foucault, ed., Hommage À Jean Hyppolite [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971], unnumbered, two pages prior to page 1). I imagine Foucault recognized that in the French academic context, talking about one’s own work at the equivalent of a festschrift is legitimate. Hadot, for instance, talked about his disagreements with Foucault most forcefully when at the conference convened less than 4 years after the death of Foucault (and Hadot named multiple works of his own, including one’s newest edition, in the opening line). See Pierre Hadot, “Reflections on the Notion of ‘the Cultivation of the Self,’” in Michel Foucault, Philosopher, ed. Timothy J. Armstrong (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 225–32. (J-A Miller also declared Foucault a Freudian, more or less, as a way of discussing his own work at the same conference.) Additionally, Foucault in the early 1970s was not in the habit of naming himself in the figures he discussed, but “What is Revolution?” is from 1983 while “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” is from 1971.
^422	  Spinoza, Ethics, 4P19.
^423	  Étienne Balibar, “A Note on ‘Consciousness/Conscience’ in the Ethics,” Studia Spinozana: An International and Interdisciplinary Series, no. 8 (1992): 37–54; Yitzhak Y. Melamed, “Spinoza’s Anti-Humanism,” in The Rationalists: Between Tradition and Innovation, ed. Carlos Fraenkel, Dario Perinetti, and Justin E. H. Smith (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 147–66. 
^424	  2Def3 does state that by “idea I understand a concept of the mind that the mind forms because it is a thinking thing,” but this is “the mind,” not a human, and all things have ‘minds’ in some sense (see below). Part of the context here is that there is no cross-attribute causation (as was just expressed in Book 1, and of continuing relevance in Book 2). That is to say, Spinoza here need not be read as interested defining the human mind itself as a mode of thinking substance, but can be read rather as denying that bodies cause us to think. If Spinoza allowed that bodies could lead to thought, then he would have to allow that minds can cause bodies to move, which he rejects. 
^425	  In arguing that Substance is the only things which exists necessarily, Spinoza notes that its essence and existence are one and the same thing (1P7, 8, 10, and 11).
^426	  Recall that things are known and defined through their cause: 1Ax4.
^427	  1P24: essence causes neither duration in time nor existence.
^428	  Per 1P16Cor1.
^429	  See Gueroult, Spinoza I, 21 for nominalism of definitions. 
^430	  These can be useful—as is the “model of human nature” (4Pref)—but they are not usually helpful and never speak to what is most true about the thing under discussion.
^431	  This unnumbered definition of an individual body comes in the middle of the so-called “physical digression” after 2P13. There are 7 prior numbered definitions at the start of Book 2.
^432	  For instance, we all share motion and rest, which tells us almost nothing about the difference between you and I: 2Ax1’, 2Ax2’, 2Lem1, and 2Lem2.
^433	  He also says that “the whole of nature is one individual (2Lem7Sch).” Also see Ep. 32 for the important “worm in the blood” metaphor, which elaborates on the ways in which individuals can be ‘nested’ within other individuals.
^434	  “Nothing prevents some animals from exhibiting greater mental powers than some humans,” notes Sharp in Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization, 27.
^435	  Up to this point in Book 2, when Spinoza gives a definition, he almost always says, “I understand X to be Y” or “X must be Y.” For the definition of an individual, however, he says “we shall say [dicemus] that those bodies are united,” using the future dicemus: when this happens, then (at that time) we will do (will call it) thus. (In Book 4, he introduces “I shall call…” notably when he is shifting the accepted meaning of good and evil, for instance.)
^436	  “NGH,” 87.
^437	  While a fundamental relation to the world is also to be found in Heidegger, in Spinoza we find a wholly different conception of what this relation is, of what “the world” is taken to consist of, and of what relation to the self is involved in the fundamental world-relation. Indeed, insofar as a Spinozist subjectivity counters the desiring subjectivity of the contemporary age (as I argue below), it will also largely run counter to Heidegger. While Foucault barely hints at who might be philosophical representatives of desiring subjectivity, Heideggerians, Freudians, and Marxists often posit a real self, obscured by ideology, distorted by alienation, with a goal of overcoming all this to become close to an original and free self.
^438	  While in the initial formulation (your essence is your ratio), there is a certain fixed manner of motion, which can preserve and retain its form or nature (2Lem4-7), which seems to have locked in a stable disposition, Spinoza develops other formulations of essence or nature which highlight rather the constant changes which we undergo.
^439	  Spinoza does not make use of habit to stabilize or make “substantial” our disposition—he only mentions it when separating pity from compassion (3DefAffXVIIIExp), and again references habit in Descartes (5Pref)—though he certainly notes that there are affects which cling to us, that we have memory and what we would call today “muscle memory” (the soft parts which retain traces of repeated effects: 2Ax3’’, 2PostV, and 3Post2)
^440	  Étienne Balibar, “Spinoza: From Individuality to Transindividuality,” in Mededelingen Vanwege Het  Spinozahuis, vol. 71 (Delft: Eburon, 1997), 3–36; Sharp, “The Force of Ideas in Spinoza.”
^441	  See 3P13Sch, love and hate, a desire (3P11Sch), and desire is desire to do X. See 3P19-20.
^442	  Melancholia is the sole affect which does not cause any action, since it is defined as whole-body total diminution of responsiveness: 4P42. In a sense this means that it is the affect which prevents one’s being affected; precisely since one is no longer able to be affected, one cannot act. Wonder also does not cause any action, but strictly, Spinoza denies that it is an affect (it is imagining but not affect): 3DefAffIVExp.
^443	  Foucault, “What Our Present Is,” 410. 
^444	  Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 220.
^445	  Michel Foucault, “What Is Critique?,” in The Politics of Truth, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, trans. Lysa Hochroth and Catherine Porter (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007), 44–45.
^446	  2P17 shows that ideas remain present even when object is not, and with 4P6-9, that ideas are only removed when they are forced out by a contrary idea (this is equally true of propositions and affects).
^447	  UP, 26.
^448	  2P7 is one of the many places in which Spinoza overturns the privilege of mind over body. 3Pref is another, where Spinoza criticizes Descartes for having “believed that the mind has absolute power over its actions,” a power which Spinoza’s whole text denies (whether that power would be considered as mind over body, or as will over anything else).
^449	  While Spinoza in Book 3 focuses on explaining affects through the attribute of thought, affect ought to be understood as existing in both attributes equally with a few exceptions: purely bodily laughing and shivering (3P59Sch); those “chiefly” of the body like pain (3DefAffIIIExp); the love of God can be read as purely mental.
^450	  Ethics does not require renunciation of any part of us (neither the body, nor the irrational, nor the inauthentic), and it certainly does not require renouncing the self in general in favor of others (all affects, indeed all ideas, have necessary reference to the self: 4P22).
^451	  James is very clear on the motive power that adequate ideas have upon us, clarifying that while adequate ideas are the only ways in which we are active, activity is not the absence of affect. Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2003). In short, we love adequate ideas since they cause a great power in us, and so we have an affect toward them that desires their preservation. Thus, adequate ideas inspire a very intense affect, rather than an absence of affect. See 3P53-55, 58-59, and the love of God in Book 5.
^452	  Since even adequate ideas relate to desire, we may briefly note that there is good reason for Foucault to have discussed Spinoza when he was discussing the history of the will to knowledge (Foucault, Lectures on the Will to Know, 9 December and 16 December). These lectures are very enigmatic, due in part to difficulties with the manuscript (incomplete) and audio recordings (nearly non-existent in 1970).
^453	  3P59.
^454	  Throughout, I use activity and joy interchangeably. Technically, there is a difference between joy and activity. We can have joy in passivity (although the passivity would never be attributable to the joy as such, joy from increased power can be caused by something which still does not make us fully active). Activity properly occurs only in understanding an adequate idea. We still experience joy at this activity (3P59). But while all joy is increase in power, active affect would be increase in/through/of an adequate idea. Perhaps we can say, passive joy could still be increased, while active affect of joy cannot be increased because it is a ‘perfect’ or fully active cause.
^455	  Other than second- and third-order knowing, the ‘pleasure’ that comes from knowing something adequately (3Pref), or the love of God: these are entirely active and affect us with great joy. 
^456	  We must understand these to be compound or complex affects, and cannot say that these are serial but simple; the contrast has to come from the affects being held at one and the same time and compared, and this contrast only causes joy insofar as we simultaneously have an affect toward ourselves and not just the difference between two images of the future.
^457	  Sexual jealousy is dizzying in its complexity: 3P35Sch and 3P36-38: the recent past image of joy contrasted with absence of that or sadness; a past love which you now hate, you hate more because of the contrast between the joy the affected you with and your current sadness; the image of someone else’s shameful parts, which cause you no joy, attached to an image of your love, which reduces further the love/joy you still feel when thinking of them; if you hated the other person, you know also hate your ex-love more, and if you liked the other person, you know hate them even more than you would otherwise, because you hate them as the cause of the removal of the joy they used to cause you. The affects involved would likely be even more complex if we had a real case with which to deal.
^458	  The social, public, or environmental, system of affects is detailed at 3P15-16, 21-27, 29-35, 37-46, 49, 51, and 57, and at 4P32-40, 46, 48-54, 54Sch, 57-58, and 70-73. Specifically, 3P22 is the first central use of the affects of someone else; 3P27sch is the definition of the term “imitation of affects”; 3P31sch restates imitation. 3P12, 15, and 16 set up 3P22; 3P22-26 culminate in 3P27. 3P31-44 and 49 are how imitation leads to exponentially intense affects, while 3P6, 9, 12-13, 15, 39Sch, 50, 51, 57 and 4P32-35 highlight how individuals usually are very different from one another, which sets the stage for politics at 4P37Sch1and Sch2.
^459	  Spinoza also defines appetite (as body-mind striving 3P9) synonymously with conatus or essence or desire, desiring only being consciousness of appetite.
^460	  Foucault very likely would not agree with Spinoza on this point (which Spinoza extends to say that suicide is never really self-caused destruction).
^461	  See also 4Def8, 4P18-25, 4P29-31. The genesis of nations in the Ethics at 4P32-37 should be read in light of these passages on virtue and with the Theological-Political Treatise.
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^463	  TTP 4. See also Étienne Balibar, “Jus-Pactum-Lex: On the Constitution of the Subject in the Theologico-Political Treatise,” in The New Spinoza, ed. Ted Stolze and Warren Montag (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 2008), especially 186–187.
^464	  Benedict Spinoza, The Letters, ed. Steven Barbone, Lee Rice, and Jacob Adler, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1995).
^465	  Deleuze covers this territory in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), “On the Difference between the Ethics and a Morality.” Spinoza redefines “bad” as unhealthy (as sadness) and shows each of us how to figure out what particular “allergies” to avoid. Certainly, Deleuze’s text is very Nietzschean. But I think it is helpful explanation of how far Spinoza remains from the form of much moral instruction compulsion (what Foucault calls mode of subjection) and certainly, Nietzsche-Spinoza connections will tend to draw Spinoza toward the Nietzschean Foucault.
^466	  Book 1 gives us ethically important knowledge about Substance’s determinism, and the ontological equality of extension and thinking. Book 2 gives us ethically required knowledge about how human bodies interact with the other things, and reinforces that we too are equally mind and body, and determined. Book 3 has laid out the ethical substance of affect, with emphasis on those sad affects which we want to modify; Book 4 and Book 5 then show us how to counter sad affects in practice.
^467	  See “My Body, This Paper, This Fire”: Foucault shows how Derrida had to fabricate an interlocutor for Descartes’ to make the Meditations about philosophy’s exclusion of the common person. Foucault instead emphasized its meditative functions, as a series of tests, methods for ethical preparation for philosophical thinking, care which must precede knowledge.
^468	  The more geometrico in which Spinoza wrote the Ethics has been much commented upon; of relevance for us is that the Ethics appears to be ordered in such a way as to realistically prepare one to execute these practices. This would require as well that we focus on counter-affects (not third-order knowing, for instance) until we are prepared enough for more difficult ethical tasks.
^469	  2P17 sets this up: that so long as the body has been affected by a thing, the trace effects which it leaves in our body will be fully maintained, until something effaces that trace.
^470	  Spinoza’s rationalism leads him to equate ethical wrong with error, yet, his limited or skeptical rationalism, his “realism” (in the sense of “political realism”), leads to him to deny that reason has much power over the affects.
^471	  Spinoza more often speaks of adequate versus inadequate (instead of true versus false), and of inadequate ideas as confused and mutilated. Error is a literally confused (multiple ideas fused together, their differences indistinctly mixed) or literally mutilated (parts missing from an idea, which, if whole, would be adequate). A mutilated idea is incompletely true; confused ideas do not have ‘falseness’ in them as an inherent real quality, but only have their parts related out of order. A confused idea of a unicorn is not true, but the parts (horse and horn) we fuse together are not false, either. Since false ideas are either just part of a true idea, or are true ideas badly combined, other true ideas have little power to dispel what is true and real in the idea.
^472	  They function along the same lines as sensation, which Spinoza uses to illustrate the stubbornness of ideas (4P1Sch). Knowing that the sun is nearly one hundred million miles away cannot make you sense  it any differently: Spinoza estimates the imagined (that is, sensed) distance at about two hundred feet, a sensation which is never dispelled by true knowledge of the real distance. I would add similarly that knowing that the earth rotates around the sun cannot change the fact that our body does not sense our hurtling in orbit, but does sense the sun’s relative motion to our body: hence, we will always imagine or ‘feel’ that the sun rotates around the earth.
^473	  Note Spinoza’s exact language: “‘an affect which is a passion which is clearly and distinctly known, ceases to be a passion (5P3)”—but it does not cease to be an affect. Love of god is perhaps the most dramatic example: it is properly called love in humans, because it is an affect (indeed, it is most powerfully affective); but God’s love of himself is not properly called love because Substance is not affected (5P17). 5P4sch also states that we still desire after we know something clearly and distinctly.
^474	  See Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present (London: Routledge, 1999).
^475	  No doubt this explains the practical effects of Foucault’s genealogy, since he introduces discontinuity into our existing idea-chains.
^476	  In The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault discusses logos becoming bios.
^477	  Note that this is not an increase in knowledge by applying a theory to things: it instead slowly reforms subjectivity such that your future affects will occur differently, without  you having learned anything new.
^478	  Literally, causing veneration as a kind of wonder: an affect caused by a singular notion, which it is hard to quickly forget, because it makes you consider no other idea, since no other idea resembles it (3P52 and 3DefAffIV). Easy to recall, meaning often present to mind, meaning easy to connect to other singular images, meaning: highly effective.
^479	  These are distinct techniques, by the way: the first is tying difficult Spinozistic truths to ideas which you already firmly believe; the other is taking a singular, vivid example to firmly fix a certain idea in your memory. One compels belief by comparison, the other makes memory easier by singularity. For more on how ideas causally affect one another (an area which deserves more attention), see Sharp, “The Force of Ideas in Spinoza.”
^480	  Without supplying instances every time of how to practice them, Spinoza litters Book 5 with useful principles. Since things cause affects, positive affects with more thing-triggers will have greater results. Set up your environment so objects around you are linked to joyful affects, think as often as possible about all the many causes of your joys, other people having a similar joyful affect, etc.; any new connection will increase the number ways to arouse the joyful affect.
^481	  Foucault understood, as did Spinoza, that practices of the self are more than mere memorization, as Foucault puts it, and make ideas ready to hand; see Foucault, CdF82, e.g., 325–326. 
^482	  Foucault goes into detail about how the order of practices of the self resembles, but is distinct from, the logical order of argument, in “My Body, This Paper, This Fire,” the strongly worded disagreement with Derrida over the functioning of Descartes’ Meditations. Practices have an order, because as with a technical manual for building, each step changes the object on which you are working, changing what is required and what is possible for the object. Here, you are the object, you are the thing you are building, which is a different process than coming to know something.
^483	  Spinoza elsewhere uses the example of Buridan’s ass, which hypothetically equally desires water and food which are equidistant to it. While some use this to attempt to prove the free will—they say the ass would determine itself to one or the other, and so too would a person—Spinoza in his consistency is as stubborn as an ass. He says, per hypothesis, such an ass or person would die, since being determined equally by conflicting desires means equal—and opposite—forces. Desire would cancel desire, and whether ass or person, nothing so determined would ever move (2P49Sch, II/133 and II/135).
^484	  Spinoza finishes by saying that if you observe these rules, and practice them, you will soon be better able to direct your actions according to reason, that is, according to your self-benefit (5P10Sch, II/289).
^485	  Defined at 4P46 and 3P59Sch.
^486	  “Wrongs of others” are sadness linked to another as a cause; we always seek to remove causes of sadness, which is called hate; anger is desire to repay harm with harm). However, destroying an object which is like you, or which you otherwise have any love toward, causes its own sadness. Additionally, just as you strove to return pain for pain, if you cause pain to this other, now you have provoked their anger.
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^488	  He does give another detailed example in 5P10Sch, of weaning oneself off of bad affects. If one is too ambitious, one needs to shift that affect toward its “correct use,” which is not esteem for its own sake, but doing good to others which affects them and oneself with love for oneself. The technique works as follows: think of striving for some socially recognized good (pick one that is plausible or else your desire for it will be checked because you are also imagining causes of its non-realization), then note that with esteem you will still get the praise you desire, but additionally will have increased your own power more (esteem is more active than ambition) and have secured the power of those around you more (they are more effectively aided by doing them real good, instead of the seeming goods which win ambition), those whose power which (since, all things being equal, people repay kindness with kindness) might in the future protect or aid you in time of need, which you can then repay with genuine gratitude, which is a virtue of only the powerful among the powerful (5P70 and 5P71).
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^490	  See 1Appx. 
^491	  1Ax4. Also, as mentioned above, the conatus is identified with everything an individual does, including its force of existing as such. 
^492	  For a thing to be purely passive would mean that it has no power of existing; such objects do not exist because they have no power to exist. There is some power, though not necessarily active power, in every real thing. Conversely, the only thing that is purely active is self-caused Substance, which cannot be acted on because there is nothing other than itself by which it could be acted upon.
^493	  5P36Sch defines love of god, and immediately links it to self-esteem, which is joy at one’s own power of acting (esteem is defined at 3DefAffXXV and XXX). 5P10Sch (II/289) identifies freedom with caused virtues.
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^504	  “Technologies of the Self” makes this connection most clearly, because it compresses it into one lecture rather than scattering it throughout twelve lectures (as in Hermeneutics) or two books (The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self). My third chapter discusses Christian hermeneutics of the flesh under askesis and ethical substance. On the Government of the Living elaborates the theme as well: this was the research for the unpublished fourth volume of the History of Sexuality, which was to be called Les Aveux de la Chair: confessions of the flesh.
^505	  Since we have a hard time seeing our own age (note that Foucault never tried to directly analyze his own episteme, for instance), and Foucault never did more than gesture toward contemporary subjectivity, and there is no guarantee that Foucault was right about everything, I wonder here. Did he focus too much on his French and university-cosmopolitan context, where the “talk method” of psychoanalysis was unavoidable? What of the (perhaps symmetrically overly American) focus on “experiences” like travel, or going away from home for college? What about the ways that love is said to transform our selves, which do not seem to me to be particularly talk-based, but centered (these days) upon cohabitating. I would insist that we do think that lovers ‘show us who we really are’ but I do not have any strong inclinations to say that this happens primarily through us speaking to lovers, and them speaking our truth back. All are issues that deserve more detailed study.
^506	  Nikolas Rose, thankfully, is doing such research. Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self, 2nd ed. (London: Free Association Books, 1990); Nikolas Rose, Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
^507	  Foucault details that askeses can be mental (properly called meletai in Hellenistic ethics), or those more directly experienced (Cdf82, 425). There is no priority stated, simply their difference.
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^511	  Surely, Spinoza says, there are very real affects that are unique combinations of the basic affects, but knowledge of these “would be more curious than useful,” so he sticks to the most typical, least unique affects (3P59sch). All affects are impersonal, anyhow (being caused externally for the most part, causing behavior deterministically, and so on).
^512	  HS1, 77-80. Note Leuret, blasting the madman with cold water to force him to admit that he is mad by way of a ‘cure’ (see Foucault, “Sexuality and Solitude,” 175-176). The point of the Leuret incident is not that ‘they’ usually extract truth against our will. It is rather that truth and subject are usually intertwined in our history, in different ways (Foucault’s central issue is not linked by him to power here). It would be wrong to say that Augustine’s search for the truth of his self (mentioned later in the essay) was caused by medicine 1400 years later, or that his church ‘forced’ him to extract it for their own use: Foucault shows no such thing (despite the rhetorical effect of the example of Leuret). 
^513	  See Rose, Governing the Soul, 264, for an example. His work is full of examples of such an imbrication, but also crucial is his subtle understanding of how power and subjectivity interact. Rose refuses to say that power alone ‘makes’ us speak, instead acknowledging that our subjectivity as currently constituted produces a desire to speak. Partly this can be attributed to the professionals, but partly it must be attributed to you and I as ethical subjects.
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^515	  Foucault notes that the physician Galen recommends one spend enough time with a doctor to learn how to direct one’s own ethical regimen: CS, 99-101.
^516	  While others are ‘most useful’ to us in Spinoza (4P35sch and 4P37sch1-2; broadly, see 4P24-40), this is not because they decode us—they are in fact ‘similar’ to us; they do not teach us about self, but give us more helpful or useful ideas.
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^530	  Knowledge of the self occurs in Platonism and Stoicism (CdF82, 456-460). Since Stoicism is the pinnacle of care of the self, knowing the self and caring for the self are clearly not mutually exclusive. Foucault refers to the care of the self of Christian (specifically Alexandrian) asceticism and care (ibid., 492 and January 6, first hour). In “Technologies of the Self,” Christian ethics are again analyzed in terms of care—a care of the self which paradoxically renounces the self, but is a form of care nonetheless.
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